Greenpeace Says Whales in South Korean Waters on Brink of Distinction
POHANG, South Korea, March 30 (Yonhap) -- About 20 activists from environmental group Greenpeace urged on Wednesday the South Korean government to step up its efforts to protect whales in the East Sea, saying they are on the verge of distinction.
"Whales in South Korean sea waters face the world's worst crisis of distinction," they said in a press conference in a port in Pohang, 374 kilometers southeast of Seoul.
31 March 2005
Congratulations are in order to the distinguished Korean whales.
A little case of mistaken wording…
25 March 2005
IAEA to Pyongyang: "Drop Your Pants"
North Korean ambassador to Thailand O Song Chol, in an interview with Thailand’s The Nation published March 25, said North Korea was “ready to talk peace” and “ready for war with the Americans.”
Such talk is nothing new – North Korea has for some time said it is prepared to fight the United States and fend off any invasion, but underlying the threats remains the deeper goal of signing a non-aggression pack with the United States, or better yet diplomatic ties. Note that as O was talking war in Thailand, Prime Minister Pak Pong Ju was touring Shanghai to figure out how to repeat the Chinese economic miracle in North Korea.
But O’s interview had one of the best gems of North Korean commentary. In discussing Pyongyang’s 2002 ejection of IAEA representatives in the early stages of the current nuclear crisis, O said “It was agreed that they [the inspectors] would see the testing room, but when they arrived, they demanded to see the Army’s underground facility,” adding, “It was as if they wanted us to take our pants off for them.”
Such talk is nothing new – North Korea has for some time said it is prepared to fight the United States and fend off any invasion, but underlying the threats remains the deeper goal of signing a non-aggression pack with the United States, or better yet diplomatic ties. Note that as O was talking war in Thailand, Prime Minister Pak Pong Ju was touring Shanghai to figure out how to repeat the Chinese economic miracle in North Korea.
But O’s interview had one of the best gems of North Korean commentary. In discussing Pyongyang’s 2002 ejection of IAEA representatives in the early stages of the current nuclear crisis, O said “It was agreed that they [the inspectors] would see the testing room, but when they arrived, they demanded to see the Army’s underground facility,” adding, “It was as if they wanted us to take our pants off for them.”
24 March 2005
Deadline or Not?
U.S. President George W. Bush backed off reports of a June deadline for North Korea to re-enter the six party talks while answering questions after the North America Summit in Texas March 23. The initial idea of a June deadline was raised during Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice's visit to East Asia.
Much more interesting than a June deadline (or not) is the current spat in South Korea over whether the Bush administration intentionally misled Seoul about the issue of potential North Korean sales of nuclear material to Libya.
The perception of deception only reinforces among many in Korea that the United States only considers its own interests while dealing with the Korean Peninsula. Of course this is true, and well it should be, as any country is primarily interested in their own... well... interests. Of course, since those interests involve the lives and livelihoods of the Koreans, it is understandable that they are upset as well.
Perceptions matter.
Misperceptions matter as well.
Much more interesting than a June deadline (or not) is the current spat in South Korea over whether the Bush administration intentionally misled Seoul about the issue of potential North Korean sales of nuclear material to Libya.
The perception of deception only reinforces among many in Korea that the United States only considers its own interests while dealing with the Korean Peninsula. Of course this is true, and well it should be, as any country is primarily interested in their own... well... interests. Of course, since those interests involve the lives and livelihoods of the Koreans, it is understandable that they are upset as well.
Perceptions matter.
Misperceptions matter as well.
18 March 2005
Tokdo Protestor
A demonstrator protesting Japan's claims on Tokdo (Photo taken in Kwangju, May 2004)
16 March 2005
독도는 우리땅
Well, the Shimane Prefecture went ahead and approved February 22 as Takeshima Day, thoroughly perturbing the Koreans. Takeshima, in the Sea of Japan, is, of course, Tokdo, in the East Sea. The vote passed 33 to 2 with 2 abstentions, and drew an immediate reaction from South Korean Foreign Minister Ban Ki Moon.
So anyway, to reminisce, I dug up a link to the 1996 DJ DOC version of독도는 우리땅, from the nationalistic EP 대한민국만세. It is only half the song, but the beat beats the original, found at idokdo.or.kr, which has other information and pictures here.
There is also the Tokdo Homepage, cybertokdo, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) take on Dokdo.
To be fair, here is the Shimane Prefecture take on Takeshima.
And now, back to being partisan, you can sing along in the noraebang with the words to Tokdo is Our Land!
독도는 우리땅 (노래 정광태)
박인호 작사.작곡 김창환 편곡
울릉도 동남쪽 뱃길따라 이백리 외로운 섬하나 새들의 고향
그누가 아무리 자기네 땅이라고 우겨도 독도는 우리땅
경상북도 울릉군 울릉읍 독도리 동경백삼십이 북위 삼심칠
평균기온 십이도 강수량은 천삼백 독도는 우리땅
오징어 꼴뚜기 대구 명태 거북이 연어알 물새알 해녀 대합실
십칠만 평방미터 우물하나 분화구 독도는 우리땅
지증왕 십삼년 섬나라 우산국 세종실록지리지 오십쪽 셋째줄
하와이는 미국땅대마도는 몰라도 독도는 우리땅
노일전쟁 직후에 임자없는 섬이라고
억지로 우기면 정말 곤란해 신라장군
이사부 지하에서 웃는다 독도는 우리땅
So anyway, to reminisce, I dug up a link to the 1996 DJ DOC version of독도는 우리땅, from the nationalistic EP 대한민국만세. It is only half the song, but the beat beats the original, found at idokdo.or.kr, which has other information and pictures here.
There is also the Tokdo Homepage, cybertokdo, and the Ministry of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries (MOMAF) take on Dokdo.
To be fair, here is the Shimane Prefecture take on Takeshima.
And now, back to being partisan, you can sing along in the noraebang with the words to Tokdo is Our Land!
독도는 우리땅 (노래 정광태)
박인호 작사.작곡 김창환 편곡
울릉도 동남쪽 뱃길따라 이백리 외로운 섬하나 새들의 고향
그누가 아무리 자기네 땅이라고 우겨도 독도는 우리땅
경상북도 울릉군 울릉읍 독도리 동경백삼십이 북위 삼심칠
평균기온 십이도 강수량은 천삼백 독도는 우리땅
오징어 꼴뚜기 대구 명태 거북이 연어알 물새알 해녀 대합실
십칠만 평방미터 우물하나 분화구 독도는 우리땅
지증왕 십삼년 섬나라 우산국 세종실록지리지 오십쪽 셋째줄
하와이는 미국땅대마도는 몰라도 독도는 우리땅
노일전쟁 직후에 임자없는 섬이라고
억지로 우기면 정말 곤란해 신라장군
이사부 지하에서 웃는다 독도는 우리땅
04 March 2005
Desperation, Delays and Demagogues
North Korea has delayed the planned meeting if the Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA), according to the KCNA.
The decision comes as Pyongyang piles on the threatening comments, finally (almost) formally declaring itself a nuclear power, holding out on six-nation talks and calling an end to its already once renewed self proclaimed missile moratorium.
Why, one may ask, is the North postponing its regular meeting of the “praise and adulate Kim Jong Il” Assembly? My guess – regime change.
Regime change is something North Korea fears (if externally instigated) and is desperately seeking to prepare for (internally directed). One of the main reasons for the sudden flurry of North Korean threats and typical “evil” behavior is that the “outpost of tyranny” is desperate to force a resolution to its own fabricated nuclear crisis. Plain and simple, Pyongyang miscalculated with the 2003 nuclear crisis, and thought that there was little fundamental difference between the pre-911 Whitehouse and the post-911 Whitehouse. Oops.
Pyongyang wants to implement carefully controlled economic reforms, but fears doing so will open a path for Washington to undermine the North Korean regime – thus the push for a non-aggression treaty or even better a peace accord and formal diplomatic relations. But Kim Jong Il is also looking to begin laying the groundwork for his own successor – one of his sons – to avoid any potential confusion should Kim find himself suffering from a myocardial infarction while preparing his dacha for a visit from the South Korean president or packing his bags for the train ride to Seoul.
The first generation leaders are the few remaining contemporaries of Kim Il Sung. They are the true revolutionaries, the guerilla fighters who paid for their positions with frostbite and bullet wounds. They are mostly dead, but there are a few left, and they cant stand to see the degradation of North Korea, but cant really fathom the benefits of economic openings or market reforms. They wont be around much longer.
The second generation leadership – Kim Jong Il and his associates – are children of the revolution. Few have fought in wars, but most knew at least some privations as children. Their claim to power is the role their fathers played in the guerilla war against Japanese occupation. They are educated and trained in the Soviet bloc countries, have some knowledge of the need for economic changes, but fear for their grip on power.
The third generation leadership in South Korea – the sons of Kim Jong Il and his contemporaries – are spoiled money loving power craving elite brats, trained in western Europe and always enjoying near royal treatment. They are the true unreliable class in North Korea, but as children of the ruling elite, they remain protected. They will sell out the country when they take power.
In transferring power to the third generation, Kim wants plenty of time to train up his successor in the finer points of demagoguery, but he needs time. He also needs a stable atmosphere. Kim Jong Il came into power after the bulk of the resolution of the first nuclear crisis, and used that three-plus years to solidify his control over the country. With a batch of selfish third generation leaders and a remnant of second generation leaders all jockeying for power and position, Kim will have a very difficult time ensuring his successor can actually take on the mantle of the Kim dynasty with any hope of success.
And thus we get back to the current issue – delay the SPA, don’t have a parliamentary meeting until the clear path for a successor is solidified. The path can’t be solidified until Kim Jong Il is certain in his regime’s security, either through a pact with the United States or a clear demonstration of North Korea’s military might. Which it will be is up to Washington, but Pyongyang has made it clear that time is running out, it can’t delay forever. And it has put this autumn as the final cutoff point.
Pyongyang, March 4 (KCNA) -- The Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly of the DPRK Thursday announced a decision on postponing the third session of the 11th SPA. According to it, the Presidium of the DPRK SPA will postpone the session originally slated for March 9, Juche 94 (2005), at the requests made by deputies to the SPA in all domains of the socialist construction.
The date of the session will be set and announced publicly.
The decision comes as Pyongyang piles on the threatening comments, finally (almost) formally declaring itself a nuclear power, holding out on six-nation talks and calling an end to its already once renewed self proclaimed missile moratorium.
Why, one may ask, is the North postponing its regular meeting of the “praise and adulate Kim Jong Il” Assembly? My guess – regime change.
Regime change is something North Korea fears (if externally instigated) and is desperately seeking to prepare for (internally directed). One of the main reasons for the sudden flurry of North Korean threats and typical “evil” behavior is that the “outpost of tyranny” is desperate to force a resolution to its own fabricated nuclear crisis. Plain and simple, Pyongyang miscalculated with the 2003 nuclear crisis, and thought that there was little fundamental difference between the pre-911 Whitehouse and the post-911 Whitehouse. Oops.
Pyongyang wants to implement carefully controlled economic reforms, but fears doing so will open a path for Washington to undermine the North Korean regime – thus the push for a non-aggression treaty or even better a peace accord and formal diplomatic relations. But Kim Jong Il is also looking to begin laying the groundwork for his own successor – one of his sons – to avoid any potential confusion should Kim find himself suffering from a myocardial infarction while preparing his dacha for a visit from the South Korean president or packing his bags for the train ride to Seoul.
The first generation leaders are the few remaining contemporaries of Kim Il Sung. They are the true revolutionaries, the guerilla fighters who paid for their positions with frostbite and bullet wounds. They are mostly dead, but there are a few left, and they cant stand to see the degradation of North Korea, but cant really fathom the benefits of economic openings or market reforms. They wont be around much longer.
The second generation leadership – Kim Jong Il and his associates – are children of the revolution. Few have fought in wars, but most knew at least some privations as children. Their claim to power is the role their fathers played in the guerilla war against Japanese occupation. They are educated and trained in the Soviet bloc countries, have some knowledge of the need for economic changes, but fear for their grip on power.
The third generation leadership in South Korea – the sons of Kim Jong Il and his contemporaries – are spoiled money loving power craving elite brats, trained in western Europe and always enjoying near royal treatment. They are the true unreliable class in North Korea, but as children of the ruling elite, they remain protected. They will sell out the country when they take power.
In transferring power to the third generation, Kim wants plenty of time to train up his successor in the finer points of demagoguery, but he needs time. He also needs a stable atmosphere. Kim Jong Il came into power after the bulk of the resolution of the first nuclear crisis, and used that three-plus years to solidify his control over the country. With a batch of selfish third generation leaders and a remnant of second generation leaders all jockeying for power and position, Kim will have a very difficult time ensuring his successor can actually take on the mantle of the Kim dynasty with any hope of success.
And thus we get back to the current issue – delay the SPA, don’t have a parliamentary meeting until the clear path for a successor is solidified. The path can’t be solidified until Kim Jong Il is certain in his regime’s security, either through a pact with the United States or a clear demonstration of North Korea’s military might. Which it will be is up to Washington, but Pyongyang has made it clear that time is running out, it can’t delay forever. And it has put this autumn as the final cutoff point.
03 March 2005
Subtleties, Suggestions and Semantics
Talk isn’t cheap in nuclear negotiations. The exact phrasing can mean the difference between complete comprehension and complete confrontation. North Korea’s classic claim that, when initially faced with U.S. accusations of having a Uranium nuclear program, said Pyongyang has the “right” to have nuclear weapons, is just one of myriad examples of why subtle shifts and changes in phrasing can have significant impact on the negotiations.
But Pyongyang is certainly not alone in playing the semantics game, as seen from the recent comments from China and South Korea. South Korean and Chinese officials, meeting in Seoul, have come up with a new definition for the “demands” North Korea has made before Pyongyang will rejoin talks. Rather than being “pre-conditions,” something the United States has refused to accept, Seoul and Beijing are referring to these demands as simply being about a changed “atmosphere.”
It is a clever wordplay, but like North Korea’s earlier claim of the “right” to have nuclear weapons (as opposed to its most recent claim to actually having them), and even South Korea’s recent decision not to call North Korea the “Main Enemy” in the Defense White Paper (even if it remains the most immediate military concern), the semantics of the South Korean and Chinese word choice is only important in the context of the subtleties of diplomacy. In reality, Washington will call them whatever it wishes – or, more specifically, Washington will choose to deal with North Korea not on the twisting of wording, but on the strategic decision to engage, ignore or even invade the North.
Subtle diplomatic phrasings and semantical games are swell, but in the end, the decisions are based much less on how cleverly someone has manipulated the definitions, than on the cold, hard realities of security and interst – and if there isn’t much of a threat, the subtle semanticizers can play their games.
Maybe, then, talk IS cheap afterall…
But Pyongyang is certainly not alone in playing the semantics game, as seen from the recent comments from China and South Korea. South Korean and Chinese officials, meeting in Seoul, have come up with a new definition for the “demands” North Korea has made before Pyongyang will rejoin talks. Rather than being “pre-conditions,” something the United States has refused to accept, Seoul and Beijing are referring to these demands as simply being about a changed “atmosphere.”
It is a clever wordplay, but like North Korea’s earlier claim of the “right” to have nuclear weapons (as opposed to its most recent claim to actually having them), and even South Korea’s recent decision not to call North Korea the “Main Enemy” in the Defense White Paper (even if it remains the most immediate military concern), the semantics of the South Korean and Chinese word choice is only important in the context of the subtleties of diplomacy. In reality, Washington will call them whatever it wishes – or, more specifically, Washington will choose to deal with North Korea not on the twisting of wording, but on the strategic decision to engage, ignore or even invade the North.
Subtle diplomatic phrasings and semantical games are swell, but in the end, the decisions are based much less on how cleverly someone has manipulated the definitions, than on the cold, hard realities of security and interst – and if there isn’t much of a threat, the subtle semanticizers can play their games.
Maybe, then, talk IS cheap afterall…
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