It's Dokdo Time!
Yep, it's that time of year again. Time to argue over Dokdo. This time, in addition to the usual text book stuff, apparently Japan has found documents proving that Dokdo was never returned to Korea after World War II, because Washington didn't make Japan give it back. Perhaps this has something to do with Japanese nationalism, or patriotism, and perhaps it has to do with the disputed northern territories with Russia or maybe Japan is just feeling its oats.
In general, as Abe prepares for his PM run, it is likely Japan will continue its little pokes at its neighbors over sovereignty and history issues, like the occasional visit to Yasukuni as a way to tell the rest of Asia that Japan HAS moved beyond World War II, and now it is time for the rest of Asia to do the same.
For both Korea and China, however, the perennial "enemy" of Japan is too good a foil to pass up, and Seoul, Pyongyang and Beijing will continue to play the Japan card, stirring domestic unity through angst and shifting attention away form domestic issues.
The South Korean Foreign Ministry (which keeps the East Sea and Koguryo as Hot Topics on its website) has issued its rebuttal to the Japanese claim, calling on Tokyo to "retract its undue and intolerable claims to Dokdo, owned by South Korea" and questioning "whether Japan has the will to develop friendly relations with South Korea and work toward regional peace and co-prosperity" (though if I were the Korean's, I would steer clear of words like "co-prosperity" when dealing with Japan, given its historical implications).
Anyway, as this is wandering away from me, lets all go look at some cool pictures of South Korea's mini aircraft carrier, the (aptly named) LPX Dokdo, http://forum.keypublishing.co.uk/showthread.php?t=46792 which, by the way, was launched before Japan got their mini-carrier out of the dockyards. Oh Pilsung Korea...
30 March 2006
29 March 2006
Team Yodok Mountain?
All the talk on whether President Roh has seen or should see Yodok Story is somewhat reminiscent of a question at a U.S. press conference not long ago asking President Bush if he had seen Brokeback Mountain.
Now, before you slam me for comparing North Korean prison camps and U.S. views on homosexuality, I simply raise the comparison as one of politicking entertainment that is political in nature. It also seems like Kim Jong Il's moves to get Team America banned in some former East Bloc countries. No one wants an alternative political (social, moral, religious...) view shoved down their throat, and such sensitive issues (homosexuality in the midst of a Bush administration, North Korean human rights in the Roh administration or short puppets in the Kim Jong Il administration) become charged topics that are political suicide one way or the other for the political leadership.
South Korean politics remains at a very primitive stage, and it is compounded by the highly emotional Korean persona (you rarely see people disembowel themselves on the floor of the U.S. Senate or light themselves on fire on the Capital steps). The reactive nature of the political landscape continues to be a big drag on coherent and unified policies, but this is something that only time will sort out. After all, American politicians were still dueling to the death a hundred years after the founding of the US of A, and South Korean politics didn’t really open up until Kim Young Sam's or Kim Dae Jung's elections. There are still plenty of good years of political chaos to go, and that doesn't take into consideration the outlier of unification!
Now, before you slam me for comparing North Korean prison camps and U.S. views on homosexuality, I simply raise the comparison as one of politicking entertainment that is political in nature. It also seems like Kim Jong Il's moves to get Team America banned in some former East Bloc countries. No one wants an alternative political (social, moral, religious...) view shoved down their throat, and such sensitive issues (homosexuality in the midst of a Bush administration, North Korean human rights in the Roh administration or short puppets in the Kim Jong Il administration) become charged topics that are political suicide one way or the other for the political leadership.
South Korean politics remains at a very primitive stage, and it is compounded by the highly emotional Korean persona (you rarely see people disembowel themselves on the floor of the U.S. Senate or light themselves on fire on the Capital steps). The reactive nature of the political landscape continues to be a big drag on coherent and unified policies, but this is something that only time will sort out. After all, American politicians were still dueling to the death a hundred years after the founding of the US of A, and South Korean politics didn’t really open up until Kim Young Sam's or Kim Dae Jung's elections. There are still plenty of good years of political chaos to go, and that doesn't take into consideration the outlier of unification!
25 March 2006
Politics: Good Morning, Mrs. Prime Minister
Politics: Good Morning, Mrs. Prime Minister
Roh Moo Hyun's nomination of Han Myung Sook was a clever move. Han's appointment wasn't exactly a major surprise - she was among the top possibilities being tossed around by political observers and advisors. But it will be difficult for the GNP, led by a woman (Park Geun Hye) to block Han's appointment, as they would be seen blocking the first female Prime Minister, just before the elections, and that would rekindle attention on the GNP political scandals over sexist remarks and actions (which were only swept away by URI's golf scandal).
The interesting thing to watch is whether Han's appointment (assuming it is approved) increases the chances for Park to run for president. Perhaps Han, the former Minister of gender Equality, will break down a few more barriers.
Roh Moo Hyun's nomination of Han Myung Sook was a clever move. Han's appointment wasn't exactly a major surprise - she was among the top possibilities being tossed around by political observers and advisors. But it will be difficult for the GNP, led by a woman (Park Geun Hye) to block Han's appointment, as they would be seen blocking the first female Prime Minister, just before the elections, and that would rekindle attention on the GNP political scandals over sexist remarks and actions (which were only swept away by URI's golf scandal).
The interesting thing to watch is whether Han's appointment (assuming it is approved) increases the chances for Park to run for president. Perhaps Han, the former Minister of gender Equality, will break down a few more barriers.
You can lead a horse to water...
Free Trade: You can lead a horse to water, but you can't make him drink...
OK, not exactly what is going on, but the Ministry of Agriculture's investigative groups to monitor the movement of the imported USA rice does showcase one of the facets of free trade. The big retailers, like E-Mart, Lotte Mart and Home Plus are not going to participate in government auctions of imported USA rice, because they feel they wont be able to sell it. The reasons they are giving include negative publicity over the imports, quick expiration dates and a low quality image of the foreign rice. The cheap discount stores are buying the rice, but will watch carefully so as not to tarnish their image.
It is an interesting thing. The farmers fought so hard to keep the rice out, and now that it is in, it isn’t exactly taking off yet. Similar to when they finally opened the door to Japanese "cultural" goods, like music and movies. They never did dominate the market. As for the rice, I would imagine the unscrupulous are re-labeling it "grown in Korea" (hence perhaps part of the reason behind the Ministry's investigation team), or it is being picked up by restaurants and processors rather than its intended public marketplace sales. It will be interesting to see if the social pressure can keep the market for foreign rice small, or if it will eventually seep into wider circulation like so much Chinese seafood before.
OK, not exactly what is going on, but the Ministry of Agriculture's investigative groups to monitor the movement of the imported USA rice does showcase one of the facets of free trade. The big retailers, like E-Mart, Lotte Mart and Home Plus are not going to participate in government auctions of imported USA rice, because they feel they wont be able to sell it. The reasons they are giving include negative publicity over the imports, quick expiration dates and a low quality image of the foreign rice. The cheap discount stores are buying the rice, but will watch carefully so as not to tarnish their image.
It is an interesting thing. The farmers fought so hard to keep the rice out, and now that it is in, it isn’t exactly taking off yet. Similar to when they finally opened the door to Japanese "cultural" goods, like music and movies. They never did dominate the market. As for the rice, I would imagine the unscrupulous are re-labeling it "grown in Korea" (hence perhaps part of the reason behind the Ministry's investigation team), or it is being picked up by restaurants and processors rather than its intended public marketplace sales. It will be interesting to see if the social pressure can keep the market for foreign rice small, or if it will eventually seep into wider circulation like so much Chinese seafood before.
15 March 2006
Indonesia Connects the Koreas
Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono will travel to Pyongyang and Seoul in April. Yudhoyono's visit is not only about bilateral relations between Indonesia and the respective Koreas, but also Jakarta's attempts to play a role in the inter-Korean dialogue. Indonesian presidential envoy Nana Sutrena visited Pyongyang and Seoul in February, during which he invited North Korean leader Kim Jong Il to Indonesia (an invitation Kim, through President of the Presidium of the SPA Kim Yong Nam, reportedly accepted after inviting Yudhoyono to Pyongyang) and offered Jakarta as a neutral location for a proposed meeting between South and North Korean defense ministers.
While North Korea remains circumspect on the defense ministerial talks in Jakarta (all ministerial talks are temporarily delayed amid U.S.-South Korean defense exercises), Pyongyang has recently reiterated Kim Jong Il's agreement to visit Jakarta this year. As Indonesian officials have said, worries of Kim's alleged fear of flying are somewhat suspect, as Kim visited Indonesia in 1965 via air. This was, of course, Kim's only known foreign visit by air, but it happened nonetheless.
For Indonesia, the inter-Korean work serves several purposes. First, it gains economic attention from South Korea, which is ever ready to "pay" anyone for working to facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation (Seoul is reportedly talking of submarine sales to Jakarta, and will likely also get involved in infrastructure development projects and other investments in Indonesia). Second, through working with North Korea, Indonesia raises its importance in East Asia, something Yudhoyono sees as necessary for regaining a national sense of unity and pride and for rebuilding defense and economic ties with the United States. Finally, Indonesia hopes to regain its regional role as a major player, somewhat usurping China's growing regional role, though Jakarta is far from economically ready or socially stable enough to really reassert itself effectively.
But Indonesia serves a unique roll from the perspective of the two Koreas as well. Indonesia, unlike China, is neutral. While China claims to be a neutral party it has a vested interest in Korea, and thus cannot be seen as simply serving as a venue for dialogue. But Indonesia is geographically distant, didn't participate in the Korean War, and doesn't have a history of using the Korean peninsula as a defensive shield or an invasion route to Japan.
And this brings us to the little possibility floating in the air. That when Kim Jong Il goes to Jakarta, he may "accidentally" bump into another "secret" visitor – Roh Moo Hyun. The rumors of a second inter-Korean summit this year have been hot and heavy, and most have involved the summit in a third country, more often than not China. But Indonesia would be an even better place to hold it, taking the inter-Korean dialogue completely out of the hands of the Chinese or the United States. So watch June or so, and watch the airport in Jakarta.
While North Korea remains circumspect on the defense ministerial talks in Jakarta (all ministerial talks are temporarily delayed amid U.S.-South Korean defense exercises), Pyongyang has recently reiterated Kim Jong Il's agreement to visit Jakarta this year. As Indonesian officials have said, worries of Kim's alleged fear of flying are somewhat suspect, as Kim visited Indonesia in 1965 via air. This was, of course, Kim's only known foreign visit by air, but it happened nonetheless.
For Indonesia, the inter-Korean work serves several purposes. First, it gains economic attention from South Korea, which is ever ready to "pay" anyone for working to facilitate inter-Korean reconciliation (Seoul is reportedly talking of submarine sales to Jakarta, and will likely also get involved in infrastructure development projects and other investments in Indonesia). Second, through working with North Korea, Indonesia raises its importance in East Asia, something Yudhoyono sees as necessary for regaining a national sense of unity and pride and for rebuilding defense and economic ties with the United States. Finally, Indonesia hopes to regain its regional role as a major player, somewhat usurping China's growing regional role, though Jakarta is far from economically ready or socially stable enough to really reassert itself effectively.
But Indonesia serves a unique roll from the perspective of the two Koreas as well. Indonesia, unlike China, is neutral. While China claims to be a neutral party it has a vested interest in Korea, and thus cannot be seen as simply serving as a venue for dialogue. But Indonesia is geographically distant, didn't participate in the Korean War, and doesn't have a history of using the Korean peninsula as a defensive shield or an invasion route to Japan.
And this brings us to the little possibility floating in the air. That when Kim Jong Il goes to Jakarta, he may "accidentally" bump into another "secret" visitor – Roh Moo Hyun. The rumors of a second inter-Korean summit this year have been hot and heavy, and most have involved the summit in a third country, more often than not China. But Indonesia would be an even better place to hold it, taking the inter-Korean dialogue completely out of the hands of the Chinese or the United States. So watch June or so, and watch the airport in Jakarta.
09 March 2006
Pyongyang's Political Rube Goldberg Ploy
North Korea tested two surface-to-air short-range missiles between March 7 and 8, sparking all sorts of reports about accidents and direction. The key initial debate was whether the launches were intentional or accidental, and the related debate was over direction; did North Korea launch them toward the Chinese border or over the East Sea?
To a great degree, neither question is all that important. Sure, an accidental launch may mean some troubles with equipment, but every country has troubles, and at least these were not apparently launched over a major population center like the South Koreans did accidentally back in 1998, with the NIKE missile launching (and exploding and falling) over Inchon.
As for the direction, there are no conflicts as to the missiles remaining in North Korean territory. If they shot them East, as is normal, it is nothing new. If they flew North, even that isn't all that odd, as the short range would be easily calculated to remain in North Korean territory. Sure, China or Russia might wince for a second, but two SAMs are obviously not the preface barrage for an invasion across the Yalu River.
Rather, there are two other aspects of the launch that seem more interesting. First, unlike North Korea's silkworm and seersucker anti-ship missile tests in February, March and October 2003 and in May 2005, these were not anti-ship but anti-air missiles (at least if the initial reports are accurate). Why the shift?
It could be that Pyongyang simply hasn't tested its air defense in a while, and really wanted to try it out. On March 2, Kim Jong Il did visit KPA Air Force Unit 991. It could be that the exercises were air defense exercises. It could be a way to reinforce the monthly North Korean complaints of "aerial espionage" by the United States. Or, a very minor chance, it could have been an unsuccessful launch at a U.S. aircraft operating in the area. If the latter is correct, then Pyongyang was sending a much more robust signal than normal.
But this still gets into the main reason for the launch - sending a signal. Pyongyang is sitting on the sidelines right now, watching Iran get all the attention. The North Korean leadership is also mulling a new special economic zone near the Chinese border on the Yellow Sea (perhaps Sinuiju, perhaps Bidan Island). And the North Koreans are looking to find a way to incentivise Washington into acquiesce to Pyongyang's concerns on the counterfeiting issue and return to the six-party talks. And in a convoluted way, popping off a missile is intended to assist with this, as Washington has been touting the North Korean missile threat just at this time, and North Korea is obliging that sense of dread.
In return, North Korea gets prime billing at the State Department daily briefing, and may remind those in Washington that North Korea could be dangerous too, and therefore need dealing with. Pyongyang has offered bilateral talks with Washington on counterfeiting, and then laid out that those talks need to precede the return to the six-party talks. Washington has said the six-party talks can become the forum to discuss North Korean missiles. So if Washington wants to talk missiles, it must first talk counterfeiting. And now missiles are high on the U.S. radar screen (perhaps literally).
Now, all this rolls back to a fundamental question; why does North Korea really care about U.S. actions over counterfeiting? Closing down contact with one Macao bank isn't all that bad, and if North Korea is clever enough to produce the so-called "super notes," it is certainly clever enough to launder them. This then gets us back to the economic issue. Pyongyang's plans for Sinuiju or Bidan include banking. A way to move currency in and out of the country. Possibly even setting up shelters for foreign money to move all over the place. A new Switzerland or Caymans, perhaps. But, if Washington is putting the kibosh on interaction with North Korean financial institutions, then all bets are off.
Note that Ri Gun reportedly told U.S. Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser that North Korea would like to set up a bank in the United States to handle its international accounts. Banking, or more specifically facilitating the flow of money, is a key element to North Korea's future economic plans. It wants to be a Hong Kong, or at least a place where money can move, sit quietly, and not be too deeply scrutinized by international investigators, and where North Korea can profit off of the movement and interest.
So missile tests, talks on counterfeiting, nuclear negotiations, and economic desires have all come together in a convoluted but nevertheless interesting flow. And all for the cost of two little old SA-2s or something similar. Now, if only North Korea's diplomatic Rube Goldberg devices worked, this would be brilliant.
To a great degree, neither question is all that important. Sure, an accidental launch may mean some troubles with equipment, but every country has troubles, and at least these were not apparently launched over a major population center like the South Koreans did accidentally back in 1998, with the NIKE missile launching (and exploding and falling) over Inchon.
As for the direction, there are no conflicts as to the missiles remaining in North Korean territory. If they shot them East, as is normal, it is nothing new. If they flew North, even that isn't all that odd, as the short range would be easily calculated to remain in North Korean territory. Sure, China or Russia might wince for a second, but two SAMs are obviously not the preface barrage for an invasion across the Yalu River.
Rather, there are two other aspects of the launch that seem more interesting. First, unlike North Korea's silkworm and seersucker anti-ship missile tests in February, March and October 2003 and in May 2005, these were not anti-ship but anti-air missiles (at least if the initial reports are accurate). Why the shift?
It could be that Pyongyang simply hasn't tested its air defense in a while, and really wanted to try it out. On March 2, Kim Jong Il did visit KPA Air Force Unit 991. It could be that the exercises were air defense exercises. It could be a way to reinforce the monthly North Korean complaints of "aerial espionage" by the United States. Or, a very minor chance, it could have been an unsuccessful launch at a U.S. aircraft operating in the area. If the latter is correct, then Pyongyang was sending a much more robust signal than normal.
But this still gets into the main reason for the launch - sending a signal. Pyongyang is sitting on the sidelines right now, watching Iran get all the attention. The North Korean leadership is also mulling a new special economic zone near the Chinese border on the Yellow Sea (perhaps Sinuiju, perhaps Bidan Island). And the North Koreans are looking to find a way to incentivise Washington into acquiesce to Pyongyang's concerns on the counterfeiting issue and return to the six-party talks. And in a convoluted way, popping off a missile is intended to assist with this, as Washington has been touting the North Korean missile threat just at this time, and North Korea is obliging that sense of dread.
In return, North Korea gets prime billing at the State Department daily briefing, and may remind those in Washington that North Korea could be dangerous too, and therefore need dealing with. Pyongyang has offered bilateral talks with Washington on counterfeiting, and then laid out that those talks need to precede the return to the six-party talks. Washington has said the six-party talks can become the forum to discuss North Korean missiles. So if Washington wants to talk missiles, it must first talk counterfeiting. And now missiles are high on the U.S. radar screen (perhaps literally).
Now, all this rolls back to a fundamental question; why does North Korea really care about U.S. actions over counterfeiting? Closing down contact with one Macao bank isn't all that bad, and if North Korea is clever enough to produce the so-called "super notes," it is certainly clever enough to launder them. This then gets us back to the economic issue. Pyongyang's plans for Sinuiju or Bidan include banking. A way to move currency in and out of the country. Possibly even setting up shelters for foreign money to move all over the place. A new Switzerland or Caymans, perhaps. But, if Washington is putting the kibosh on interaction with North Korean financial institutions, then all bets are off.
Note that Ri Gun reportedly told U.S. Assistant Treasury Secretary Daniel Glaser that North Korea would like to set up a bank in the United States to handle its international accounts. Banking, or more specifically facilitating the flow of money, is a key element to North Korea's future economic plans. It wants to be a Hong Kong, or at least a place where money can move, sit quietly, and not be too deeply scrutinized by international investigators, and where North Korea can profit off of the movement and interest.
So missile tests, talks on counterfeiting, nuclear negotiations, and economic desires have all come together in a convoluted but nevertheless interesting flow. And all for the cost of two little old SA-2s or something similar. Now, if only North Korea's diplomatic Rube Goldberg devices worked, this would be brilliant.
07 March 2006
Catchin' Cine-Crooks
Cinetizen, a South Korean movie site, has completed its first month of the "film paparazzi" anti-piracy campaign, in which people turn in those who download and distribute pirated movies (and maybe win a prize while doing so). In the first month of operation, the campaign netted some 60,000 violations. The first person to identify a violator gets 10000 won or two movie tickets. The violators have their IDs posted, and can pay to have them removed or risk being sued by a movie studio.
Of course, someone could make a fortune if they could go to a Korean grocery store in the United States. While not internet copies, the cheap video copies of TV series and movies are plentiful, and cheap to rent (with little if any fee if unreturned). And some are now moving more high-tech. Rather than the static-filled videos on tapes that have been copied and erased dozens of times, there are now shiny new DVDs, freshly burned, complete with extra scenes and subtitles. And these, too, don’t seem to have a late fee associated with them. Just 'rent' for a few bucks and forget to take them back.
And the Korean movie studios and actors are upset about the FTA with the United States and the changes in screen quotas?
Of course, someone could make a fortune if they could go to a Korean grocery store in the United States. While not internet copies, the cheap video copies of TV series and movies are plentiful, and cheap to rent (with little if any fee if unreturned). And some are now moving more high-tech. Rather than the static-filled videos on tapes that have been copied and erased dozens of times, there are now shiny new DVDs, freshly burned, complete with extra scenes and subtitles. And these, too, don’t seem to have a late fee associated with them. Just 'rent' for a few bucks and forget to take them back.
And the Korean movie studios and actors are upset about the FTA with the United States and the changes in screen quotas?
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