Dear Leader Travel Diary

On the side, I maintain the "Where is Kim Jong Il?" Kim Jong Il tracker. Why? Who knows. But anyway, here is a review of first quarter visits. The 2007 tracker page has details.

The first quarter is almost up, and Kim Jong Il’s inspection tours this quarter have been a typical mix of economic, social and military locations, though military inspections were a bit low this quarter compared to previous first quarters. Kim made four inspections of military sites in the first three months of 2007, including one connected to a tank division.

Number of military sites inspected by Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of previous years:

4 times in the first quarter of 2007

12 times in the first quarter of 2006

3 times in the first quarter of 2005

14 times in the first quarter of 2004

6 times in the first quarter of 2003

6 times in the first quarter of 2002

2 times in the first quarter of 2001

4 times in the first quarter of 2000

7 times in the first quarter of 1999

10 times in the first quarter of 1998

Kim’s main focus this quarter was in the energy and economic realms. Even as the six party talks started and stalled and started and stalled, and as U.S. and South Korean military exercises ramped up, Kim stuck to the economic activities (something he does quite a bit these last few years). There is a major push on internal economic issues, and the six party talks coupled with the Kaesong development are ultimately designed to help spur the DPRK domestic economy. During the quarter, he visited:

the Huichon Machine-Tool Factory

the Youth Electrical Complex in Huichon

the Huichon Ceramic Factory

the newly built Thaechon Youth Power Station No. 4

the Chongjin University of Mining and Metallurgy

the newly built Orangchon Power Station No. 1

the construction site of the Orangchon Dam

the Jangyonho Fish Farm

the Chongjin Primary Seasoning Factory

the newly built Army-People Power Station in Chongjin

the Pakchon Silk Mill in North Phyongan Province

And, as usual, Kim spared time for cultural activities, including:

an art performance given by the Merited State Chorus of the KPA

a visit to the statue of President Kim Il Sung in Ranam District, Chongjin

a visit to the Malum Revolutionary Site in Chongjin

a visit to a room for the preservation and education in slogan-bearing trees in Chongjin

field guidance to Chongjin University of Mining and Metallurgy

the art performance "The Blue Sky over My Country" (Part Dawn.)

a concert given on works created by People's Artiste Jang Ryong Sik

Finally, Kim paid a visit to the Chinese Embassy to mark the Lunar New Year. Much was made of this visit in the press, but in fact it is not all that unusual for Kim to visit the embassy or meet with the Chinese in the first quarter. While in other countries a head of state visit to an embassy is a major deal, in North Korea, so long as it is the Chinese embassy, it is not entirely out of the ordinary. Despite the mixed feelings between DPRK and PRC, North Korea remains heavily reliant upon Chinese goods, services and good will. And the visit to the embassy was a way for North Korea to symbolically show it understood that dependency.

Other key first quarter meetings between Kim and China included:

On March 6, 2000, Kim visited the Chinese embassy.

On January 15-20, 2001, Kim visited China.

On February 10, 2002, Kim met with the incoming Chinese Ambassador (Wu Donghe).

On April 19-21, 2004, Kim visited China (technically in the second quarter)

On January 10-18, 2006, Kim visited China.

And on March 4, 2007, Kim visited the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang.

In addition to these, Kim had several meetings with various Chinese officials visiting North Korea.

So what does all this tell us? Not much. But sometimes watching Kim’s travels can reveal national economic or strategic priorities, and the focus on economic and cultural issues over military ones suggests that DPRK is not feeling any particular pressure after the nuclear test or amid the six party talks. Pyongyang is feeling confident.

What's In A Word? Part II

In regards to yesterday’s post, Hayden appears not only to be talking to the Americans, but also to the North Koreans. If the rumors are accurate that DPRK’s Kim Kye Gwan asked USA’s Christopher Hill in New York in March to treat North Korea the way the United States treats India (recognize its nuclear weapons and still cooperate with it), then Hayden may have been offering an answer. By saying North Korea’s nuclear test was not successful and North Korea is not a nuclear power, Hayden has effectively told Pyongyang that the United States has no intention to treat the DPRK like India, reinforcing what Hill told Kim at their New York meeting. Washington does not consider North Korea a nuclear power yet. It will not accept North Korea as a formal nuclear power. This means that, for North Korea, destruction of the existing nuclear devices is a must for diplomatic relations with the United States. And this may be an untenable position for Pyongyang. Meaning that, no matter what progress in thee current round of six party talks, there is little agreement on the ultimate outcome, and trouble is coming – though that trouble may not manifest until the next U.S. president takes office.

What’s In A Word?

U.S. CIA Chief Michael Hayden, on an “unannounced” visit to Seoul, said Washington does not consider North Korea a nuclear power because North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test was a failure. This is a silly bit of semantics, something the CIA is famous for. Every word counts, as a way to justify sometime in the future some action in the past. In this case, by saying the test was a failure (likely), and saying that the failure means North Korea is not a nuclear power (despite the fact that the CIA has been saying for years that North Korea “likely” possesses two or three nuclear devices), Hayden can justify to the hawks at home the decision to negotiate with North Korea was not capitulation to a nuclear North Korea, but the continued attempts at prevention of north Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Silly words that distract from the core responsibility of the intelligence agencies – finding the information rather than creating ream after ream of CYA documents.

Washington Takes a Page from North Korean Playbook

The release of North Korea’s funds from Banco Delta Asia (Macao) by the U.S. Treasury Department has smoothed the continuation of the six party talks process. Responses internationally to the decision to let North Korea reclaim the $24 million have been mixed, with plenty of complaints that the United States gave in and had to “pay” North Korea for the continued talks.

But instead, the United States paid North Korea nothing. In fact, it turned North Korea’s tactics around and applied them TO Pyongyang. Washington froze North Korea’s access to its money. It then withheld that money, until North Korea finally agreed to talk and take other steps (like agreeing to IAEA visits and planning to shut Yongbyon). Then Washington gave back to North Korea what was already North Korea’s.

Pyongyang has used a similar tactic over and over again. It creates a new crisis, and demands concessions to return to the status quo. Pyongyang has now been paid back in kind, with Washington creating a “crisis” for North Korea, and demanding compensation to return to the status quo.

Just desserts all around.

ROK @ SXSW

There are three Korean features at SXSW this year.

On Thursday, March 15, the Seoul Electric Band performs at the Plaza of City Hall from 5:30-6:30 PM as part of the “Live from the Plaza” series.

On Saturday, March 17, the Park Chan Wook movie, “I'm a Cyborg, but That's OK” will makes its North America premier at the Paramount at 7:30 PM as part of the SXSW film festival.

In a bit of unfortunate timing, the highlight of the Korean presence at SXSW begins just one hour after “Cyborg” starts. YB (Yoon Band) will be playing at Maggie Mae’s beginning at 8:30 PM March 17.

Juche Girl, Sarangheyo <3<3<3

Juche Girl, Juche Girl

Juche Girl, my heart melts for you.

Who has such brilliant insights as you, daughter of the fatherly leader?!

Who else could come up with the solution to our oil problems: clone dinosaurs so we can melt them into oil.

And who else has such a wise and caring brother who points out how Bush tips over wheelchairs for the laughing pleasure of vampire Cheney? Or has a brother who points out that Kiwis have no wings

because Bush steal their wings and take them to his white house to eat them. Proof of that is that white house has "west wing".

And really, who else could see such ideological struggles in the flight of birds as this October 2005 observation?

I was watching a troop of good little comradely sparrows flying and swirling in formation like invincible state-of-the-art Mig-21 of the KPA Air Force who protect the children from US imperialist air pirates when capitalist puppet seagull flew over me and pooped on me >_<
The poop of the air pirate seagull hit me on the head and stuck in my hair. This made me very sad and angry and I ran home crying. This make me hate Bush more than ever.

Ah Juche Girl, I could read you all day every day. Please, write more!

And the best thing is that, somehow, Juche Girl gets a nod from the Songun Blog, listed among such sources of information as Naenara, Uriminzokkiri and KCNA. If Songun Blog only knew...

And as you read this, watch out for your kittens and your kids' ears, because, as Juche Girl tells us...

Bush is criminal ugly monster who eat little cats and world children eardrums

KPA Airforce

No reason for this post, but as I was wandering around looking at videos of the SU-45, I jumped to some of the J-10, which eventually got me to an obviously dated video of the KPA Air Force posted on the Songun Blog. There is some dated information on the size and shape of the KPA Air Force over at GlobalSecurity.org, and to top off the dated look at the KPA Air Force, attached are a few pics from the DPRK military museum of a Yak-18 and a MiG-15 stuck down in the basement.

Crossing the Yalu

Human Rights Watch has released its latest report on North Korean border crossers, titled Harsher Policies against Border-Crossers. The report cites interviews with 16 border crossers, as well as information from aid groups and the anti-regime South Korean paper, Daily NK. I will not attempt to address the accuracy of the report, nor the motivation of the interviewers or interviewees. The issue of North Korean human rights is one that is both troubling and difficult to gauge given the emotions and agendas of all players.

During my time in Dandong in January, I saw little sign of any North Korean border patrol presence along the river for several miles, but that was a survey of less than a week. There are places just east of Dandong city where the river is no more than a few feet (and in one spot, just 18 inches), with no fences on the North Korean side and a single barbed wire fence on the Chinese side. Crossing is likely limited more by fear of retribution than of difficulty (unlike the more heavily fortified DMZ or the old Berlin Wall).

Stories, oft repeated but never directly sourced, floated around Dandon of the treatment of North Korean border crossers who were caught and turned over to North Korean security. Typical of these stories is that those caught are pierced beneath the collar bone and strung together on a wire to be walked back across the bridge, or pinned through the flesh between te thumb and index finger and strung together on wire that way, though no one who told these stories had actually seen the actions take place.

North Korea and China use such stories to discourage the movement of individuals across the border – Pyongyang for political and security reasons, Beijing for security and economic reasons. There is likely a certain level of truth in the allegations, but a certain amount of exaggeration as well. Historically, there has been a fair amount of human activity across the border, mostly illegal, but frequently facilitated by border security on both sides that are willing to turn the other way for a fee, like a television set or some other useful commodity.

That still seems to be occurring, but the increase in Christian aid groups on the Chinese side of the border is encouraging more North Koreans to cross, offering promises of assistance and a better life (but in some cases manipulating the flow of border crossers for broader political goals). Barely across the border, where the river is just a few feet wide, the bright neon protestant church crosses light the night sky to guide the North Korean pilgrims on their way. Then comes the longer trek to Mongolia or Vietnam or Thailand, before a very small fraction can ever make it to South Korea (where many soon find that, despite the better economy, they are unable to adjust and make their new country their home).

Below are a few pictures of the Dandong area, across from Sinuiju in North Korea, one of the more heavily crossed areas of the North Korean border, due to the easy access to the Chinese city. These are from January 2007, and show in some places the minimal physical barriers to crossing (though there are many ways to discourage such activity).

One of the church complexes along the Chinese side of the Yalu river, opposite North Korea. In Northeast China, three are many more visible protestant churches than in some other areas. Near the Yalu, many of these are ethnic Korean.

DPRK/China Yalu River border. Around the bend, the river narrows to a width of just 18 inches, considered (by my guides) the narrowest spot in the Dandon area.

The barbed wire fence on the Chinese side of the Yalu. This fence is only in place where the river is rather narrow. On the North Korean side, the land is flat, and cultivated right up to the river's edge. On the Chinese side there is an embankment above the wire fence, leading to rural housing and farms.

A North Korean border guard resting by his post along the Yalu river, east of Dandong.