Happy New Year

Guess Who's Having a Birthday

February 16, 2007 is Kim Jong Il's 65th Birthday. Happy Birthday Mr. Kim. I would shake your hand, but you have said that is not sanitary or fitting of Korean sensibilities, so I give you a slight bow of my head. In honor of Kim's Birthday, here is a little set of pictures to see as Kim grows up.

1948

Late 1940s, maybe early 1950s

As a student

1975

1982

1983

1988

1989

1991

1992

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Reshaping North Korean Nuclear Management

The February 13 agreement at the six-party nuclear talks is receiving quite a bit of criticism from various quarters in the United States and abroad. Certainly, like any agreement, this one is full of unanswered questions, incomplete timelines and verification procedures, and a general lack of any enforcement measures. That said, there are some notable aspects of this agreement that far outshine the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement – not the least of which is the establishment of working groups to both separate the various individual issues from the broader talks, and allow for more focused discussions and arrangements before tactical and contentious issues are ever brought before the larger forum. If the process proceeds under the new, more routinized and institutionalized format, rather than the ad hoc crisis management format of the past talks, will allow for more progress on various elements of the overall process, while avoiding allowing individual hang-ups to stop the whole process. Thus, the Japanese issue with North Korean abductions, or the North Korean issue with U.S. banking sanctions, would be moved to the smaller working group discussions – similar to the way the U.S. and DPRK held a series of bilaterals prior to the latest round of six-party talks. The working group model also removes the sense of all-or-none from the talks, making breakdowns seen in the 2004 Agreed Framework less likely as there are multiple tracks ongoing simultaneously. Perhaps this is where much of the criticism comes from. The United States is now dealing with North Korea as an equal partner at talks, not as a crisis that needs immediate management or as an “Evil Axis” member that needs punished and constrained. This really leaves a sour taste in the mouths of the “hawks” and “conservatives” who didn’t want to see the United States “give in” to North Korean “nuclear blackmail.” At the same time, the “doves” and “liberals” who called on Washington to hold bilateral talks with North Korea are seeing progress on the multilateral front instead, but aren’t seeing any concrete outcomes or requirements. In the end, at first glance, it appears that North Korea is the big winner. Pyongyang instigated the crisis – just to force negotiations. It now has those negotiations. Effectively, North Korea trashed its room, and then demanded an allowance from the United States before cleaning up. And the United States gave in. Now, this giving in is interesting. Under Bush, the United States has pursued a policy toward North Korea that consisted of criticizing, vilifying, and basically ignoring North Korea and its actions. This strategic neglect was intentional. If one wasn’t going to engage North Korea in state-to-state discussions, and wasn’t going to attack, then ignoring North Korea was the only way to deal with them. Basically, North Korea was the kid holding his breath at the toy store demanding a toy, and the United States was the parent ignoring the kid, knowing that, when the kid passed out, it would begin breathing again. But, like at the toy store, The U.S. wasn’t alone, and lots of other countries were watching and criticizing. So long as it was a top-tier issue, Washington could deal with the angry looks and keep ignoring Pyongyang. But Iraq and Iran have taken up all the bandwidth, and Washington has devolved North Korean policy back down to State Department. And State, with some opportunity to again shape policy, has jumped on the opportunity. So now, they have moved beyond ignoring, and beyond dealing with the issue as a crisis, and instead set a framework for future talks on a more mutual basis. So back to the current accord. This time, they have moved past the game of chicken to setting a series of actions in motion that happen relatively simultaneously, rather than one after another. Again, this is designed to reduce the problems seen in the 1994 agreement. North Korea will shut down Yongbyon (something it has done in the past), seal it (something it has un-done in the past) and invite back the IAEA inspectors. Washington, in association with the other parties (aside from Japan), will supply “emergency” fuel and aid. Both these steps happen within 60 days. Half way through that period, the six parties get together again to see where they are at. Washington gets its concession for moving forward with talks (North Korea has to identify and list all its nuclear facilities and materials) and North Korea gets what it wants for moving forward (Washington talks about normalizing relations, removing sanctions and taking North Korea off the State Sponsor of Terrorism list). South Korea gets what it wants - the ability to build up North Korean infrastructure, as head of the economic and energy air working group, thus smoothing the way for future reunification. Russia, as head of the Northeast Asia Peace working group gets a role in the Asia-Pacific region, something it hasn’t had for quite a while. China retains overall control over the denuclearization process, keeping the tools of leverage for dealing with the United States. And Japan gets to keep hounding North Korea over abductions, something good for domestic consumption and for justifying Tokyo’s defense development and constitutional changes. Of course, the problem of North Korea’s nukes isn’t solved, but then dialogue with the USSR didn’t eliminate their nukes either, and the general reaction from all the parties suggested that the Oct. 2006 DPRK nuke tests, while unfortunate, didn’t really change anyone’s views on the real situation in Northeast Asia. So if you wanted a real agreement that is designed to remove North Korea’s nuclear capability quickly, not there. If you wanted an agreement that takes a crisis and turns it into a managed relationship, this is it. Everyone can cheat, and it can all break down, but given the more than a decade North Korea has used the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip, at least here is a new way to try to address the issue and take some control out of Pyongyang’s hands.

Nuke Redux: North Korea Regains the Initiative

The resumption of the six party nuclear talks in Beijing has picked up where they left off back in 2005, with the Sept. 19 Joint Statement. While there have been two other meetings (in November 2005 and December 2006), neither moved beyond North Korean demands that the September 2005 USA PATRIOT Act action against Banco Delta Asia in Macao, which froze $24 million in various North Korean funds, but more importantly triggered a chain reaction in which numerous financial institutions stopped doing business with any North Korean-related account. But on Feb. 8, the parties picked up where they left off 17 months earlier, and began laying out steps for the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Now, without addressing the issue of whether this round will really end North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (it won’t) or whether North Korea really even intends to get rid of their nuclear program (they don’t), lets look at what significance there has been in the nearly two year delay in the nuclear negotiations.

Since the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, North Korea has seen some of its financial interactions impacted. There are anecdotal stories from China that North Korean mid-level officials, when they visit China, bring paintings and antiquities to sell for hard currency. But, countering these minor impositions, there has been little fundamental economic impact on North Korea.

China hasn’t invested too much additional into North Korea, but neither has Beijing cut off trade and economic assistance. South Korea hasn’t shut down the Kumkang tourist project or the Kaesong industrial zone (and in fact, Seoul can’t strike a FTA agreement with Washington because Washington won’t include Kaesong-made goods in the agreement, meaning the South Koreans have little intent of shutting down the operations). Japan has cut trade with North Korea to near zero (at least officially), but Pyongyang has other ways to get Japanese goods (primarily via China or Mongolia).

In general, then, North Korean economics have really not suffered all that much from the banking sanctions. There have been inconveniences and embarrassments, but in the end, it was only $24 million frozen, not a really large sum. And it looks like Washington is preparing to release about half of that back to the North Koreans (a $12 or $13 million repayment to restart nuke talks).

Perhaps more importantly, since the last substantial talks broke down, North Korea has tested its Taepodong-2 (with questionable success) and tested a nuclear device (also with questionable success). In both cases, Pyongyang has done was Washington demanded it not do – and gotten away with it. All the previous assumptions of U.S. action if North Korea acted up were thrown out the window. North Korea returns to the talks feeling more confident and capable.

What is perhaps most important to remember is that North Korea was not pressured or backed into the negotiations. It is Pyongyang that creates the periodic nuclear crises to force Washington, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow into talks. North Korea has chosen to restart the talks – and has demonstrated once again that it can shape the actions of major countries. Washington conceded and began to talk about lifting the banking sanctions. Washington offered earlier fuel shipments and other rewarding moves to North Korea. Washington has apparently decided to soften its demands and start making a phased deal with North Korea.

So overall, North Korea has delayed talks for nearly a year, got away with a missile and nuclear test, drawn everyone back to the table with sweeter offers, and simply picked up where it left off. Isolated crazy and falling apart, North Korea seems to have its act together when it comes to manipulating the world for its own end. And all just a little over a week before Kim Jong Il’s birthday...

Hu Shan Great Wall

Off to the Hu Shan section of the Great Wall of China, "It is the starting of eastern the great wall." you know, "you will feel regret if you don't come to Hu Shan great wall." I definately didn't want to feel regret, so it was up and down the Hu Shan wall. This is one of the rebuilt great walls, and sits in Liaoning province almost along the North Korean border (there are great views of North Korean farmland leading to Uiju from the wall). Some parts are rather steep, but it is a relatively short section, so not too bad. Upon reaching the far end of the wall, however, we were surprised to find the museum (you end up on the roof of the museum from the wall) was locked. We could hear people downstairs, anda generator running, but it took 20 minutes of shouting and banging to get them to hear us and come up and let us in (we had bought tickets at the other end of the wall, so it had better have been open...). The museum is just two floors, and only a few artifacts, but they powered up the generator to provide power so they could turn on the lights for our visit.