Krazy Kim's Missile Menagerie

North Korea’s 75^th anniversary of the KPA parade rolled, marched and pranced through the streets Pyongyang April 25, with Kim Jong Il looking on approvingly. This was the first time in more than a decade that the parade included North Korean missiles, and counts of the video footage show four dozen missiles of four different types. In the footage I have seen, which isn’t the whole parade, I have only counted three types, so if you have the fourth, let me know.

The three I saw were the Hwasong (a SCUD variant), the AG-1 (A Seersucker anti-ship variant) and the KN-02 (A short range ballistic missile based on the old Soviet SS-21 Scarab). These are shown below, in that order.

The lack of NoDongs and TaepoDongs was intentional; no need to give the foreigners too much to be concerned about. But each KCNA press release on the parade made sure to include a line about the missiles: “Columns of rocket units also went past the tribune of honor, demonstrating the invincible might of the KPA equipped with modern offensive and defensive means.”

What is interesting is that these were battlefield missiles, not the strategic ones used to shape foreign perceptions, but actual, useable weapons. And they are also for sale. North Korea sells each of these missiles abroad, and their size, versatility and lower price point give them a much larger market that for the longer range missiles. These are also easier to move, and less likely to be intercepted by the United States under the proliferation Security Initiative. So Pyongyang can talk big, carry a medium-size stick, and get some free advertising. Come on down to the bargain basement ballistic blowout sale!!!

On a side note, for some reason this picture of the reviewing stand reminds me of the intro to the Muppet Show...

Ageing Vanguard

The North Korean leadership is ageing and dieing. The remnants of the first generation leaders, the compatriots of Kim Il Sun, the anti-Japanese guerrilla commanders, are passing on. They were instrumental in maintaining the stability of the regime during the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, and have remained important voices in the ear of Kim Jong Il. But they are, to put it bluntly, old. And they are dieing off.

The second generation leadership, the children of the revolutionaries, the Kim Jong Il generation, are in power. There are some hangers on from the first generation, in the military and elsewhere, but even Jo Myong Rok, a key first generation confidant of Kim Jong Il, is reportedly near death. Whereas the first generation leadership claim to power was based on their guerilla credentials (they actually fought for Korean independence), their Children’s claim is based on family lineage. Many of the second generation leaders were trained abroad, but primarily in Soviet, Chinese and Eastern European institutions. They have grown up as the children of the elite, and saw North Korea grow in prosperity, and then sink back into the doldrums. They are in government for the power. They believe they have a right to lead, based on their lineage, and are motivated by a burning desire to retain power – for without it they are nothing. This is the current leadership. Their number one driver is the perpetuation of the elite, of their status and power. It shapes all their actions.

But there is a rising generation, the third generation of leadership, that is now emerging. These are the children of the children of the revolution. They have grown up in a completely different environment than their predecessors. They have always been the elite, the privileged, separated from the common folk. They are the new aristocracy. Many have been to western nations, schooled in Europe, Australia and even the United States. They have seen the riches of the West, and even of the East (China, Japan and the like). They like power, but they crave money, wealth, material goods. These are the spoiled third generation, the next generation of leaders. Kim Jong Il’s son, Kim Jong Nam, reflects this generation’s desires and drivers. His detention in Japan a few years back was a clear indication of the motivations of this generation. They are not concerned with power so much as spending. This generation is soon going to move into the halls of power as the first generation dies off. And it is this generation, not the current second generation leaders, who will eventually sell out North Korea. Reunification hopes under the current leadership are delusional. But when the next generation takes charge, there will be a rapid dissolution of the North Korean state.

Below are pictures of Kim Jong Il and some of his top military officers at various parades in Pyongyang. Watch as they magically grow older, right before your eyes...

North Korea, Myanmar: Tyrannical Ties...

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il (not to be confused with newly-named Premier Kim Yong Il) is expected to arrive in Naypyidaw (the new capital of Myanmar) April 25, and the following day sign the agreement to re-establish normal diplomatic relations between the two “outposts of tyranny.” Should these events actually take place as the rumors suggest, North Korea and Myanmar would finally put behind them the 1983 North Korean assassination attempt on then-South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, which took place October 9 at the Aung San Martyr’s Mausoleum. In the botched assassination attempt (the explosion occurred before Chun arrived), 17 South Koreans, including four cabinet ministers, were killed and four Burmese were also killed. At least 14 others were injured in the attack, carried out by three North Korean agents, allegedly on the orders of Kim Jong Il himself. (This was, interestingly, one of the last acts recognized by the U.S. State Department of state sponsored terrorism carried out by North Korea.) Since the early 1990s, North Korea and Myanmar have begun a series of informal exchanges, including talks on releasing the final North Korean held for the 1983 bombing, alleged military cooperation (Pyongyang reportedly sold a dozen or so 130mm M-46 field artillery pieces and some 20 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition to Myanmar in exchange for rice in the late 1990s or early 2000s), and North Korean assistance in preparing the Naypyidaw (then known as Pyinmana) site for the new capital (Pyongyang’s expertise in tunneling has been rather useful for the SPDC, allegedly). In 2000, prior to the inter-Korean summit, North Korea approached ASEAN to request membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and not long thereafter, in July, Pyongyang normalized diplomatic relations with Manila, leaving Myanmar the only ASEAN state without formal diplomatic ties with North Korea. Myanmar assented to Pyongyang’s involvement in the ARF, however, and in 200 and 2001 hinted that it was considering re-establishing diplomatic relations. In November, 2000, a Myanmar government delegation paid a secret visit to Pyongyang, and in June 2001, a North Korean delegation, led by a vice foreign minister, visited Myanmar. In 2002, Myanmar was still only “considering” the normalization of relations. In 2003, North Korean technicians reportedly helped build a bunker complex in Taungdwingyi (to the Northwest of Naypyidaw) to house Myanmar’s MiG-29s bought from Russia. (It is quite possible that in return for the construction work, North Korean pilots trained on the MiGs.) In 2003, other North Korean technicians were spotted near the Monkey Point naval base, south of Yangon, raising speculation Pyongyang was selling ship to ship missiles to the SPDC. And there are other reports that Pyongyang (and perhaps China) aided Myanmar in upgrading radar stations near Victoria point to monitor Thai-U.S. naval exercises. There are wilder claims – of North Korea assisting Myanmar in a nuclear program, or even selling it nuclear missiles, but these fall far outside the realm of North Korean activity, and come from dissident sources out to shape international viewpoints. What is clear, however, is that North Korea and Myanmar have been at least mulling diplomatic ties for a while, and have been engaged in various forms of cooperation for even longer. And if the reports of North Korean assistance in building the underground bunker and tunnel system around Naypyidaw are accurate, the SPDC certainly trusts North Korea enough to share its most sensitive security secrets. In 2006, the two countries agreed in principle to normalize relations, and in early April 2007, there were numerous leaks of the imminent visit of a North Korean delegation to Naypyidaw to finally normalize relations, nearly two and a half decades after the October 9 incident. On April 19, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il left Pyongyang for a multi-nation Asian visit, with no destination named (but hints as he was seen off at the airport by envoys from Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Iran.) His visit to Myanmar fits right into the flight path. Much of the talk of the normalization between the two centers on the potential dangers of two pariahs, two outposts of tyranny, getting together. This is rather silly. They already cooperate. For North Korea, the resumption of diplomatic ties has much more to do with ASEAN than with some nefarious plotting among the Axis of Evil and the Axis of nearly Evil. Pyongyang, since 2000, has been seeking diplomatic ties all over the place, trying to break free from the economic and political constraints of its acrimonious relationship with the United States. While it joined ARF, it never finalized cooperation with ASEAN, due to the lack of formal ties with Myanmar. But with the success (or at least hints of success) with South Korea getting Washington to at least consider counting Kaesong-made goods as fitting within the FTA, and with the South Korea-ASEAN FTA coming onto effect June 1, Pyongyang sees a way to increase its economic contacts throughout Southeast Asia, riding on the coattails of South Korea. Add in the recent ten point economic agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang, which calls for joint development of mineral resources in third countries, and you have a North Korea looking perhaps at joining in the South Korean natural gas exploration in Myanmar. And if folks get all worked up about two “evil” nations having diplomatic ties, well, North Korea wont lose any sleep over that.

China Shifts Tack On North Korea Management

China has formally appointed Chen Naiqing as special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs. Chen, China’s Ambassador to Norway, was born in Shandong, China in December 1953, graduated from the Dalian Foreign Language Institute in 1974, and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) the same year in the Department of Translation and Interpretation. Chen studied at the London School of Economics in 1975 and 1976, and remained in London as a staff member and attaché of the Embassy until 1982. Chen then moved back to the MFA in 1982, serving in the Department of translation and interpretation (1982-1986) and the Department of West European Affairs (1986-1988). Chen then moved to New York as Second Secretary and then First Secretary of China’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1988-1992) before returning to China to take up various positions in the Department of Policy Planning. In February, 2003, she took up her post as Ambassador to Norway.

Chen replaces Li Bin, former Ambassador to South Korea (2001-2005) who took on the role as special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs in September 2005. Li was raised in Beijing, studied at Kim Il Sung university in Pyongyang, and lived in Pyongyang for nearly two decades, serving in the embassy and serving as a guide for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il during visits to China in the 1980s and 1990s. Li was awarded the DPRK Friendship Order First Class in August 2001 for his "positive activities" to boost China-DPRK relations and work toward Korean unification. In May 2006, after returning to China from South Korea, Li took up the post of Deputy Mayor of Weihai City, in Shandong province, but in December 2006, Li was called to Beijing for questioning, accused of leaking state secrets, stripped of his position in Weihei and in early 2007 was arrested. (The arrest prompted Yonhap reporter Park Ki Sung to deny that Li had given him information on one of Kim Jong Il’s secret trips to China, insisting he and his fellow reporters had figured it out themselves. See the Asia Times article by Sunny Lee for more on this) Li’s detention was far more likely linked to China’s ongoing spat with North Korea than with anything li may have leaked to a South Korean reporter about Kim Jong Il’s itinerary.

The appointment of Chen fills the gap left by Li. It also changes the dynamic of the position. Rather than having someone who is closely tied to North Korea as the key envoy, Beijing is instead placing someone intimately familiar with the main policy planning and broader foreign policy goals of China. North Korean relations, or Korean peninsular relations, are being shaped more in line with China’s broader foreign policy than with China’s specific relation with North Korea. It is somewhat interesting that both Li Bin and North Korean Premier Pak Pong Ju were both unceremoniously dumped about the same time. Pak’s removal was linked both to failed policies and his close ties to Beijing. Li appears to have been dumped in part for his close ties to Pyongyang. What the two were scheming together without the sanction of their respective governments is anyone’s guess.

But Beijing is now moving on, and Chen may bring a new vision into the Korean Peninsular issue – one that looks at it as a small piece of a larger puzzle, rather than as a puzzle in itself. This may not be good news for Pyongyang, and North Korea may soon turn its affection to Russia to regain some leverage.

North Korea: New PM, New Direction?

North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly met April 11 for a one-day session, attended by Kim Jong Il. During the meeting, the SPA appointed Minister of Land and Marine Transport Kim Yong Il (sometimes Kim Young Il) the new Premier of the Cabinet, replacing Pak Pong Ju, who served as Premier since 2003. (Just for clarification, this is a different Kim Yong Il from the Vice Foreign Minister who is rather vocal on the nuclear issue) Kim Yong Il was born in 1944, served nine years in the military beginning in 1961, and later attended the Rajin University of Marine Transport (which was founded in 1968, so Kim Yong Il was in one of the earlier classes to graduate from the university).

Kim apparently served as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Marine and Land Transport for several years, before being promoted to Minister in 1994 or 1995 (either way, apparently after the death of Kim Il Sung). Kim Yong Il was reaffirmed Minister of maritime and Land Transport at the 10th SPA in 1998 and the 11th SPA in 2003. In December, 2005, he accompanied Kim Jong Il on an inspection of a new (or revitalized) dock at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Facility. Kim Yong Il attended the commissioning ceremony for the dock in March, 2006. (Yonhap reports that he accompanied Kim Jong Il on another inspection sometime in 2005, but I have yet to find verification).

In March 2005, Kim Yong Il flew to Damascus to sign an agreement on Maritime transport. He oversaw maritime transport deals with Pakistan in 1998 and China in 2002 – both of which were signed in Pyongyang. Yonhap reports that Kim Yong Il also delegations to Cuba and China within the last seven years. In general, though, Kim Yong Il has kept a low profile. There is little information in South Korea on his family background, place of birth, or his involvement in North Korean policymaking to this point. Kim Yong Il is a 2002 recipient of the Kim Il Sung order.

Kim Yong Il’s appointment means that he is now responsible for North Korea’s economic direction. His predecessor, Pak Pong Ju, is rumored to have failed in his task when he promulgated ineffective agricultural policies. Interestingly, Pak was Minister of Chemical Industry before being appointed premier, suggesting he was much more adept at focusing on heavy industry than on agriculture. Pak had been close to Kim Jong il, nearly the same age as the dear leader, and was also sent abroad several times as part of economic delegations, studying reforms and market systems. His appointment in 2003 was part of an infusion of second generation technocrats into the top tiers of the North Korean leadership. His last public appearance with Kim Jong Il was in May, 2006. His fall was made abundantly clear when he was not even present at the latest SPA session to read the government work report.

Kim Yong Il’s appointment (one of only two apparent changes in the North Korean leadership this time around), may indicate the direction of North Korea’s economic policies in the coming years. His lengthy stay in the Ministry of Maritime and Land Transportation, and his focus on maritime issues, may hint at a more active focus on trade for North Korea. In addition, Kim Yong Il’s oversight of the construction of the computerized Dock No. 2 of the Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory may hint at North Korea’s entrance into ship building or repair, and Kim Jong Il even reportedly said, during his visit, that the new facility should ultimately have facilities to serve foreign ships’ crews, and take in ship repair of foreign vessels.

As with all such appointments, there is usually much more behind the scenes, and the individual placed in charge may prove unable or unwilling to bring about a new direction for the North Korean economy. But if Kim Yong il’s background is any indicator, North Korea will look to increase foreign trade in the coming years – something that is likely to encourage South Korean and Chinese officials eager for some change in the North Korean economic situation.

Kim Yong Il visiting the Dock No. 2 at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory with Kim Jong Il in December, 2005. Kim Yong Il is pointing, Pak Pong Ju is standing behind the two Kims.

Where was Kim Yong Il (Minister of Maritime and Land Transport) Information from KCNA unless otherwise noted

1961: Joins the Military. (Yonhap)

1970s(?): Begins study at the Rajin University of Marine Transport. (Yonhap)

1994(95?): Appointed Minister of Maritime and Land Transport. (Yonhap)

September 1997: Part of the committee that nominated Kim Jong Il as

July 20, 1998: Signed an agreement in Pyongyang on maritime transport between North Korea and Pakistan. Signing for Pakistan was Ambassador Rehmdil Bhatti.

September 5, 1998: Re-appointed Minister of Marine and Land Transport at the 10th SPA session.

March 27, 2002: Awarded the Kim Il Sung Order on the 90th anniversary of the great leader's birthday (one of numerous recipients, but the third mentioned in the list as released by the SPA Presidium). (Central Broadcasting Station, via BBC)

June 15, 2002: Present at a signing ceremony in Pyongyang on maritime transport. Singing the agreement were Chinese Vice Minister of Communications Hu Xijie and Chief of Staff of the North Korean Ministry of Maritime and Land transport, Ra Dong Hui. Also present was Chinese Ambassador Wu Donghe.

September 3, 2003: Re-appointed Minister of Marine and Land Transport at the 11th SPA session.

April 19, 2005: Attended a reception at the Syrian Embassy in Pyongyang, hosted by Syrian Charge d' Affaires a.i. Muhammad Adib Alhani. Also in attendance were Secretary of the CC of the WPK Choe Thae Bok, Minister of Foreign Trade Rim Kyong Man, and Mun Jae Chol, acting chairman of the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

May 7, 2005: Left Pyongyang for a visit to Syria. He was seen off at the airport by Ra Tong Hui, chief of Staff of the Ministry, and Syrian Charge d' Affaires a.i. Muhammad Adib Alhani.

May 11, 2005: Signed an agreement in Damascus on maritime transport.

December 13, 2005: Accompanied Kim Jong Il on a field guidance visit to Dock No. 2 at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory. Also joining them was then premier Pak Pong Ju.

March 24, 2006: Attended a commissioning ceremony for Dock No. 2 of the Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory. Also in attendance was Vice-Premier Ro Tu Chol.

April 11, 2007: Appointed Premier of the cabinet of DPRK.