Kim Jong Il, Fidel Castro, and the Mixed Blessing of Medically-Induced Succession

Following his brush with death, Kim Jong Il can stand (with some assistance), brush his teeth (with only minimal drooling), and maybe even rule his country. Kim’s illness, stroke, heart attack or whatever befell the Dear leader has triggered a massive revival of interest in North Korea and even more speculation about what happens after he dies.

But perhaps the focus should not be on life after Kim, but on the general issue of succession or transition. Back around Kim’s 60th birthday, there was tons of talk about leadership succession, and Kim was apparently no nearer to death on the first day after his birthday than he was before. But health issues have a way of bringing home the potential imminence of a forced and perhaps unprepared transition, particularly in a country where there is no clear path for succession, having only seen two leaders in the past 60 years - and the second being the son of the first.

In general, there appear to be two elements of the succession/transition process largely agreed upon among the North Korean elite - the emergence of a more collective leadership (even if behind the scenes) and the placement of Kim’s second son, Kim Jong Chol, as the next leader. Kim Jong Chol was reportedly appointed Vice Director of the Workers Party of Korea in late 2007, following in his father’s footsteps along the ladder to supreme leadership. The need for collective leadership to supplement the succession process stems from Kim Jong Chol’s relative youth (he is only in his late 20s) and correlated lack of a strong base of independent support.

While there was much speculation outside North Korea, and plenty of less overt speculation inside North Korea over the past decade or so over which of Kim’s sons would succeed him, there was apparently little progress in actually shaping the successor. This was in part because Kim himself only took over in 1994, and really didn’t fully consolidate his rule until 1998. It was much too soon to begin grooming a successor - because if he did, he risked loyalty moving more to his son than to himself as the elite prepared for the future.

Kim’s medical emergency now has perhaps given him an unexpected but extremely valuable opportunity - one that he saw befall his counterpart across the seas in Cuba. When Fidel Castro fell ill, the rumors abounded of his near certain death, and the worries over transition and the potential internal bickering and competition. But Castro proved to retain his seeming Olympian longevity, and far from dying, he went about making his epoch speeches. But he did, nonetheless, transfer power to his brother, Raul. This gave Fidel Castro the ability to use his own personal influence to maintain control among the potential factions in Cuba, to lend his moral authority to Raul, and to make sure Raul or some other members of the elite didn’t do anything too far off of the Fidel plan.

Kim Jong Il is now presented with the same opportunity, one that may be even more beneficial in his case than in Fidel’s as Raul was nearly as old as his bearded brother and had quite his own power base and relationship network built among the Cuban elite, whereas Kim Jong Chol is a mere child by comparison, and will need the strength of personality and history his (still living) father may lend. Even Kim Jong Il relied upon some of the old guard revolutionaries who had fought alongside his father (figuratively or literally) during the anti-Japanese struggle and the Korean War. Kim Jong Chol even more so needs this connection to the older generation as he transitions into the place of power.

Whether Kim Jong Il takes advantage of this opportunity or not, the question of transition and succession is now a pressing one in Pyongyang... and Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, Washington and Moscow.

Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Ill, or Kim Jong Dead?

Two rumors about the health of Kim Jong Il have been circulating - in one, Kim collapsed on August 22, and a team of nearly half a dozen Chinese doctors have been shuttling back and forth between Beijing and Pyongyang to treat a high-level North Korean official - ostensibly Kim. In the other, Kim died in 2003, and all his subsequent appearances, including meetings with foreign heads of state, have been carried out by body doubles, while real power lies in the hands of a small cadre of military and government officials.

Now, such rumors are not infrequent, and talk of Kim’s incapacitation or even death are just as frequent as reports of his insanity and womanizing. What to make of the current rash of reports is not readily clear.

Foreign media is laying a lot on the September 9 60th anniversary of North Korea, and its attendant parades, as a bellwether of Kim’s health; suggesting that if he doesn’t attend, it must mean he is ill or dead.

But in the 10 years that Kim has ruled North Korea (1998-2008, the first few years after his father’s death in 1994 were used to consolidate power, so I’ll count the real rule as starting in 1998), Kim only attended the anniversary of the DPRK parade twice, the 50th anniversary in 1998 and the 55th anniversary parade in 2003. [the initial post had an error, missing the 1998 attendance, though the point still stands - missing the 60th is somewhat odd, but not necessarily proof of his imminent demise.]

Kim has frequently dropped out of public site for a month (or even two or three) at a time in the past, potentially health related, but frequently apparently related to critical decisions in North Korea’s domestic policies and international relations. His last public appearance this year was August 14, when he visited KPA Unit 1319 with two of his generals. Kim made 11 visits to military units in August, plus attended a military art performance, but that in itself was not all that unusual.

The current rash of rumors could be linked to propaganda or attempts to profit on the higher profile of North Korea after Pyongyang decided to start reversing its de-nuclearization following Washington’s decision not to immediately remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Or they could reflect more concrete rumors and leaks of the Dear Leader’s ill health. The least likely is the report that Kim died in 2003, though if that were true, there certainly has been little change in North Korea’s overall behavior and strategy since that time, so the net impact has been nil.

If Kim is sick to the point of worry about succession, that could explain the sudden shifts in North Korean behavior linked to the Kumkang shooting and Pyongyang’s apparent retraction from major initiatives with the South Koreans and others - an attempt to minimize leaks or opportunities for interference. The North Korean regime is certainly not perfect in unity, but there are not clear signs of major rifts among the elite, and even if Kim dies in the near future, it is less likely to cause a sudden collapse of the regime than a consolidation of interests to secure the privileges already given the elite.