YEOHAENG ILGI

North Korean MiG 21 Crashes in China?

2010-08-18T03:19:00.002+09:00

Chinese media is reporting the crash of an unidentified “foreign” aircraft in Liaoning province. Pictures purported to be from the scene appear to show a North Korean MiG 21 that has crashed into some sort of thatch-roofed farm building near a cornfield. The red color of the soil, the corn and the farmers in the picture suggest this is indeed an image shot in northern China, though it is unconfirmed at this point whether the images circulating on Chinese internet sites are really of today’s crash. Some Chinese media is suggesting at least one individual is dead in the incident,and that the North Korean embassy has dispatched a team to the area.

The location of the crash, some 100 miles from the North Korean border, raises several questions. Was this a North Korean pilot defecting? it is highly unlikely that such a plane could have slipped into Chinese airspace unseen by the Chinese military, so why didn’t they respond? The images do not suggest the plane exploded or was shot down, rather that it made a controlled crash landing.

Another possibility is that the North Koreans are now receiving air force training in China. The Anshan air base in Liaoning province is not far from the crash site, and the Chinese fly the J7, a Chinese knock-off of the MiG 21, out of that field. The DPRK may have been receiving external training for their pilots, and China has been trying to keep this quiet, particularly given the tensions between the US, South Korea and North Korea and China following the sinking of the ChonAn earlier this year.

North Korea’s air force gets minimal time aloft, and only in recent years has the North Korean military begun increasing the number of flights for its aging Soviet-era fleet. The North Korean air force has had to deal with shortages of fuel, spare parts and seasoned pilots, and has had minimal training and experience. In 2009 another MiG 21 reportedly crashed of the east coast of North Korea, emphasizing the difficulties the North is having as it tries to revive its fleet. It would make sense, then, that the North would be training in China. The question is whether the Chinese would want such training to be made public at this time.

Back to Bangkok

2010-06-21T13:49:00.000+09:00

OK, so once again the unpardonable blog sin - a complete lack of posting for months. Maybe I'm not cut out for this sort of thing, or maybe I have just been too lazy. Who knows. But I'm back in Bangkok, and yesterday, to get over jet lag, I thought I'd take a walk - which ended up taking me all over the city - through China Town, to the Palace, to the river (nice coffee shop there called Vivi The Coffee Place), own through Silom, through an Indian section of town... in general, all over the place - 9+ hours of walking around. Stopped by Central World as well, to see the reconstruction work. They did a number on that place.

Beijing Snow

2009-11-15T10:45:00.004+09:00

Rest in Peace Mr. Kim DJ, You will be missed.

2009-08-18T13:57:00.001+09:00

Former President Kim dies at 85
SEOUL, Aug. 18 (Yonhap) -- Former President Kim Dae-jung died at 1:42 p.m. Tuesday, Seoul's Severance Hospital said.

A Stroll Through Seoul Part I

2009-07-24T18:02:00.005+09:00

Nope, not the moon, its the crescent sun, thanks to the moon.

Think Green!

The Bank of Korea Museum in the background, not sure where the motorcycle cop parked his bike.

Another officer casually watches over the intersection.

Caged.
(Construction abounds near the Kyongbokkung and around the statue of Admiral Yi).

In a park near MOFAT

Street-side knife sharpening.

These bugs are all over the place. This one was in Changgyeonggung.

As was this guy.

Traditional Lock.

Window Screen.

And from the outside.

Changgyeonggung.

A sundial - based on a 12-hour day.

One for sorrow...

Defending the Republic of Korea. A conservative rally in the park.

Gundam: "Instilling Hope and Inspiration in People for 30 Years

2009-07-18T16:31:00.007+09:00

“I believe that the Odaiba Gundam will serve the same purpose as the Statue of Liberty — something to instill hope and inspiration in people.” - Yoshiyuki Tomino speaking at the Foreign Correspondents' Club of Japan.

The Blades of Tsukiji

2009-07-18T09:25:00.006+09:00

Sweatin' in Tokyo

2009-07-16T23:40:00.005+09:00

Oh the humidity! Plenty of walking today, between meetings. Maybe observations another time...

The most cliche shot of the Imperial Palace:

An inverted view of the wall:

Look closely, the Gundam stands guard:

The Diet; Under (re)Construction:

Falling Water:

The Way Cool Wacoal Building:

Model C53 Locomotive No. 31 from the Thai-Burma Railroad:

Yellow at Yasukuni:

Yasukuni:

Old and New:

The Cocoon:

Save the Uighurs, and a few others:

Free (Inner) Mongolia:

Shinjuku:

That's all for now. G'night folks.

Evening in Tokyo

2009-07-15T21:52:00.002+09:00

Humid, Muggy, Breezy, Sticky. Ah, July.

Coming in on the train from Narita this afternoon, the strong winds were beating at the bright green rice, sending the stalks undulating like waves on the ocean, while the reeds in the background simply laid down, determined not to challenge the winds. The waves of rice lapped at the bases of the small hills, darker green, nearly black, with their conifers, small houses clustered on the hills above the sea of green. The farmer, clinging tightly to his wide-brin straw hat, wades between the rice fields, blue pants rolled up above the knees, his pale blue shirt ballooning out; maybe he is not so much holding his hat on as pressing himself firmly back to the ground, afraid that if he softens his grip, he will simply mount up into the sky, following the circling crows in their dark dance.

This evening, once settled in to my snug closet, I took a brief stroll past Tokyo Station, around the outskirts of the Imperial Palace grounds, through the maze of government buildings, and back again, my shirt clinging tightly to my back, the breeze nearly gone, the air thick; how I longed to be that farmer, aerated by the winds, lifted by the breeze, not wading through dense still air...

UPDATE: Now Who Hangs With Kim Jong Il

2009-07-08T14:20:00.000+09:00

So I know you have been waiting with baited breath for the second quarter Friends of Kim Jong Il list (First quarter list here), so here it goes.

Coming in at number one with the most reported public appearances with the Dear Leader in April, May and June is Kim Ki Nam with 25 recorded appearances. Kim Ki Nam, a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, also held first place for the first quarter, with 25 appearances, and holds the number one spot for the first half, with 49.

Moving up two places from his first quarter finish to rank number two in the second quarter is none other than Kim Jong Il’s brother-in-law and now member of the National Defense Commission, Jang Song Thaek, with 23 appearances. This also puts him in the number two spot for the first half, with a total of 42 reported sightings with Kim Jong Il.

Holding steady at third place for both the second and first quarters of 2009 is General Hyon Chol Hae, with 18 appearances (down two from his first quarter 20). Hyon holds the third place spot (tied) for the first half as well, with 38 total appearances.

Fourth place for the second quarter is a tie between General Ri Myong Su and Pak Nam Gi, department director of the WPK Central Committee, both with 16 appearances for the quarter. Ri has risen one place from his first quarter performance, but Pak has fallen from his number two spot last quarter. For the first half, Pak is tied for third with Hyon Chol Hae at 38 appearances, while Ri takes fifth with 31.

Coming in sixth is a new face in the top ranks for this year, Choe Ik Gyu, department director of the Central Committee of the WPK, with 10 appearances, a substantial jump from his single appearance in the first quarter. This gives him the ninth place ranking for the first half.

Seventh place is also another newcomer to the top of the list, KPA Colonel General Kim Won Hong, with eight appearances for the second quarter, compared to just one in the first. This leaves him outside the rankings of the top ten for the half, however.

In eighth place for the second quarter in a row is Kim Jong Gak, with just 6 appearances in the second quarter for a total of 12 in the first half, giving him an eighth place rank for the half as well.

Tied for ninth place for the second quarter are Kim Yang Gon, department director of the WPK Central Committee, and KPA Vice Marshal Kim Yong Chun, both with 5 appearances for the quarter, equal to each of their five appearances in the first quarter, leaving both tied for tenth place for the half (with Ri Je Gang, first vice department director of the WPK Central Committee).

Two strong performers for the half, who nevertheless had fairly weak showings in the second quarter, were KPA General Kim Myong Guk with 15 for the half, and first vice department director of the C.C. of the WPK Ri Jae Il, with 14 for the half.

North Korea Rhetoric Rises to New Heights

2009-06-01T23:22:00.002+09:00

OK, no joke, and I probably couldn't make this up if I tried. A statement from the North Korean Foreign Ministry last weeks concludes with the following phrase:

The U.S. is keen on using a catchphrase "Carrot and stick."
It would be better for the "Donkey" of the U.S. Democratic Party to lick the carrot.

Ummm, did they just say what I think they said? I don't even think it is a double entendre, as "lick the carrot" really cant be meant in any straightforward manner...

Perhaps the State Department should respond in kind:

We understand Kim Jong Il has Nodong and is preparing a Tape-on-dong.

Ah, the foreign policy of the fifth-grade playground...

Good Bye, Mr. President.

2009-05-29T14:22:00.001+09:00

Dear Leader celebrates Mr. T's Birthday

2009-05-21T23:34:00.001+09:00

5.18

2009-05-18T22:59:00.002+09:00

PLAN Fleet Review

2009-04-24T00:10:00.008+09:00

Just pics for now (click to enlarge), still traveling...

#108 DDG Xining

#115 DDG Shenyang

#218 "Great Wall"

#526 FFG Wenzhou

#527 FFG Luoyang

#528 FFG Mianyang

#529

#565 (Yulin) #572 (Beishui)

#699

#866 Peace Ark Daishandao

Assorted

Assorted Submarines

Hai Z-9C Haitun

Changhe Z-8 Super Frelon

Back to TAO

2009-04-21T23:40:00.003+09:00

Passing through, looking forward to seeing a boat or two.
The Coast Guard is on watch.
Slipping out at dusk, Luda Class Type 051, Hull 108 - the Xining, part of the North Fleet.

Who Hangs with Kim Jong Il?

2009-04-14T14:27:00.007+09:00

So I have been a little slow lately, but here are the results for the top 12 most-seen with Kim Jong Il for the first quarter of 2009. Two Workers' Party of Korea folks beat out the top Generals for the most reported appearances* with Kim this time around. Below are some mini-bios of some of these folks. If you spot errors, or have additional info to flesh these out, feel free to contact me (yisunshin@aol.com). These are based off of open source information (some from foreign language - you would be surprised how much the Chinese discuss Pyongyangology), and are thus subject to the rumors, mis-information and general lack of clarity associated with the topic. I have almost completed the mini bios of all 12 on the list, and will likely just update this entry when they are complete.

*Based on visits reported in the English language KCNA. For this study, each individual article counts as a single appearance, even if multiple locations were visited.

(1) Kim Ki Nam, Secretary, Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea

A shaper of North Korean image and propaganda, Kim Ki Nam was born August 28, 1926 in Wonsan, and began his studies at Kim Il Sung University before the outbreak of the Korean War. He also spent time at Moscow University. After a nearly decade-long teaching stint at Kim Il Sung University, Kim Ki Nam shifted into journalism in the mid 1960s, working at Rodong Sinmun (“the organ of the Central Committee of the Workers' Party of Korea”) and Kunroja (“the politico-theoretical magazine of the WPK Central Committee”).

In 1977, he was a delegate to the 6th Supreme People’s Assembly (also serving in succeeding SPA sessions), and was elected a member of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea in 1980. Five years later, Kim Ki Nam became Director of the Central Committee’s Agitation and Propaganda Department, becoming First Vice Director in 1987. In 1992, he became Secretary of Propaganda for the Central Committee of the WPK. Kim Ki Nam served on the funeral committee for late DPRK President Kim Il Sung in 1994. He is currently a Secretary of the Central Committee of the WPK, overseeing revolutionary politics.

Kim Ki Nam made 24 reported public appearances with Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of 2009, ranking first among North Korean officials. In 2008, he ranked third for the year, with 21 appearances, behind Generals Hyon Chol Hae (52) and Ri Myong Su (47).

(2) Pak Nam Gi, Department Director (Financial Planning), Central Committee of Workers’ Party of Korea

A key member of North Korea’s economic team, Pak Nam Gi was born in 1928 in Haeju, and studied at Kim Chaek University of Technology in North Korea, and studied abroad, before beginning work in economics. In 1976, Kim became Vice Chairman of the State Planning Commission (visiting Russia in this position in 1984, and leading an economic delegation to Austria and Finland in 1985) and was promoted to Director in 1986. In 1984, Pak Nam Gi became a Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, but apparently lost the post in 1986, only to regain it and then lose it again in 1993. He was re-appointed a Secretary around 2003, and held the title in 2004 press releases, but no in 2005.

In 1985, he was named to the Economic Policy Commission of the Central People’s Committee, and in 2003 became Chairman of the Budget Deliberation Committee of the Supreme People’s Assembly (a position he had held earlier, but lost in 1993, when he was appointed Chairman of the Pyongyang Municipal Administrative and Economic Committee). Pak Nam Gi was a member of the North Korean delegation for economic talks during the 2000 inter-Korean summit in Pyongyang, and accompanied Kim Jong Il on trips to Russia (2002) and China (2006).

Pak Nam Gi was present at 22 of Kim Jong Il’s public appearances in the first quarter 2009, second only to Kim Ki Nam. He made 11 appearances with Kim Jong Il in 2008, tying for fifth place with Kim Myong Guk and Kim Jong Gak.

(3) Hyon Chol Hae, KPA General, Deputy Director of the General Political Bureau of the Korean Peoples’ Army

An important player in maintaining the political loyalty of the military, General Hyon Chol Hae was born in August 1934, leaving him just shy of 16 when the Korean War broke out (though he was reportedly one of Kim Il Sung’s bodyguards during the war). Hyon Chol Hae studied at the Red Flag Mangyongdae Revolutionary School, Kim Il Sung University and studied abroad in Romania.

As a Lieutenant-General, Hyon Chol Hae became Director-General of Military Logistics for the KPA in 1991, and was promoted to the rank of General in April 1992. A year later, he took up a position in the Central Committee of the Worker’s Party of Korea, and has served as a deputy to the 10th, 11th and 12th SPA sessions. Hyon Chol Hae is currently Deputy Director of General Political Bureau (a position he took in 1995), serving directly under Vice Marshall Jo Myong Rok. He accompanied Kim Jong Il on a 2001 visit to China.

Hyon Chol Hae has appeared 20 times with Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of 2009, ranking third. In 2008, he appeared with Kim Jong Il 52 times, ranking first.

(4) Jang Song Thaek, Department Director (Administration), Central Committee of Worker’s Party of Korea

Jang Song Thaek, Kim Jong il’s brother-in-law (married to Kim Kyong Hee), has had a tumultuous ride in the inner circles of Korean power. Born in February 1946 in Kangwon province, he studied at Kim Il Sung University (where he met Kim Kyong Hee) and Moscow State University. His marriage to Kim Jong Il’s sister was purportedly opposed by Kim Il Sung, who relented only after countless tantrums by his daughter and the intervention of Kim Jong Il.

In 1975, Jang Song Thaek was given a position in the Guidance Department of the Central Committee of the WPK, only to be removed in 1978 and sent to a factory for re-education (either because he was caught throwing lavish parties, or because he was linked to a relative who was purged around the same time for opposing the positioning of Kim Jong Il as Kim Il Sung’s successor). Jang Song Thaek was re-instated after a few years and promoted to Deputy Director (1982) and then Director (1985) of Youth Labor for the Central Committee of the WPK, where he oversaw construction projects ahead of the 13th World Festival of Youth and Students in Pyongyang in 1989. Jang served as a delegate to the 9th, 10th, 11th and 12th SPA sessions. He became an alternate member of the Central Committee of the WPK in 1989 and a full member in 1992. Sometime between 1992 and 1995 he was named First Vice Director of the Guidance Department (where he had worked briefly in the 1970s), a position he held until around 2004, when he was again purged, purportedly for plotting the overthrow of Kim Jong Il, or at least of whatever successor emerged after Kim Jong Il.

Jang Song Thaek was again rehabilitated in late 2005, but given the reduced position of First Vice Director of Workers organization. In 2007, he was promoted to Department Director of Administration for the CC of the WOK, and returned as First Vice Director of the Guidance Department in 2008, following Kim jong il’s stroke. During Kim’s convalescence, Jang served as a key liaison between Kim and the rest of the government. By some accounts, Jang and Hyon Chol Hae were effectively running North Korea for several months after Kim’s stroke, and Jang’s appointment to the National Defense Commission at the April 2009 SPA session appears to confirm Jang’s rising power.

Jang Song Thaek made 19 appearances with Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of 2009, compared to 14 total appearances with Kim Jong Il in 2008.

(5) Ri Myong Su, KPA General, Director of Administrative Department of NDC

Born around 1937, Ri Myong Su has for the past half decade, been one of the most frequent participants with Kim Jong Il on his inspection tours. Ri has reportedly been close to Kim since the 1970s, and played a role in maintaining stability during the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il following the elder Kim’s death in 1994.

Ri was curator of the National Liberation War Memorial Hall in the 1980s, and in 1993 was chief of the KPA Third Corps (which is responsible for the west central area including the area surrounding Pyongyang). Three years later, Ri was promoted to Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the KPA, became Director of the KPA Operations Department in 1997 (serving in the position until 2007), and was promoted to full General in 2000. Ri was given his position in the NDC in 2007. Ri led a military delegation to Russia in October 2002, as one of the numerous North Korean nuclear crises was kicking off. Ri was a Deputy to the 10th and 11th SPA (1998, 2003) but not on the list of deputies to the 12th SPA in 2009.

Ri Myong Su appeared with Kim Jong Il 47 times in 2008, second only to General Hyon Chol Hae. In the first quarter of 2009, Ri made 15 appearances with Kim, ranking fifth.

(6) Kim Myong Guk, KPA General, Director of KPA Operations Department

Kim Myong Guk served as Director of the KPA Operations Department from 1994-97, when he was replaced by Ri Myong Su. He returned to the post in 2007, when Ri was moved over to the NDC. There is a rumor that Kim Myong Guk was briefly sidelined in 1996 after slipping up and revealing information about a secret underground bunker designed for Kim Jong Il.

Kim Myong Guk appeared 11 times with Kim Jong Il in 2008, seven of those were after Kim’s purported stroke. In the first quarter of 2009, he has made 11 appearances.

(7) Ri Jae Il, First Vice Department Director (Information and Agitation Department) of the Central Committee of the WPK

Little is known about Ri Jae Il, who began to rise in prominence (at least as far as his public appearances) in 2004, after he was promoted to First Vice Director of the Information [propaganda] and Agitation Department of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea. Ri had been appointed Vice Director of the same Department in 2003. Prior to that, he was a Bureau Chief for information/Propaganda.

Ri Jae Il made eight public appearances with Kim Jong Il in 2008, seven of them after Kim’s stroke. He made 11 appearances in the first quarter of 2009.

(8) Kim Jong Gak, KPA General, First Vice Director of the KPA General Political Bureau

Born around 1946, Kim Jong Gak is one of the leading figures in the Korean People’s Army. Kim was appointed Vice-Minister of the People's Armed Forces in 1992 (some sources suggest this took place in 1997), made full General in 2002, and was appointed First Vice Director of the KPA General Political Bureau in 2007 (though some reports suggest he took this position in 2000), where he effectively oversees propaganda and ideological guidance for the military. In 2008, it was rumored that he was fulfilling the role of Director while Jo Myong Rok was ill.

Kim Jong Gak is frequently chosen to deliver strong warnings to the outside world about North Korea’s military might and willingness to over-respond to provocations, and was one of the main speakers at a rally praising North Korea’s 2006 nuclear test.

Kim Jong Gak made six appearances with Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of 2009, tying for eights with Ri Je Gang. In 2009, Kim Jong Gak made 11 public appearances with Kim Jong Il, tying for fifth with Kim Myong Guk and Pak Nam Gi.

(9) Ri Je Gang, First Vice Department Director (Organization and Instruction) of the Central Committee of the WPK

Born in 1930, Ri Je Gang studied at Kim Il Sung University. Ri has been caught up in the soap-opera that is overseas observations of the palace dramas in Pyongyang. He is rumored to have been close to Ko Yong Hee (mother to Kim Jong Chol and Kim Jong Un), and is the rumored rival to Jang Song Thaek, whose return to power in 2006/2007 was seen as a counter to Ri’s rising influence in Party and Military promotions and affairs (Ri reportedly took over as Department Director for Structure Management when Jang was purged).

Ri purportedly mentored and backed Kim Jong Il’s youngest son, Kim Jong Un, as successor to Kim Jong Il, as opposed to Jang, who supported eldest son Kim Jong Nam (some reports also suggest Ri mentored Kim Jong Chul during his training period as well). Ri reportedly announced Kim Jong Il’s decision to anoint Kim Jong Un his successor sometime in January 2009, though this was never confirmed.

Ri joined the Central Committee in the early 1970s, rising to Vice Department Director (Organization and Instruction) in 1982 and First Vice Department Director (Organization and Instruction) in 2001. During the 1980s, Ri was part of Kim Jong Il’s Pyongyang re-development project, gaining Kim Jong il’s trust. At one point, Ri headed the military operations department of the WKP.

Ri Je Gang made 10 public appearances with Kim Jong Il in 2008, and six in the first quarter of 2009.

(10) Kim Yong Chun, KPA General, Vice-Chairman of the National Defense Commission, Minister of the People's Armed Forces
Five appearances with Kim Jong il int he first quarter of 2009, but prior to that, no appearances since June 2007.

(11) Ju Kyu Chang, Member of the National Defense Commission, First Vice Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK
Seven appearances in 2008, five in the first quarter of 2009.

(12) Kim Yang Gon, Department Director of the Central Committee of the WPK, Member of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly
Eight appearances in 2008, five in the first quarter of 2009.

Happy Birthday, Old Man

2009-02-16T11:46:00.003+09:00

Once again we arrive at the auspicious date of February 16, when the Lodestar for the 21st Century was brought into the world under the twin rainbows over the holy mother Mount Paekdu. Were it not for the Son of the Sun, the Shining Star of Juche and Songun policies, the imperial aggressors and their puppets would have destroyed the People's paradise with their decadent Jonas Brothers and Double Meat Whoppers.

Manse!
Dear Leader,
Manse!

Get the Fireworks Ready Boys, Hillary's Comin' !!!

2009-02-11T14:15:00.000+09:00

U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton is headed to Asia soon, her first international travel with her new State Department business cards. Clinton will visit Japan Feb. 16-17, Indonesia Feb. 18-19, South Korea Feb. 19-20 and China Feb. 20-22. The visit comes as North Korea is ratcheting up its anti-U.S. rhetoric (the “problem is that the U.S. bellicose forces are supporting the puppets by waging saber-rattling against the DPRK from the outset of the new year”), anti-South Korean rhetoric (“The frantic exercises staged by the Lee Myung Bak warlike forces who put the inter-Korean relations in total stalemate and drove the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war through their reckless anti-DPRK confrontational moves will only precipitate their ruin”), and anti-Japanese rhetoric (“Japan is an aggression and war force which the international community should stand guard against, in particular”), and sending signals of impending missile tests. It is likely that, as part of a pattern of rhetoric leading to physical escalation, North Korea will greet Clinton’s visit to South Korea Feb. 19 or 20 with a test of short-range missiles in the West Sea (likely surface to surface anti-ship missiles, though there are reports Pyongyang was playing around with air-launched anti-ship missiles last year). This would be a near exact repeat of North Korea’s missile tests on Feb. 24, 2003, the day then Secretary of State Colin Powell arrived in South Korea for Roh Moo Hyun’s inauguration. What will be interesting to watch is not the short-range missile tests (pretty run of the mill for the DPRK) but the potential for a more dramatic show - a launch of the Taepodong-2 in SLV configuration, either from the Musudan-ri launch site on the east coast or the newer Dongchan-ri site on the west coast. That will stir up not only the South Koreans, but the Japanese and Chinese as well, giving Clinton a real test of her new foreign policy credentials.

Kim Jong Il's Provincial Schedule

2009-02-05T05:41:00.001+09:00

Here is a little something I have been fiddling with lately. It breaks down Kim Jong Il’s (non-military, non-art performance) field guidance visits by province. (This is an approximation, and there is an explanation of methodology below.) So what does it show? Well, we will begin with an assumption that Kim’s visits to certain economic activities demonstrate a particular focus on that economic project or sector. This may be inaccurate, but it will be our starting assumption: Kim Jong Il makes visits for a reason, and in some ways that reason can be deduced from the topic of the reported visit.

So first, it becomes clear that South Hwanghae province gets the shaft. This is somewhat interesting, as it is South Hwanghae that is shut off by the Northern Limit Line (NLL) that Pyongyang always complains about. It may simply reflect an insecurity of traveling to the province, though we don’t know that Kim doesn’t make regular visits there as part of his military tours. Or it could be that the province really isn't an economic priority, particularly with the NLL issue (most port upgrades have been in Nampo, just north of South Hwanghae, or across the Peninsula in Wonsan, so Haeju continues to sit in relative decline).

But aside from the under-visited South Hwanghae province, if these do reflect economic priorities, a couple of other things stand out.

In 2000 and 2001, there is a fairly strong focus on provinces that border South Korea (represented by shades of green), which makes sense given the 2000 summit between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung and the massive increase in the focus on cross-border projects. In 2002, there is a rapid drop in Kim’s visits to non-military projects along the border, as Pyongyang seeks to understand George Bush’s “Axis of Evil” remark.

In 2003 and 2004, economic projects at home were not a priority at all. That is not all unbelievable - at the time Pyongyang was concerned that Washington was going to declare “mission accomplished” in Iraq and turn its bomb-sites to another “Axis of Evil” member, North Korea. Really, economics take back seat to physical survival, and the tensions in the US-DPRK relations appear clearly reflected in these numbers.

What is perhaps most notable is the disproportionate attention to the four northern provinces (represented by shades of blue) in 2007 and 2008. It has always been conventional wisdom (a warning factor if there ever was one) that the northern provinces were the lowest priority for North Korea, that they were the least agriculturally and economically viable, that they were where the politically unreliable were sent, and that, if there were famine or other social problems in North Korea, they would be disproportionately represented in these four provinces along the Chinese and Russian borders.

It could be just a reflection of more attention to the places where Kim houses his long-range missile bases, but it may also be both a way to rebuild the support and loyalty of the disenfranchised politically unreliable class and to strengthen the border region with China, the latter both as a security measure and as preparation to replace the economic cross border activity along the DMZ with new economic zones along the PRC border. The most attention is given to Chagang (Jagang) province, one of the least developed of North Korea’s provinces. Kim has paid considerable attention to the province of late, something that may bear watching.

[Methodology Note: All reports of Kim’s public appearances are taken from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). For this review, a single KCNA report counts as a single visit, even if it included multiple factories or locations. For this chart, Field Guidance events are those to a factory, recreation area, business or infrastructure project. Those labeled in the “unclear” column are visits that, though not via exhaustive measures, it could not be determined exactly which province they occurred in. This is not all exact, but used for general comparisons, and assumes for this look that all visits by Kim Jong Il took place as reported in KCNA.]

Not Another Missile Test...

2009-02-04T15:00:00.003+09:00

Its that time of year again. Time for Pyongyang to make sure everyone with a satellite sees that North Korea is preparing to launch a new missile. South Korean and Japanese media are citing U.S. spy satellite imagery of a train hauling a long, cylindrical object toward Dongchan, site of North Korea’s newer long-range missile/satellite launching facility. Now if there is one thing the North Koreans have mastered over the last decade or so, it is the art of manipulating foreign powers through the selective exposure of “secrets” to the always watchful international intelligence community. Since last year, North Korea has made sure that its final construction at the launch facility near Dongchan, in North Pyongan Province, has been seen and noted by interested powers. The new facility is bigger and better than the old Musudan facility, capable of launching the suspected Taepodong 2 or even Taepodong 3 missile (or SLV). Coming on the heels of the claimed Iranian satellite launch, it would appear that Pyongyang and Tehran are coordinating in seeking to get the attention of Barak Obama’s new U.S. administration. In fact, it is likely that they are coordinating their actions to create a bigger sense of crisis, to test the limits of the Obama administration’s capabilities and tolerances, and perhaps to try and gain rapid concessions from Obama in return for not distracting from the focus on the economy, on Afghanistan and iraq, and on the uneasy relations emerging with Russia. Rumor has it the North Koreans will be able to launch in a few months or less - perhaps around April 15 as a way to mark the anniversary of Kim Il Sung’s birth? (Try blowing that candle out.) But what is perhaps most interesting is that North Korea really wants to get this one right. Its first satellite launch attempt in 1998 failed in the final stage. A second launch in 2006 was either aborted intentionally (just a test of the new and improved first stage) or was another failure. It is important for Pyongyang to prove its missile capability, its technological capability, despite its isolation, as it heads into a new round of negotiations with Washington. This was the intent in 1998, and it remains the intent now. It is a show of capability and strength, a demonstration that North Korea doesn’t need negotiations - and thus giving itself a bit more leverage in the negotiations that it does desire.

41 Years of the Pueblo

2009-01-24T01:04:00.002+09:00

41 years ago today, on January 23, 1968, the North Koreans captured the USS Pueblo. For 11 months, the crew was held by the North Koreans, stuck in the middle of a Cold War chicken fight between Pyongyang and Washington. The ship still sits along the bank of the Taedong River, a trophy for the North Koreans to show off to guests.

I visited the Pueblo back in 2005 - here is the snippet from my journal at the time.

Where Was Kim Jong Il in 2008?

2009-01-01T02:39:00.003+09:00

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il was rather busy in 2008, despite his August stroke. By far the two individuals named alongside Kim during his public appearances in 2008 were Korean People’s Army (KPA) Generals Hyon Chol Hae and Ri Myong Su, with 52 and 47 named appearances respectively [See below for methodology in assessing appearances]. Coming in a distant third was Kim Ki Nam, Secretary of the Central Committee of the Workers Party of Korea (WPK), with 21 named appearances alongside the Dear Leader. Perhaps most notable about Kim Ki Nam’s appearances, however, is that only one was made after Kim re-emerged following his stroke, and that on November 5, Kim’s first reported public appearance following his incapacitation.

The change in who Kim appears with is not the only change in his schedule before and after the stroke. Perhaps most notable is his penchant for cultural events after returning to the public stage - most likely because such large-scale events give many people the opportunity to see Kim while requiring little physical exertion from him and allowing little close inspection of his physical status, as he can sit up in his special box waving down to the crowds below. Notable also is that, while Kim makes sure to make inspections of military units following his return, they are a far cry fewer than in the months preceding his stroke. But despite the lower number of visits, there is a very strong military presence accompanying him in each of his public appearances following his stroke - most notably the above mentioned Hyon Chol Hae and Ri Myong Su, who were named with Kim on 20 and 18 occasions respectively following Kim’s return to the public spotlight.

A few other shifts in the people appearing with Kim include WPK officials Jang Song Thaek, Kim Yang Gon, Ju Kyu Chang, Ri Jae Gang and Ri Jae Il, who appeared much more often with Kim after his stroke than before. This may indicate an adjustment in balancing the powers within the WPK, but also ensuring the WPK remains linked in to the plans of Kim as he lays the groundwork for succession. Among the KPA officials, General Kim Myong Guk and KPA Air Force Commander Ri Pyong Chol are notable additions beside Kim post stroke, as opposed to pre-stroke.

One oddity is the appearance of Cha Sung Su, Chairman of the Radio and TV Broadcasting Committee of North Korea, who has one appearance with Kim prior to the stroke and two following the stroke. Cha was last named at a public appearance of Kim in 2006. His two appearances in 2006 were at musical performances, as were two of his appearances in 2008. But Cha also accompanied Kim on a visit to the Pyongyang Zoo on December 1, which doesn’t seem to match his prior appearances this year or in years past. It perhaps reflects Kim’s desire to make sure that there is plenty of public exposure in North Korea to counter the reports of his stroke and possible incapacitation spreading from South Korea and China into North Korea.

Kim’s appearances in 2008, broken down by type, include 44 military, 24 economic, 21 cultural, 3 political and 3 educational appearances. Of these, there were 7 military, 6 economic, 9 cultural, 0 political and 1 educational appearance following the recovery from the stroke. For the complete year, military appearances made up 46 percent of the total, followed by 25 percent economic, 22 percent cultural, 3 percent political and 3 percent educational. Of the pre-stroke appearances, 51 percent were military, 25 percent economic, 17 percent cultural, 4 percent political and 3 percent educational. Of the post stroke appearances, 30 percent were military, 26 percent were economic, 39 percent were cultural, 0 percent were political and 4 percent were educational.

In the last quarter of the year, Kim made 16 percent of his total military appearances, 25 percent of his economic appearances, 43 percent of his cultural appearances, 0 percent of his political appearances and 33 percent of his educational appearances. What does all this mean? Not much, really, except to confirm that Kim bulked up on cultural appearances in the last quarter (after his stroke). If anything, it shows almost no change in the average patterns of Kim’s activities this year (I still have to compare this year’s breakdown to previous years, which may offer some additional insights).

[Methedology Note: All reports of Kim’s public appearances are taken from the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). For this review, a single KCNA report counts as a single visit, even if it included multiple factories or locations. A military visit is one to a KPA unit or sub-unit. An economic visit is one to an industry or infrastructure project. A cultural visit is one to a concert or performance (even if performed by a military troop), a sporting event or a visit to commemorate Kim Il Sung or some significant date in DPRK history. Political visits are those that involve foreign political visitors or Supreme People’s Assembly meetings (Kim didn’t attend any of the latter this year). Finally, an educational visit is one to a university, training institute or library. this is not all exact, but used for general comparisons, and assumes for this look that all visits by Kim Jong Il took place as reported in KCNA.]

DPRK - of missiles and regime stability

2008-10-09T23:09:00.000+09:00

South Korean media has speculated that North Korea’s latest short-range anti-ship missile tests were air launched, rather than fired from ground or sea-based platforms. This would mark an advancement in North Korean capabilities if true, and would explain the increase in recent years of KPA Air Force exercises despite fuel shortages, and visits to air-bases by Kim Jong Il.

Now, there are some oddities to the reports. First, some have suggested that North Korea fired the KN-01 (or AG-1) anti-ship missiles (based on the Chinese Silkworms/Seersuckers) from an AN-2. The Antanov AN-2 is a Russian-designed large biplane, still used in North Korea for troop transport and cargo flights, and still seen lying around in other parts of the world (there was a field full of them at the airport in Ulan Bator last time I was there, sitting unused and decaying), and sometimes one sees them making the airshow circuit (as in the attached photo from a stop in Texas a few years ago).

While it would certainly be interesting if somehow they had modified the AN-2 to carry the nearly 2000kg KN-01/AG-1 (the cargo version of the AN-2 carried a load of 1500kg), and to somehow launch it from inside or modify the carriage to handle the more than half-meter diameter missile under the wings or fuselage that sit so low to the ground, it seems rather unlikely. Not impossible, given north Korea’s ability to MacGyver pretty much anything and everything, but highly unlikely. Of course, given the AN-2’s extremely slow stall speed and ability to fly extremely low, one would think that it may be possible to fly an AN-2 below radar level for some distance before needing to gain lift for the launch of the missile. An interesting prospect, but not likely.

Rather, the other bit of speculation from ROK is that Pyongyang used an IL-28 Beagle, an old Soviet light bomber, to launch the missile. This would make more sense, regarding airframe compatibility and functionality. The Beagle could serve North Korea as a maritime interdiction aircraft, to back up its surface combatants, and in fact Pyongyang has been raising issues of control and sovereignty of the contested or ill-defined zones of the West Sea as of late, confronting not only South Korea but China as well for control over the crab and other fishing grounds, but also in an attempt to expand North Korea’s access to the area. The IL-28 carrying anti-ship missiles on patrol in North Korean waters would require a slight modification of the posture of South Korean and Chinese naval assets in the area, but is still a far cry from bringing North Korea up to par with its neighbors’ capabilities.

Still, despite economic problems, rumors of social crises, and questions of succession, North Korea’s military development seems to be steady and progressing, rather than stagnant (for everything but missile development) as we had seen in the past decade. It suggests stability of the regime to continue to develop long-term enhancements to the North Korean military structure. Foreign desire to see instability in the North Korean regime may be more wishful thinking than based on reality.

Kim Jong Il, Fidel Castro, and the Mixed Blessing of Medically-Induced Succession

2008-09-16T13:47:00.000+09:00

Following his brush with death, Kim Jong Il can stand (with some assistance), brush his teeth (with only minimal drooling), and maybe even rule his country. Kim’s illness, stroke, heart attack or whatever befell the Dear leader has triggered a massive revival of interest in North Korea and even more speculation about what happens after he dies.

But perhaps the focus should not be on life after Kim, but on the general issue of succession or transition. Back around Kim’s 60th birthday, there was tons of talk about leadership succession, and Kim was apparently no nearer to death on the first day after his birthday than he was before. But health issues have a way of bringing home the potential imminence of a forced and perhaps unprepared transition, particularly in a country where there is no clear path for succession, having only seen two leaders in the past 60 years - and the second being the son of the first.

In general, there appear to be two elements of the succession/transition process largely agreed upon among the North Korean elite - the emergence of a more collective leadership (even if behind the scenes) and the placement of Kim’s second son, Kim Jong Chol, as the next leader. Kim Jong Chol was reportedly appointed Vice Director of the Workers Party of Korea in late 2007, following in his father’s footsteps along the ladder to supreme leadership. The need for collective leadership to supplement the succession process stems from Kim Jong Chol’s relative youth (he is only in his late 20s) and correlated lack of a strong base of independent support.

While there was much speculation outside North Korea, and plenty of less overt speculation inside North Korea over the past decade or so over which of Kim’s sons would succeed him, there was apparently little progress in actually shaping the successor. This was in part because Kim himself only took over in 1994, and really didn’t fully consolidate his rule until 1998. It was much too soon to begin grooming a successor - because if he did, he risked loyalty moving more to his son than to himself as the elite prepared for the future.

Kim’s medical emergency now has perhaps given him an unexpected but extremely valuable opportunity - one that he saw befall his counterpart across the seas in Cuba. When Fidel Castro fell ill, the rumors abounded of his near certain death, and the worries over transition and the potential internal bickering and competition. But Castro proved to retain his seeming Olympian longevity, and far from dying, he went about making his epoch speeches. But he did, nonetheless, transfer power to his brother, Raul. This gave Fidel Castro the ability to use his own personal influence to maintain control among the potential factions in Cuba, to lend his moral authority to Raul, and to make sure Raul or some other members of the elite didn’t do anything too far off of the Fidel plan.

Kim Jong Il is now presented with the same opportunity, one that may be even more beneficial in his case than in Fidel’s as Raul was nearly as old as his bearded brother and had quite his own power base and relationship network built among the Cuban elite, whereas Kim Jong Chol is a mere child by comparison, and will need the strength of personality and history his (still living) father may lend. Even Kim Jong Il relied upon some of the old guard revolutionaries who had fought alongside his father (figuratively or literally) during the anti-Japanese struggle and the Korean War. Kim Jong Chol even more so needs this connection to the older generation as he transitions into the place of power.

Whether Kim Jong Il takes advantage of this opportunity or not, the question of transition and succession is now a pressing one in Pyongyang... and Seoul, Beijing, Tokyo, Washington and Moscow.

Kim Jong Il, Kim Jong Ill, or Kim Jong Dead?

2008-09-09T13:42:00.001+09:00

Two rumors about the health of Kim Jong Il have been circulating - in one, Kim collapsed on August 22, and a team of nearly half a dozen Chinese doctors have been shuttling back and forth between Beijing and Pyongyang to treat a high-level North Korean official - ostensibly Kim. In the other, Kim died in 2003, and all his subsequent appearances, including meetings with foreign heads of state, have been carried out by body doubles, while real power lies in the hands of a small cadre of military and government officials.

Now, such rumors are not infrequent, and talk of Kim’s incapacitation or even death are just as frequent as reports of his insanity and womanizing. What to make of the current rash of reports is not readily clear.

Foreign media is laying a lot on the September 9 60th anniversary of North Korea, and its attendant parades, as a bellwether of Kim’s health; suggesting that if he doesn’t attend, it must mean he is ill or dead.

But in the 10 years that Kim has ruled North Korea (1998-2008, the first few years after his father’s death in 1994 were used to consolidate power, so I’ll count the real rule as starting in 1998), Kim only attended the anniversary of the DPRK parade twice, the 50th anniversary in 1998 and the 55th anniversary parade in 2003. [the initial post had an error, missing the 1998 attendance, though the point still stands - missing the 60th is somewhat odd, but not necessarily proof of his imminent demise.]

Kim has frequently dropped out of public site for a month (or even two or three) at a time in the past, potentially health related, but frequently apparently related to critical decisions in North Korea’s domestic policies and international relations. His last public appearance this year was August 14, when he visited KPA Unit 1319 with two of his generals. Kim made 11 visits to military units in August, plus attended a military art performance, but that in itself was not all that unusual.

The current rash of rumors could be linked to propaganda or attempts to profit on the higher profile of North Korea after Pyongyang decided to start reversing its de-nuclearization following Washington’s decision not to immediately remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism. Or they could reflect more concrete rumors and leaks of the Dear Leader’s ill health. The least likely is the report that Kim died in 2003, though if that were true, there certainly has been little change in North Korea’s overall behavior and strategy since that time, so the net impact has been nil.

If Kim is sick to the point of worry about succession, that could explain the sudden shifts in North Korean behavior linked to the Kumkang shooting and Pyongyang’s apparent retraction from major initiatives with the South Koreans and others - an attempt to minimize leaks or opportunities for interference. The North Korean regime is certainly not perfect in unity, but there are not clear signs of major rifts among the elite, and even if Kim dies in the near future, it is less likely to cause a sudden collapse of the regime than a consolidation of interests to secure the privileges already given the elite.

Back to Asia

2008-08-04T12:25:00.000+09:00

U.S. President George W. Bush is on his way to Korea for a visit before heading to Bangkok and Beijing. Bush’s visit, somewhat delayed due to a slight case of overzealous fury at the idea of importing U.S. beef or more accurately an opposition attempting to prove its continued significance), comes at a time when the (soon to be) outgoing U.S. president is looking to set the course of events for his successor (be it McCain or Obama). This means that his stop in seoul isn't just a farewell tour or a reciprocal greeting to ROK President Lee Myung Bak’s visit to Washington, but instead is part of a revived attempt to set the terms of the future U.S. role in East Asia. Now, this may be a bit grandiose explanation, and certainly Bush won’t (and doesn’t expect to) accomplish everything in this brief visit to three Asian cities, but it is part of the underlying architecture of his final six months in office.

In Asia, Bush is looking to re-engage the United States. At the start of the Bush administration, the number one foreign policy issue was neither Iraq nor Iran and certainly not Afghanistan. It wasn’t even in the Middle East. Things there were as messy as normal, and little more or less so. Bush’s core focus was not on the Middle East, but on China. When he came to office, it was at a time when there was a growing fear of “China rise,” the emergence of China as not only an economic power, but one with a rising military power and political ambition. One of Bush’s first foreign policy issues was the E-P3 incident, when the aptly named Wong Wei got a little over confident and smacked into the nose of the U.S. surveillance (spy) aircraft, sending himself to the depths and the crew and plane full of Elint equipment to a Chinese military airfield on Hainan Island.

But as Bush was getting ready to check the rise of China and ensure Beijing didn’t try to take the place of Moscow as the rival to Washington, a loose end from the Cold War contest with the Soviet Union suddenly rose up, and the Bush administration’s attention was turned almost exclusively toward al Qaeda, drawing the United States, through a sometimes complex series of events and reasonings, back into the Middle East with a vengeance, where it remains largely focused today. The Bush administration is trying to wrap up the Middle East and Afghanistan - or at least set things on such a course that the succeeding president has little initial room to maneuver on policy - and now there is the chance to re-set sights on CHina and East Asia.

East Asia wasn’t really ignored during Bush’s two terms in office, but it certainly didn’t take center stage in policy initiatives. Perhaps the two most significant elements of U.S. foreign policy in East Asia over the past eight years have been the evolution of the U.S. security triangle with Australia and Japan, and the U.S. engagement strategy with China (some might say something about North Korean policy, but in many ways this has been a subset of China policy). With the former, Washington expanded the military and political commitment of its key regional allies to play a much more pro-active role regionally, not necessarily on behest of Washington (as the early days of the Downer “deputy sheriff” policies appeared) but at least in a complimentary direction. With the latter, Washington managed to play China slowly, rather than confrontationally, and via coercion and compliments get China to pursue some economic and political policies it may not have been entirely comfortable with otherwise.

The current trip begins to roll in the next steps. In Korea, Bush will seek to smooth over some of the bumps in ROK-US relations from the Roh administration and from the transition to the Lee regime. The beef protests, with their anti-American tone, were barely about beef or the United States, but instead were about the now opposition (formerly ruling) and the labor unions attempting to rebuild their relevance. Anti-U.S. sentiments are simply a convenient tool, but Washington took a much more conciliatory tone than usual in both this and the recent reversal of Dok-do naming conventions in order to give a bit of a boost to Lee and let Lee claim at home that he can shape Washington (as opposed to Roh constantly trying and running against a brick wall).

The future U.S. Asia policy envisions Korea taking a role, but not a critical one. At the same time, it is important not to let Korea feel isolated, and therefore prone to slide closer to China. What Bush will reassure his Korean counterpart is that the United States sees Korea as a potential global player (play to the ego of the small nation), and will ensure Korea doesn’t end up once again squished between a rising China and a rising Japan (play to the insecurities of the small nation). This gives Korea the sense of control of its destiny on one hand and a bit of insurance on the other.

The more significant visit than Korea is Thailand. Here Bush is looking to stage the re-involvement of the United States among the ASEAN nations. over the past five or six years, China has taken a much less imposing position with ASEAN, instead using smiles and friendly gestures to gain greater influence and leverage among the South East Asian grouping. Left nearly abandoned after the Asian Economic Crisis by the United States (with the exception of criticizing policies, supporting the independence of East Timor, launching counter-terrorism operations in the Philippines and occasionally badmouthing Myanmar), ASEAN has looked to others for economic and political support. The preference, aside from the United States, was Japan, but Tokyo remained pre-occupied with malaise for much of the time, and then, under Koizumi, focused on internal social and perceptional change, so Japan wasn’t forthcoming in playing the greater role ASEAN subtly offered.

So in came China, playing friendly rather than threatening, offering economic cooperation rather than domination, and generally filling a void that SEAN saw needing filled. Bush’s visit to Thailand will be part of trying to address and reverse that trend. Over the next several months, look for increased economic and military interaction between the United States and the ASEAN nations. Look for the U.S. to step up its criticism of Myanmar and seek to shift ASEAN from its non-interference policies to a more activist role (something China doesn’t want to see). And look for a slow but steady increase in subtle and not-so-subtle anti-China rhetoric from the United States, though not necessarily from Bush himself.

Bush is leaving soon, but he wants to reshape America’s role in East Asia, and doesn’t have time. Thus he will push various buttons and pull various levers in an attempt to steer U.S. interaction and policy in the region on a course that won’t be readily changed by the next administration. The era of Asia on the sidelines of U.S. foreign policy may be ending soon.

ZhuJiaJiao and Shanghai

2008-07-07T22:48:00.000+09:00

Hanging out in the airport, flight seriously delayed. A couple of pictures to keep me interested...

The Tower is Gone, What is next?

2008-06-30T10:26:00.000+09:00

North Korea has made a public demonstration with the destruction of the cooling tower of the Yongbyon nuclear complex. Although it is always fun to see concrete structures blown up, the controlled detonation really meant little, aside from symbolically, as the floor of the reactor building had already been breached to ensure there could be no further nuclear activity at Yongbyon. The cooling tower destruction, rather, was to serve as a more visible set of evidence that North korea was no longer capable of using the Yongbyon facility. The timing was to coincide with U.S. President George Bush promising to take North Korea off the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

Pyongyang has played out the Yongbyon card - it had become more costly to keep the facility than get rid of it. The U.S. backed down some, in the compromise mode currently prevailing, and the North Koreans have simply given up an old program that is no longer used or useful. The weapons grade plutonium they made they still have. The weapons they made they still have. They didn't have to admit to a uranium program (in public) or to their proliferation activities (publicly at least). They just got rid of an old, outdated, costly facility that needed demolished anyway. And in return, they break free from the constraints from the State Sponsors of Terrorism list.

With this step out of the way, we now move on in the new mode - no more created crises, but instead a series of small steps, handled by the bureaucrats. Look, for example, at the timing of last week’s events. North Korea released its list, The State Department was ready with its press release and Bush had about the earliest morning press conference I have ever seen, then a day later, boom, up down goes the cooling tower. No breakthrough here, just fulfillment of pre-arranged steps. The breakthrough, if there was one, happened two years ago. All the rest is details.

Now, none of this means North Korea has given up, nor that the U.S. has given in. Just that they have agreed that crisis is less useful for now that this slow dance. Pyongyang is still buying space, Washington still doesn’t trust them, and both are perfectly capable of turning things around and going toe to toe whenever they find it more effective and useful. The real question, now, is what this means for China and Japan, and even South Korea. So long as North Korea is dealing one-on-one with the United States, it doesn't really need China or South Korea. China has been trying to rectify this, and sending Xi there a week or so ago was part of that - and convincing the USA that they still need the PRC in this. Japan is nervous, and Seoul is, well, pre-occupied for now, but they will try in the not too distant future to try to retake the lead. Once the beef mess is done...

Torch Relay - Forget the Sponsors...

2008-04-11T06:20:00.000+09:00

There were only infrequent attempts to link Olympic sponsors or companies producing in China to the demonstrations, but a few Boycott signs showed up. In general activism related to the Beijing Olympics has not really targeted the major sponsors, though they are taking a financial hit potentially from the much lower-key presence they are now showing due to the protests and complaints. This means that advertising they had paid for by becoming sponsors is being abandoned to avoid raising the corporate profile in the eyes of activists – and in their cross hairs.

Hide and Seek - Olympic Torch Run San Francisco

2008-04-11T00:19:00.001+09:00

More to come, as I am sitting in the airport waiting for my next flight, but a few initial thoughts on and shots of the torch run. First and foremost, the Tibetan and Darfur movements had shifted tactics for the San Francisco run, after the publicity in London and Paris began making the protesters look less than credible and their causes were falling prey to the images of them going after the designated torch runners. It is one thing to oppose China's activities or even to use the Olympics to draw attention to issues with China, quite another to physically threaten the athletes and individuals who have the once-in-a-lifetime chance to hold the Olympic flame. So in San Francisco, the targeting of the torch was more designed to impede movement rather than to extinguish the flame or steal the torch. However, even that goal was largely thwarted by the shifts and changes in the ultimate route the torch took. Rather than using any of the pre-arranged routes (which had been changing daily anyway), the torch went the opposite way, and uphill, making it difficult for the demonstrators, when they finally found out where it was, to get there. All told, in the initial survey of the pre-announced route and in chasing down the torch once it changed routes, I walked and ran some 11 miles, mostly up the San Francisco hills. Tiring work just to see the torch. Security around the torch was significant. Rather than blocking the route, they had a mobile blockade that would shut things down basically one or two blocks at a time so there was no easy location for the demonstrators to congregate to ambush the torch relay. In addition, there was a line of police with batons up both sides of the street as the torch passed through, keeping all demonstrators and spectators off the street. There were also motorcycle and bicycle police, federal security around the torch (joined by a few of the Chinese government security forces), and in general one could rarely see even the torch above all the security, much less the torch bearers. In the end, the torch relay faked out the final attempt to delay things, and took the exit just before the Golden Gate Bridge, heading to the airport quickly and quietly. The Chinese had paid several hundred pro-Chinese demonstrators to show up early and line the planned route, waving Chinese, Olympic and USA flags (pretty much only the pro-China demonstrators waved American flags; the anti-China protesters didn't, and that was quite noticeable. The Chinese are getting better at this sort of thing). One of the organizers of the Chinese said they had spent something like $30,000 on food and supplies, but I could not verify this (though there were boxes of bulk water, snacks and tissues with each clump of Chinese demonstrators). The Chinese also had a few quality English speakers with each clump who questioned the American pro-Tibet demonstrators and challenged them, usually starting off asking if they had even ever been to Tibet. And the Chinese paid for an air sign just like the anti-Chinese demonstrators, the Chinese sign, towed by a biplane, saying "Tibet will always be a part of China." Among the demonstrators that turned out was a large contingent of pro-Tibet activists, a moderate Safe Darfur contingent, and then Free Burma, Uighur independence, Pro-Taiwan and a few assorted others. Not a single Falun Gong that I saw. There was more serious security incident, when pro-Tibet activists blocked a bus carrying Olympic torch bearers and Chinese security. During the evacuation of those on the bus, the protesters jumped on the bus, smashing the the windshield, and spray painting "Free Tibet" on one side. Aside from that, there were a couple of scuffles between pro- and Anti-China activists, and a few tossed water balloons at the torch. A few pictures below, more later.

One of the youngest pro-China demonstrators. The Mickey ears help emphasize that the pro-China contingent was not anti-American (many waved American flags with their Chinese flags). This was a key part of their PR plan.
The largest number of demonstrators were pro-Tibet, but only a few ever made it up to the actual torch route, most ending up staying down on the initially planned route.
Security cordon was so thick that at times you could barely see the torch, much less the runners. It sort of defeats the whole purpose, and there was a conspicuous absence of any sign of the Olympic sponsors, who really didnt want to be caught up in the potential PR nightmare.
It doesnt really rhyme, but this was the most common chant.
The Olympic flame - what the day was supposed to be about.

Cultural Revolution Chic

2008-04-08T14:01:00.001+09:00

China’s official Xinhua news agency has run an article, reprinted in the English language China Daily and the People's Daily, discussing the merits and problems of one of the latest in Cultural Revolution Chic theme restaurants in Beijing, the Red Flag Fluttering, in the Daxing district of Beijing.

Now, Red Flag Fluttering has the requisite Cultural Revolution decor, highlighting Workers, Peasants and Soldiers, propaganda posters, and Mao portraits, and has a nightly song-and-dance routine playing off of the music and shows of the Cultural Revolution period. The article discusses some of the social controversy over the restaurant, and its treatment of the Cultural Revolution, with some criticizing the restaurant for making light of a difficult and terrible time, and others enjoying the memories.

When I saw the article, two things struck me. First, Red Flag Waving seems to be a knock-off of The East Is Red, which is located east of Beijing in Dongwuhuan. I visited East Is Red back in July 2007, and what a show it was. The Cultural Revolution meets Andrew Lloyd Weber, complete with keyboard and rifle-waving girls in drab. One wall even had one of those famous red famous tractors busted through the brick, and the performers mounted the disused vehicle to create a still-life that may as well have been a propaganda poster scene. No pictures allowed there, but I have one below, and there is a tiny YouTube snippet as well, though it isn't mine.

But aside from thinking that Red Flag Waving is just a knock-off of the always-packed East Is Red (showcasing the entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese, ready to fly with whatever idea works to make a buck... or yuan), the most striking thing was the more open discussion of the Cultural Revolution. The current leadership is the CR generation. They were the sent down students, and they are now exerting their influence and power across the nation. They are also flirting with a more open discussion of just what happened during the CR, of the failure of the Chinese leadership (and the Party itself), and the significant damage all of this caused.

That is allowing open criticism, and that is, in some ways, good and cathartic for the Chinese. Living with pent-up anger and frustration at the delays and damage of the CR certainly affects several of my Chinese acquaintances, some of whom more recently have begun talking about the CR time (and not without some twinge of pain in their voices). One recounted how their teachers were locked up, and some of the older teachers, so confused and upset about what was happening, simply beat themselves to death by steadily pounding their own heads into the concrete wall of their school where they had been locked up. Another complained about the delay in education, and bemoaned the problems the CR caused for China's development as a whole.

But as the Xinhua article notes, not everyone is ready to talk about the CR, or at least not openly. And certainly not everyone is prepared to let it go, to take a few liberties with the past and revive some of the perhaps fond memories there were. And there seems to have been some. At East Is Red, the audience of 40- and 50-somethings sing along lustily with the CR songs, waving their red flags and raising their beers. And there was a sense of Chinese doing their own thing, of self reliance and national mobilization that is so anathema to the current self-focused race to economic wealth.

So the question I have is – of the CR becomes more acceptable to talk about (and exploit for economic gain), then perhaps we are less than a generation away from the ability of the Chinese to address Tiananmen Square as well...

A snippet of video from the show at The East Is Red, from YouTube.

Kim Jong il Visits Unit 776... Again

2008-04-07T13:07:00.001+09:00

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il made two visits to military sites in recent days, stopping by a company of KPA Unit 350 on April 5 and visiting a recruit training subunit of KPA Unit 776 on April 6. These are Kim's first public appearances in nearly a month, and the first time Kim has visited a military facility since mid-February.

South Korean media is highlighting the visit both because it is Kim's first appearance in a month, and because it comes amid heightened political tensions between the North and South. In addition to finally opening the taps on the vitriolic rhetoric condemning South Korea’s new president Lee Myung Bak, North Korea has also revived the threats of turning Seoul to ash (apparently an evolution from the old "Sea of Fire" warning), flown sorties with its old MiG 21s, and started posturing in the East Sea (both warning of naval clashes and testing surface to ship missiles).

But there is another element of the visit that still has me wondering. What is with all the visits to Unit 776? Normally, North Korean media simply mixes up the numbers – and there is not necessarily a clear correlation between the number printed in the media and any real unit number. But Kim has visited some element of Unit 776 now in December 2007, January, February and now April – four visits to the same unit designation. As I noted back in February, Kim’s visits to 776 may have something to do with Jagang Province (where North Korea’s suspected Uranium enrichment facility is located).

With a deal between Washington and Pyongyang in the final stages of negotiation on North Korea's listing of nuclear facilities, perhaps Kim is making sure things are cleaned up and ready up north for inspection after listing.

Or maybe it has nothing to do with the nuclear facilities at all. But the repetition of unit 776 does not seem to me to be a random event.

Secret Photo Reveals What Really Happened in Tibet

2008-04-04T07:39:00.000+09:00

North Korea Stirs the Pot a Bit More

2008-03-28T12:50:00.001+09:00

North Korea kept up the pressure March 28, testing four surface-to-ship missiles in the West Sea and warning via the KCNA that U.S. insistence on North Korea declaring a Uranium program in addition to its Plutonium program could derail the dismantlement of North Korean nuclear facilities.

As I noted yesterday when Pyongyang booted the South Korean government workers in Kaesong, Pyongyang is trying to create a sense of imminent crisis and the potential for the reversal of all progress made thus far in the nuclear talks. This is standard negotiating tactics for the North. If there is a crisis, then when talks resume, the focus is on returning to the pre-crisis status-quo rather, with less attention on the next steps in the process. In essence Pyongyang stalls the long-term issues and gets the other parties to focus on new short-term issues. Then, when Pyongyang gets what it wants, it comes back to the long-term issues again, seeming relatively reasonable.

The U.S. and China are very aware of these tactics, and lose patience with the North Korean games. But they also are constantly drawn into the North Korean plan, because, despite knowing it is just an act to get greater leverage, there is still the sense of crisis that needs resolved. So, somewhat exasperated, they trudge back into the talks with the North, knowing that to get the longer-term process back on track, they need to push through the new "crises" first.

Ah, the joys of nuclear diplomacy with that wily, wrascally Kim Jong Il...

Qingdao Naval Museum

2008-03-28T11:57:00.000+09:00

Probably one of my favorite spots in Qingdao is the PLAN Naval Museum. Now, the inside is nothing to write home about - seriously. There are numerous display cases of plates, plaques, and trinkets that were gifts of other navies. There is even a stuffed penguin from some Chinese expedition to the Antarctic. But outside is a different story. There, they have so many toys to look at - and if it happens to be open, there are destroyers, and escort ship and a decommissioned Romeo-class submarine to wander through as well. Rumor has it that the PLAN is considering placing a soon-to-be decommissioned nuclear submarine at the museum in the next few years as well. now THAT would be cool. The following pictures are from two visits - a nice sunny day in March 2008 and a windy, rainy day in July 2007.
This is the submarine, an old Romeo-class knock-off, built by the Chinese (all the cast parts inside are stamped in Chinese, not Russian). They wont let you take pictures inside, though if it wasn't for my host being concerned of the consequences, that wouldn't have stopped me. Maybe next time...
237 sits up along the wall, splendid in the afternoon sun. The hatches are small, as old submarines were. There are six torpedo tubes in the front, each with a red star on the door, and two in the rear.
They let you go in one end and out the other. There are a few spots rusting out inside, but in general it inst in all that bad of condition for a display.

The AnShan Destroyer, formerly the Courage of the Soviet Navy. This is one of the PLAN's first two Destroyers, leftovers from the Soviet's World War II fleet.
The red flag flies proudly over the anti-aircraft guns.

The NanChong was launched in 1968, and is a Chinese-built craft.

Two views of the aptly-titled "Airplane."

There are plenty of aircraft and other goodies to admire.
On a nice sunny day, even a missile is a good place for a bird to take a rest...
This section of the display was closed, unfortunately, when I visited in March. All the hips and submarine were closed in July. They are undergoing renovations at the museum, enlarging and modernizing it.

One of China's older hovercraft landing vehicles.
The NanChong on the left, the AnShan on the right.

Wooden-hulled torpedo boat number 245, famous because Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong came aboard once.

A row of MiGs, and their Chinese variants, the F, J an dA series.
Qingliu or B-6 Seaplane.
Sea Eagle surface-to-ship missile.
F5 (MiG-17 variant)
A5 (MiG-19 variant)
A lovely display of projectiles and projectile launchers on the grounds of the Naval Museum.

Surface-to-ship missiles.
The central display area.
Vintage Soviet-era aircraft on display.

North Korea Tries to Stir the Pot... Again

2008-03-27T13:17:00.000+09:00

North Korea has expelled the 11 South Korean government officials stationed at the Kaesong joint economic zone, sending them unceremoniously packing at around 1:00 AM March 27. The expulsion was accompanied by North Korean references to earlier comments by South Korea’s minister of Unification, Kim Ha Joong, who said expansion of the joint economic zone would be contingent upon a resolution of the North Korean nuclear issue. Pyongyang allowed five South Korean civilian managers to remain in the city.

The move by Pyongyang serves several purposes. First, it is a way for the north to show its displeasure with the comments coming out of the new South Korean government regarding North Korean policy, not only on the economic front, but also comments from South Korea's military that it would carry out a pre-emptive strike on North Korea if it thought Pyongyang was preparing a nuclear strike on south Korea. Pyongyang is also displeased with Seoul's very public reconciliation with Washington – the friction in the U.S.-South Korean relationship were a convenient tool for Pyongyang to exploit, and it appears to be fading.

But most importantly, North Korea is trying to create a sense of crisis – first to test the South Korean resolve and see how the Lee Myong Bak government reacts, and second to inject a sense of instability into the political and security situation on the Peninsula. North Korea has long relied upon crises – usually manufactured by Pyongyang – to extract concessions out of South Korea and the United States, but also China and Japan. The series of nuclear crises stretching from the early 1990s to today have been largely instigated by North Korea for the main purpose of negotiating things back to the status quo while gaining economic assistance and prolonging the regime.

With the North Korean nuclear test in 2006, North Korea pretty much shot its wad in creating crises, and lost one of its main negotiating tactics. Even the three month delay in delivering a report of North Korean nuclear sites has done little to rile the United States into giving in to North Korea's own special form of international coercion. So Pyongyang is trying to up the ante, creating a sense of tensions with South Korea and hinting that all the progress to date could be scrapped if something isn’t done soon.

In some ways, then, this may be less a sign of troubles than of North Korea's decision to finally come back to the table and make a deal with the united States (perhaps taking advantage of offers to provide one public list showing the plutonium program and one private list showing the uranium and proliferation activities). It is a longstanding pattern for North Korea since it lost its Cold war sponsors – always go into negotiations from a position of strength, and make sure people feel a sense of urgency and crisis so they make faster and bigger concessions than they would under more sedate negotiations.

China, T1bet, and crisis management

2008-03-17T11:00:00.000+09:00

China is an interesting place sometimes. The Tibet incident has brought out the total confusion and indecisiveness of Chinese crisis management. In Beijing, for example, every time the BBC runs a story about Tibet, the channel gets blocked. But in some other Chinese cities, BBC is not blocked at all. Some websites and stories about Tibet are being blocked, others are not. I can post to my blog, but cannot read it. Some email is blocked (particularly outgoing), but incoming is just fine. Not related to Tibet, but also notable is that I cannot read any of the major Taiwanese newspapers... except the China Pot. I guess the Taiwanese tricked Beijing by calling it "China" Post, as opposed to "Taiwan" post...

The Tibet protests really do expose one of the longstanding problems of China – its problems with assimilating the populations of the buffer zones. The Tibetans haven't become part of China. Rather they have been kept under control by military garrisons and the government-arranged influx of Han Chinese and Hui Muslims. The opening of the Tibet railway was seen as a major blow to the Tibetans, as it would open the floodgates to the Han and Hui, further diluting the Tibetan population in Tibet.

With the annual remembrance of the 1959 uprising, this year things got out of hand. There was an explosion of the built-up socio-economic tensions. Like the LA riots, we saw one ethnic population target another, primarily hitting economic interests (shops and the like) that represented the economic power of the immigrants (and reminded about the economic weakness of the natives). China has clamped down in Lhasa for now, though there are reports of sympathy unrest in other cities in Tibet and neighboring provinces. And Beijing has mostly avoided what could have been a considerable increase in political pressure from the world – sure, BBC is running plenty of stories of Tibet now, but the U.S. government is pre-occupied with the economy, and in general mot governments have taken a mild stance so as not to create undue tensions or impact the coming Olympics.

But dodging a bullet is not the same as being out of trouble. China is a pressure cooker of socio-economic crises, and the lid is likely to blow off in the years after the Olympics. The mixed openness and control that led up to the Olympics, and the booming economic benefits for a few in the South and East are making the crisis for the CPC nearly unavoidable. They have long been capable of management – deal with the immediate and hope the future stays distant – but that will not serve forever. That was how Tiananmen got out of hand; they refused to address the issue and delayed response until the only response left was unfortunate.

The Olympics are swell, but they do not change the reality in China.

Howdy from Beijing

2008-03-14T23:44:00.000+09:00

I'm back in Beijing, briefly, and thought I'd share a tiny piece of a day here (this is just a fraction of the 230 or so pics I took). The air is full of the yellow dust, construction dust and car exhaust, there is massive security for the CPPCC and NPC sessions, and all the subway stations are under construction and half torn apart (aside form those on the new number 5 line). But the food is good, the art scams are going strong, and there is plenty to do and see.

A guard stands across from Tiananmen Square in the morning. the Square was closed in the morning for the final session of the CPPCC. Security was heavy to dissuade any protests or disruptions. This guy was prepared for any self immolation attempt or other fire emergency.
The new North-South Number 5 subway line is open. Modern, clean, and with the glass safety doors. Packed like sardines on the cars, though. The new cars are clean, have electronic maps to show where you are and where you are going, and some have security cameras mounted on the ceiling. the rush to finish the subway by June has allowed Canadian and Japanese firms to get nice contracts, along with Chinese companies. Everyone wins...
A local tourist finishes a day at the imperial Palace Museum. Couldn't resist the hat.
A window. I like Windows. But I will only post one this time.
Guards marching toward the imperial Palace after closing time.
A door pull in the Imperial palace. This door hasn't been caught up in the renovations... yet.
One of the workers taking a break from placing new tiles as part of the renovations of the Imperial Palace.
An artistic iced mocha at the Coffee Lobby near the Chaoyoungmen subway stop.
No fireworks, OK?!
Not sure what they didn't like about the hard-hatted construction worker, but he can't see now.
Construction over near Wangfujing. All the construction inside the second or third ring roads was to have been completed before January. Not a chance. I'm not sure it will be done before the Olympics are over.
Cleaning up the stream for spring.
I cant decide if this is an admonition against blaring horns or car bombs, but neither are all that appreciated.

Reshaping America's View of Korea

2008-03-14T22:45:00.000+09:00

Kim Byung Kook, President Lee Myung Bak's advisor on foreign and security affairs, is headed to the United States to finalize the arrangements for Lee's visit in April (the first for a Korean president to visit Camp David). Kim, a professor at Korea University and president of the East Asia Institute (founded in 2002), will be charged with reshaping the U.S. view of Korea as a potential political, military and economic partner on par with U.S. relations with Japan. This is an issue Lee will emphasize during hi visit, and why he is rather excited about the Camp David visit, which is supposed to symbolize a higher-level relationship between the United States and the hosted leader. South Korea is undergoing a reassessment of its global position. Long stuck between China and Japan, [South] Korea has had to either pay homage to the Chinese to keep them from interfering, or call on larger powers to intervene when Korean sovereignty is threatened. These have not been entirely successful strategies. Seoul is now looking at trying to reform its military and reshape its diplomatic, economic, aid and cultural interactions globally to strengthen its economic connections (both supplies of raw materials and markets for exports) and to insulate itself from shifts in international security. North Korea has steadily fallen in South Korea's threat assessment, and the long-term view is one of peaceful unification, with the biggest troubles being economic disparity and the flow of jobless North Koreans into the south and rich South Koreans into the North. Further down the road, Seoul sees potential trouble from a resurgent Japan – something compounded by the rising China. When Korea gets stuck between a simultaneous rising China and Japan, there is trouble. Kim and Lee are heading to Washington to urge the United States to assist Seoul in a more rapid shift in its military capabilities, as well as to offer Korean assistance abroad – not because Korea is subservient to the Untied States, but to get real-world training alongside the U.S. military in a variety of operations.

A "Kaesong Communique?"

2008-03-07T13:52:00.000+09:00

U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Christopher Hill has thrown out several options for reconciling relations between Washington and Pyongyang. In recent comments, he noted that diplomatic relations were quite possible between the two countries even given North Korea’s current human rights record – so long, of course, as North Korea gives up all of its nuclear materials (the unmentioned subtext being North Korea hand over its bombs as well).

Hill also noted that there were ways to move toward diplomatic recognition even without solving differences between Washington and Pyongyang, similar to the "Shanghai Communique" of 1972 between Nixon and Mao as Washington and Beijing began the process toward normalization of relations. In the communique, both sides expressed their own positions and agreed to disagree, noting that "the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence."

Hill's comments, and recent positive remarks by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, seem to contradict the views of President George W. Bush, who recently noted when asked about his relation with outgoing Russian President Vladimir Putin that it was important to have personal relationships with significant leaders even if there were disagreements, but that Bush would never have such a relationship with Kim Jong Il. The gratuitous remark about Kim seemed to come from nowhere, yet Bush has been consistent in his public distaste for Kim and the North Korean regime. But personal distaste and international relations are very different things.

While there remains division within Washington as to just how best to deal with North Korea, and whether any real change in relations can come so long as Kim Jong Il remains in charge, much of the responsibility for the North Korean issue has been devolved down to Hill and others at the State Department, and for the time being, the engagement crowd is winning out. This doesn't mean there isn’t continued criticism and resistance, or that things like the BDA issue cannot spring up again. But there is a certain methodical calmness to the bureaucratization of relations that keeps things slowly grinding forward, or at least managed, and leaves North Korea unable to foment a renewed crisis. This has taken a key bargaining card from the North Korean hand, leaving Pyongyang with only delay and criticism in its arsenal of diplomatic weapons.

But while Hill may talk of the potential for diplomatic ties, there is a very important prerequisite from the U.S. side – North Korea must not only identify and dismantle its nuclear facilities, it must also dismantle verifiably its nuclear devices. For North Korea, this remains an unacceptable price. North Korea is ready to trust the United States and dismantle its weapons only after diplomatic ties have been established, whereas the United Sates refuses to establish diplomatic ties until North Korea has dismantled its weapons. It is a chicken and egg problem, and neither side appears ready to give in. But with the U.S. refusing to panic at the north Korean delays, Pyongyang is left with little additional leverage, and the process is likely to continue, albeit glacially at times, even if the end goal remains extremely distant.

New Choices for the Flight to Pyongyang

2008-03-05T13:15:00.000+09:00

Air China will finally begin three-day a week service from Beijing to Pyongyang after a more than two month delay. The state-run airline will operate the routes between the two capitals on Mondays, Wednesdays and Fridays, supplementing the two regularly scheduled Air Koryo flights a week.

That Air China is finally opening the route to Pyongyang is an indication of the increased traffic between the two capitals – many passengers being European businessmen seeking risky but potentially lucrative investment opportunities in North Korea. Of course, part of the joy of flying to Pyongyang is the opportunity to fly on the vintage Soviet aircraft of Air Koryo – it just wont be the same on the more modern Air China fleet.

North Korea: Money For Nothing

2008-03-04T13:47:00.000+09:00

North Korea is selling missiles, counterfeit cigarettes and possibly nuclear material to earn hard currency, according to different reports recently released.

The Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the text of the annual "Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions," which covers activities in 2006, and notes that North Korea is still trying to sell missiles, though having difficulties due to additional UN sanctions put in place after its 2006 missile and nuclear tests. The report also suggests, but doesn’t state outright, that North Korea may be interested in or actively selling nuclear or other WMD technology to Iran and/or Syria.

In the State Department's "International Narcotics Control Strategy Report," it is noted that North Korean state involvement in illegal narcotics trade appears sharply down if not extinguished since 2003, though there is a continued, if not increased, trafficking in counterfeit cigarettes coming out of North Korea.

North Korea has long been involved in various schemes to earn hard currency, from money laundering and illegal drug trade to semi-legal weapons and missile sales and potentially even the transfer of nuclear technology (the Israeli air strike on a Syrian facility last year has been linked to North Korean technology transfer, something Washington wants Pyongyang to admit as part of its disclosure of nuclear activities under the Six Party talks). However, Pyongyang is also very capable of shutting down illicit activities when confronted – the drug smuggling and the counterfeiting of U.S. $100 bills are cases in point.

As a source of hard currency, North Korea's missile and weapons programs are ideal. North Korea has spent decades working over Russian and Chinese designs, improving and simplifying the missile systems, and Pyongyang offers an inexpensive and experienced alternative for countries with no access to Western technologies and minimal interest in the political baggage of Chinese or Russian assistance. Pyongyang sells not only complete missile systems, components and launchers, but also rents out its own technicians, to allow the "indigenous" development of rocket and missile systems in other countries.

With the increased scrutiny on North Korean ballistic missile sales, however, and no one taking North Korea up on the offer to suspend missile development in return for hard currency, Pyongyang has shifted from the ballistic missile export market to shorter-range anti-ship and battlefield ballistic missile systems, which are easier to conceal and transport. While it is not a substitute for the more expensive medium and long-range ballistic missiles, it does represent a product that is more broadly marketable. After all, more countries are interested in anti-ship capabilities and short range systems than really need NoDongs or Taepodongs.

As for the cigarettes, there are two parallel systems underway in North Korea. There are state-run factories connected to the military and Workers Party producing knock-off cigarettes for sale in China and Japan, and there are foreign run factories, primarily Thai and Malaysian, that rent space in North Korea to manufacture and export counterfeit cigarettes. Marketing and distribution is done through Chinese and Taiwanese intermediaries, and the products travel both inside Asia and as far as the United States. Counterfeiting cigarettes is big money, particularly when resold in the United States, where the added tax on cigarettes gives the knock-offs a very high profit margin.

Bush Sr. Heading to North Korea?

2008-02-29T01:28:00.000+09:00

In June 1994, former President Jimmy Carter traveled to North Korea for what was, at the time, one of the most amazing glimpses into North Korea, and the negotiating tactics and decision-making process of its leadership. Face to face with then North Korean President Kim Il Sung (who lies in repose as President in perpetuity now), Carter entered into extremely public negotiations, leading to a seeming offer by the North to open up its nuclear facilities and end the escalating nuclear crisis that had seen the U.S. brought close to approving another military action in North Korea.

The June 1994 Carter-Kim Il Sung meeting was the archetype of North Korea's nuclear negotiation strategy, revealing both the ultimate goal of the nuclear crisis (establishing normalized relations with the United States) and the place where decisions can actually be made in the North (in the person of the leader alone).

This latter pattern has been repeated by Kim Jong Il, successor to the North Korean founder. In a 2000 meeting between Kim Jong Il and then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Kim unilaterally offered a moratorium on North Korean missile tests. And during a 2002 visit by then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, Kim suddenly admitted the North Korean program of kidnapping Japanese citizens and handed over information on several abducted Japanese to the visiting Prime Minister.

It is the prerogative of the leader in North Korea to make such large-scale gestures that, even through numerous rounds of lower-level bureaucratic discussions and interactions, could never likely be made. And this is why there is some excitement with the rumors that former President George HW Bush (Bush Sr.) may be heading to North Korea. Without a doubt if he goes, it would be for a face-to-face with Kim Jong Il, and this would open an opportunity for the Dear Leader to make another bold move, perhaps owning up to a smaller Uranium program, or even stating the number of bombs.

North Korea has been itching for a visit by Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, hinting that they would offer her a "big present" if she came. Obviously she isn't going, not without a deal already arranged and agreed. She can't look like Albright at the end of the Clinton term – the politics wont allow it. But Bush Sr. may be the perfect candidate – unofficial but with more heft than most anyone else around in regards to the current President. With North Korea done with all the January and February holidays, and not quite ramping up for April yet, there are a few weeks for something to happen – and if Bush Sr. drops by for a boat ride along the Taedong River, things could suddenly get really interesting on the North Korean front.

Kim Jong Il and the Mystery of Unit 776

2008-02-15T14:40:00.000+09:00

During the course of his activities, Kim Jong Il often pays visits, or inspections, to various military units. These visits are reported as significant news in the local Korean media, complete with photos and video clips of the Dear Leader walking around flanked by uniformed officers and followed by officials taking studious notes. In addition, there are the requisite pictures of a grinning Kim waving and the thunderous applause of the cheering review stands filled with soldiers. Kim also makes it a point to be seen visiting the kitchens or bedrooms of the soldiers, emphasizing how much he cares about the lives of the soldiers.

Which units he visits, and where they are actually located, is rarely revealed. Rather, there are unit numbers assigned for the stories, which apparently have no real discernable meaning other than to make the military sound rather large and grand. Given the fairly plentiful choices of three and four digit numbers to choose from to name these various units, it is odd that, occasionally, within a few months time, Kim will be said to have visited the same unit twice. Perhaps he does. Perhaps he has places he things are really swell to visit, or that serve good food or put on a good show. But these double visits are rare indeed.

Which is why I find it so odd that Kim visited Unit 776 on Valentines Day. This is the third mention of that specific unit in ass many months. On December 19, 2007, Kim “inspected a company of KPA unit 776.” On January 7, 2008, Kim “inspected KPA Unit 776.” And on February 14, 2008, Kim “inspected battalions under KPA Unit 776.” On all three viits, Kim was accompanied by KPA Generals Hyon Chol Hae and Ri Myong Su. On the January visit, Ri Yong Chol, first deputy department director of the Central Committee of the Workers’ Party of Korea, also joined them. Kim last visited the “Twice Three Revolution Red Flag Company of KPA Unit 776” on December 12, 2003.

There have been reports recently that North Korea has stepped up military drills, has shifted oil and gas resources to the military to allow training exercises (which have been curtailed in recent years do to shortages of POL). Perhaps Unit 776 represents a specific area where training is underway, or perhaps it is in a specific location that South Korean military and intelligence know about (maybe they know the DPRK Unit number code), and this is a little message to them. Or it could be just coincidence, good Kimchi at that military base, or poor planning by the propaganda squad as to which unit numbers they put down in the newspapers. Or, if you want to be really crafty, maybe the North Koreans are trying to get all the Pyongyangologists worked up into a tizzy over the mysteries of Unit 776.

When Kim visited 776 back in 2003, it came as China was trying to push North Korea back into the stalled nuclear talks, and was part of a series of military visits Kim made after being largely out of the public spotlight for a month and a half. So is 776 linked to the nuclear issue? Most of Kim’s non-military visits this year have been to various places in Jagang Province, along the Chinese border. One of the suspected locations for North Korea’s suspected Uranium enrichment program, the one Pyongyang wont admit to or give information on (and this is stalling the six party process) is thought to be in Hwapyong county, Jagang Province. So perhaps Unit 776 is related to that – after all, it was the uranium program that kicked off the 2003 nuclear crisis in the first place.

Change Without Change - North Korea's 2008 Joint New Year Editorial

2008-01-11T05:16:00.000+09:00

"GLORIFY THIS YEAR OF THE 60TH ANNIVERSARY OF THE FOUNDING OF THE DPRK AS A YEAR OF HISTORICAL TURN WHICH WILL GO DOWN IN THE HISTORY OF THE COUNTRY." So reads the official KCNA translation of the title of this year's edition of North Korea's Joint New Year Editorial, an annual event since at least 1995 (though the editorials appear to go back as far as 1993, see a list of inspiring titles below this post).

This year's editorial is similar to past years in many respects - extolling the virtues of the DPRK, raising high the Songun banner, describing some of the feats of accomplishment in various economic and ideological sectors. But this year also has an interesting twist. It not only looks forward to the coming year (2008), but also sets a further mile marker for reaching economic and social goals - 2012, the 100th birth anniversary of North Korean founding leader Kim Il Sung.

This is an interesting element, setting in motion essentially a five year plan for national economic strengthening, to be formulated and controlled by the Cabinet (as the editorial notes, "it is necessary to establish the strict order and discipline of concentrating all economic work on the Cabinet and organizing and carrying them out under its unified command." Whomever controls the cabinet (Kim Yong Il, the Premier ) is also responsible for the economic consolidation and direction of the country.

So what is that direction, at least for 2008? According to the commentary, number one is power generation, specifically hydroelectric power production. After that is coal mining, the iron and steel industry, and improving the rail transportation system. Then comes improved mining. One the surface, these are extractive and heavy industries, the traditional bread and butter of the Communist economies.

But they are also paving the way for improved domestic infrastructure (reliable power, reliable rail transportation) that can assist in the export of minerals. Pyongyang has been passively and actively seeking foreign investors for its mineral sector, trying to get Americans or Europeans first, then South Koreans and Chinese as the major investors (it would prefer to limit the influence of neighbors, but if they are paying and not interfering, it is not too bad).

In fact, elsewhere in the commentary, it discusses the series of contradictions that economic development with foreign involvement will bring (though it doesn't use those exact terms). There are three contradictions that they must cope with, according to the commentary.

First is technically modernizing the economy while not losing the specific features of the North Korean economic structure (bring in the technology but don’t get rid of the socialist centralized control).
Second is allow people to reap the greatest possible benefits while also ensuring the greatest possible profitability (price controls will have to be carefully adjusted to find the sweet spot).
Third, develop external economic relations but focus on tapping domestic resources and potentials (don’t become a client state, don’t become an exploited extract-based economy).

The intent at economic expansion and international economic engagement is clearly seen, but so is the fear of the consequences. As the editorial notes elsewhere, "It is imperative to resolutely smash the enemy's reactionary ideological and cultural infiltration and psychological warfare and not to tolerate any elements that undermine our system and corrode our socialist morality and culture and our way of life." Don’t let their ideas undermine our control, carefully inoculate and isolate the population from the social and cultural influences that come with economic engagement.

This is a longstanding fear of the North Korean leadership, and has been a key element in understanding the sometimes bizarre paths toward economic change.

One last note on the economic front, there is the requisite imperative to substantially improve agriculture, and there is the frequent reference to continuing to supply consumer goods to satisfy the people's demands.

On the international front, there are the requisite digs at American imperialism, and the more recent calls to closer cooperation with the South, But there is also a very strong passage suggesting a potential shift in North Korea's defense posture in the future. "The idea of confrontation regarding the fellow countrymen as the archenemy should be discarded, the military tension be eased, and the elements of dispute be removed."

The last half of that is not all that groundbreaking, but the first half is rather interesting, considering the troubles the security services have been having in approving various aspects of the inter-Korean rail and other transportation networks. This shift has been underway for a while (propaganda changed after the 2000 summit, and continues to change with the increase in South Koreans visiting North Korea, as posters of flowers and smiling children on a backdrop of a unified peninsula replace scenes of evil puppet South Korean politicians).

But this is a rather clear and concise call to make the complete mindset shift, after more than half a decade of internal propaganda groundwork. The North Koreans may not be fast, but they do prepare ahead.

Radical changes from the North these are not, but the slow evolution of rhetoric and actions gives clearer insight into a regime that knows it is way out of steps with the times and realities of its neighborhood, sees a few potential paths to change, but is scared to death of each one for fear that something will get out of control and the regime will be swept aside.

Previous titles for Joint New Year Editorials:

(1993) Let Us Accelerate The Fatherland's Reunification On The Principle Of National Independence
(1994) Let Us Dynamically Advance In The New Year Under The Leadership Of The Great Party
(1995) Let Us Vigorously Accelerate The New Year's March By Upholding The Leadership Of The Great Party
(1996) Let Us Advance Vigorously In The New Year, Flying The Red Flag
(1997) Let Us Make Our Country And Motherland Evermore Prosperous Under Great Party's Leadership
(1998) Let Us Push Ahead With General March In New Year Under Great Party's Leadership
(1999) Let This Year Mark A Turning-Point In Building A Powerful Nation
(2000) Glorify This Year Greeting 55th Anniversary Of The Party Foundation As A Year Of Proud Victory In The Flame Of Great Chollima Upsurge
(2001) Glorify This Year As A Year Of Fresh Onward March In The Building Of An Economic Power In The 21st Century
(2002) Glorify This Year That Greets The 90th Birthday Of President Kim Il Sung As A Year Of A New Surge In The Building Of A Powerful Nation
(2003) Let Us Fully Demonstrate The Dignity And Might Of The DPRK Under The Great Banner Of Army-Based Policy
(2004) Let's Glorify This Year As A Year Of Proud Victory Through Revolutionary Offensive On All Fronts Of Building A Great Prosperous Powerful Nation Under The Party's Leadership
(2005) Let The Whole Party And Army And All The People Unite As One In Mind And More Strikingly Demonstrate The Might Of Songun!
(2006) Make A Higher Leap Full Of Great Ambition And Confidence
(2007) Usher In A Great Heyday Of Songun Korea Full Of Confidence In Victory
(2008) Glorify This Year Of The 60th Anniversary Of The Founding Of The DPRK As A Year Of Historical Turn Which Will Go Down In The History Of The Country

What Does Kim Jong Il Do in December?

2007-12-20T12:56:00.000+09:00

Kim's public appearances by year for the month of December (2007 runs through Dec. 19)

North Korean leader Kim Jong Il has paid 8 visits to military units this December (up through December 19), and on nearly all occasion Kim was accompanied by KPA Generals Hyon Chol Hae and Ri Myong Su, who are frequently seen on Kim’s inspection trips.

The eight visits to military units thus far puts Kim on track to make this a banner December for military inspections. From 1998 through 2002, Kim usually inspected three military units in December. From 2003 to the present, he has shifted to an average of eight unit inspections in December, and he is set to exceed that number this year. Overall Kim has paid 29 inspection visits to military units this year.

In terms of other guidance or "appreciation" or artistic performances, Kim was particularly active in economic guidance in December 2005 (six visits) and 2000 (four visits). He has made no economic visits this December (barring a visit to a military-run cotton production unit on December 6). In 2001 and 2002, Kim met with Russian officials in December, but aside from that, his diplomatic calendar is usually quiet at the end of the year.

ROK - Evolving Elections

2007-12-19T21:19:00.000+09:00

South Korea's opposition Grand National Party (GNP) candidate Lee Myung Bak appears set to clinch the presidency, with most exit polls giving him just over 50 percent of the vote. Lee's victory is less one of "conservatives" over "liberals," though, that a combination of factors ranging from the moderation of political extremes by the main parties, a maturing of Korea's democratic process and a shift to a more internal-focused campaign, rather than one driven by foreign relations and highly charged nationalism.

For a year or so, both the GNP and the pro-government parties (whatever their chosen name at any given moment) have been sliding to the center, a pattern being seen in the lead up to Taiwan’s elections and even seen in Japanese politics recently. In Korea, the move is part of the maturing of the democratic process. Kim Dae Jung won the election in 1997 in what was largely a rejectionist vote against the old-guard forces in Korea. Roh Moo Hyun pulled off his victory riding a surge in Korean nationalism manifest as anti-Americanism. Neither of these played well this year. (It was barely even mentioned that Lee wasn't even born in South Korea)

Some of Lee's support was certainly a rejection of what many see as a decade of mismanagement or missed opportunities by the "liberal" political leadership (even if Kim Dae Jung pulled the country rapidly out of the Asian economic crisis). But there was also a look to internal economic and social policies, and Lee apparently had the most clearly defined (even if they include a canal).

The near lack of foreign policy, and particularly of disagreements over relations with the United States, is also telling of a shift in South Korean thinking. The generation that cheered Kim Dae Jung's victory and brought Roh Moo Hyun to power is maturing, and recognizes that South Korea cannot just go it alone, that Seoul needs to manage its relationship with Washington, not just insist on going its own way. While there is no desire to become a puppet of the United States, there I a need to avoid being abandoned by Washington, both for security and economic reasons.

On a side note, Koreans are also getting a bit bored with elections, relatively peaking. Voter turnout this time was 62.9 percent, according to the National Election Commission, down from 70.8 percent in 2002 and 80.7 percent in 1997. Democracy is settling in, and so is apathy and ennui. Ah, the freedom not to choose...

Text of Bush Letter to Kim

2007-12-06T23:45:00.000+09:00

The text of Bush's letter to Kim Jong Il has been leaked. Apparently, the cleaning staff for the Oval Office pulled this draft from the executive waste paper basket, unwrinkled it, and has released it to select outlets (those who were willing to buy said cleaning staff a burger). So here is the letter, though this may not be quite the same text as the final copy delivered by Hill.

Dear Mr. Kim,

I have struggled with this letter, not so much because I don't know what I want to say to you, but because I couldn't figure out how to address it. Should I call you Mr. Kim? Chairman Kim? Comrade General Kim? Dear Leader? I couldn't see addressing the letter to "Dear Dear Leader" though – too redundant.

So what is it I want to say to you? Well, what I want to say I have been told is not acceptable to be written down, because then it would end up in the archives for all eternity, so those comments I will save for my diary and memoirs.

Instead, I would like to invite you to trade in your membership in the Axis of Evil (AoE) for a new membership in the Club of Formerly Evil but now on the Mend, or COFEBNOTM for short. If you will give up your evil ways, I will stop calling you evil. You stop making nucular bombs, I stop blocking all your bank accounts. You give me your old nuclear bombs (and no, I don't mean give them to me on the end of a missile flying over the Pacific), I offer you the privilege of being recognized by me (meaning I won't ignore you when you wave at me while passing each other in the mall).

In short (and no, that wasn't a pun on your stature, though now that I think of it, that would be funny), I am nearing the end of my presidency, and all the countries I didn't get to bomb I am offering a chance to act like Libya and give up all your self respect, wear a dress and eye shadow, and beg people to take your natural resources. If not, I still hold the nuke-'em suitcase until 2009.

Yours,

G.W.B.

DPRK Looks for Advice and Economics

2007-10-31T12:30:00.000+09:00

North Korea’s two Kim Yong Il’s (Premier and Vice-Foreign Minister) have been rather active recently in Southeast and South Asian diplomacy. Kim Yong Il (the premier) is currently on a four nation trip to Vietnam, Malaysia, Cambodia and Laos. Earlier this month, he met with a visiting business delegation from Singapore, and joined Kim Jong Il in greeting visiting Vietnam Communist party secretary general Nong Duc Manh. Kim Yong Il (the premier) also met with Chinese ambassador Liu Xiaoming in June.

Meanwhile Kim Yong Il (the vice-foreign minister) and Kim Yong Il (the premier) jointly met with visiting Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi in July. Kim Yong Il (the vice-foreign minister) went to Myanmar in April to pave the way for the re-establishment of diplomatic ties, traveled to Indonesia in April, Iran in May and China in September, and met with visiting Philippine Foreign Secretary Alberto Gatmaitan Romulo in June.

Rounding out all the various meetings and visits, Kim Yong Nam (Chairman of the Presidium of the SPA) visited Singapore in August and Mongolia in September, while Foreign Minister Pak Ui Chun visited the Philippines in July. Oh, and there WAS that inter-Korean summit as well, and Kim Jong Il is meeting with Liu Yunshan, a member of the politburo of the Communist Party of China.

All in all, it has been a busy few months, with North Korea ramping up regional diplomacy, focusing intensely on Southeast Asia (the ASEAN nations). The re-establishing of diplomatic ties with Myanmar gave Pyongyang normalized relations with all of the ASEAN countries, and North Korea is looking to find some common economic interests with these states. The diplomatic offensive also matches that carried out by the DPRK in association with its 2000 inter-Korean summit – part of Pyongyang’s attempt to break free from the constraints of its relationship with the United States.

With Vietnam, Pyongyang has said Doi Moi is its economic model of choice, beating out the economic opening and reform of China and Russia’s Glasnost and Perestroika. The reason is simple. Russian economic reform led to political and social upheaval and the collapse of the state. China’s economic reform is leading to too many social instabilities and ever-more-vocal calls for political reform. Both Russia and China were unable to keep economic reform isolated from social and political reform. Vietnam’s Doi Moi is supposed to do just that.

Of course North Korea is not planning to imitate Vietnam’s experience exactly, nor could it. North Korea’s population is just a third the size of Vietnam’s, it doesn’t have the domestic energy resources (though there is some promise in the Bohai Bay area), and its location is all wrong – at least as far as Southeast Asian trade and flow between the United States and the Indian Ocean Basin is concerned. Instead, North Korea looks to Vietnam for some advice, some capital, and some hope that economic change can come with minimal political change.

North Korea will have its own economic model, but it is always looking for advice. The number one issue for North Korea is to have an economic change that doesn’t bring "evil" social influences or political change. They REALLY didn’t like what happened with Russia's economic model. They have been nervous about the Chinese model since the 1980s. Doi Moi offers a model that doesn’t expect social or political change, at least not for a very long time.

The current DPRK model is based on establishing special economic zones. The RaSon zone in the northeast was the first, but proved a big flop. Who wants to be up on the Tumen river isolated and only hanging out with a select few Chinese and Russian businessmen? It turned temporarily into a casino haven, but was pretty much shut down.

The second attempt was to be in Sinuiju, on the Chinese border at the mouth of the Yalu river. This was a good location, easy access to the Chinese markets, and a relatively good transportation infrastructure by rail or ship. But the Chinese didn’t like it one bit. The DPRK's chosen manager, the Dutch-Chinese entrepreneur Yang Bin (the “tulip king” of north China) was arrested and imprisoned, bringing an end to the DPRK's attempt at the SEZ and leading to a precipitous decline in DPRK-China relations that continues to color ties between Pyongyang and Beijing and shape Pyongyang’s search for independence form China’s economic tether.

The third and current zone is in Kaesong. Mostly it is underwritten by the South Koreans, who have political reasons to see it successful. But aside from the politically motivated South Koreans, most others view the location as pretty useless. Kaesong is stuck inland, it can mostly only service the ROK.

The new locations being discussed are in port cities like Wonson, Chinnampo and Haeju. These are industrial cities with deep water ports, places where goods can be quickly shipped to China or Japan or beyond. South Korea is considering shipbuilding and auto manufacturing there to start. The DPRK is looking for more tech investment (as it already does low end consumer electronics in Kaesong).

The purpose of these SEZs is to bring in investment and technology and training without exposing the population to western influences. They are walled off from the neighboring cities. The workers are selected just for work in the SEZ, given their own isolated housing in government work facilities, and in general are kept isolated from the “regular” population. They are also paid by the DPRK government, not he foreign company they work for. They work for the DPRK, which then is paid by the foreign company and supplies workers. Those who learn new skills in efficiency or manufacturing design or methods and who are politically reliable will be transferred either to North Korean facilities elsewhere, to bring about "indigenous" improvements, or to training facilities to train DPRK managers and workers. This is economic growth carefully controlled, isolated from the population, and with all the money directly to the government, so the workers allegiance remains to the DPRK, not their foreign company.

This is slow going, but it is their current model. They also want to expand foreign involvement in the mining sector (coal, uranium, molybdenum, gold, etc), but these, too, will be set up in the controlled conditions, all workers coming from a government contractor, rather than hired directly.

For DPRK, the US is a hindrance on economic change. Not necessarily because they lack US investment or the US as a market - those are nice but not necessary. Rather, because the US-DPRK ... situation ... discourages Europeans and other Asians from investing in DPRK. The political risk is high - not only the chances for conflict, but also for being randomly punished by the US when it gets frustrated with the DPRK. The return on investment isn’t there until the US-DPRK situation stabilizes. This doesn’t require normalization of relations, but it does at least require North Korea’s removal from the terrorism list and the associated sanctions against DPRK. The US is already planning, perhaps by the end of this year, but definitely by the end of next year, to establish an economic liaison office in DPRK. Just that move alone significantly reduces the political risk of investing in DPRK.

What the DPRK counts on, then, is the following image. Consider a labor force that is disciplined, industrious, always on time, and works for pennies a day - making products right next door to the consumer markets of some of the world's largest economies – China (number 4 and soon to be number 3), Japan (number 2) and South Korea (number 12). Products made in DPRK have very easy transportation routes to these neighboring states, by road, rail or ship. Labor costs are rising in China. But the consumer market is also growing. So why not build it in North Korea, and sell in to the neighbors?

If Southeast Asia can cooperate on low-end goods – and maybe even be an early market for DPRK goods – and the Europeans can supply the capital and technology, then the DPRK thinks it may have a chance to start to reverse the economic decline and not have to have a too immediate social or political consequence.

Summit Wrap: Mushrooms, Movies and Money

2007-10-05T12:33:00.000+09:00

The second inter-Korean summit is over, the two leaders have parted, Kim Jong Il to his DVD player with a load of new movies and Korean dramas, Roh Moo Hyun to his kitchen for a few (tons of) mushrooms.

In addition to the gifts, the banquets, the speeches and the photo ops, the two leaders also signed the "Declaration on the Advancement of South-North Korean Relations, Peace and Prosperity" as South Korea's Yonhap translates it, or the "Declaration for Development of North-South Relations and Peace and Prosperity" as North Korea's KCNA writes it.

There are minor differences between the English translations of the two texts. Some are just standard adjustments in phrasing, and the difference in order of South and North or North and South. In the South Korean version, when they refer to doing things for all of Korea, they say "the Korean people" whereas the North Koreans use "the nation," a reflection of the south Korean sensitivities and the North Korean emphasis on the artificialness of separation. This sense is repeated in the section on Kaesong, where South Korea talks about "the special nature of inter-Korean cooperative projects" and North Korea phrases it "the peculiarities of cooperation undertakings between compatriots."

Perhaps the most striking instance of translation differences of this nature comes in the first point, where the South says "The South and the North have agreed to resolve the issue of unification on their own initiative and according to the spirit of 'by-the-Korean-people-themselves,'" and the North says "The north and the south agreed to independently solve the reunification issue in the spirit of 'By our nation itself', put the dignity and interests of the nation above all and orientate everything to this objective."

One other difference comes in the final section, where the two discuss future inter-Korean summits. The South side document is much more committed to the idea, saying "their highest authorities will meet frequently" while the North side is less committal, stating "the top leaders of both sides meet from time to time."

Differences aside, the document actually came out with a series of concrete goals, perhaps most noticeable being the agreements on road and rail transportation and maritime and port cooperation. North Korean premier Kim Yong Il was chosen for his post in part due to his work on the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory near the port of Nampo, at the mouth of the Taedong River. His appointment, and the removal of Pak Pong Ju, was a shift in North Korea’s economic focus, and opened the way for the agreements on expanded economic zones, joint ship building facilities, and development of Haeju, long cut off from significant use due to the location of the NLL.

If Haeju, Nampo and Anbyon take off, this could prove a profitable place for joint economic ventures, as they have ready port access rather than the landlocked Kaesong or the isolated RaSon zone.

So maybe the two got more than mushrooms and movies. Maybe they will get some cash.

Summit Redux

2007-10-03T12:50:00.000+09:00

The leaders of the two Koreas are meeting. No one is quite sure what for, but there will be talk of an end to hostilities and an increase in economic relations. People are wondering at the apparent sudden moderation of the North Korean leadership, with a reduction of international tensions and the welcoming to Pyongyang of the South Korean leader. In South Korea, there is concern that the trip to North Korea is just a political stunt by the president.

The summit occurs in the context of the regional powers and their interactions. Russian President Vladimir Putin appears full of surprises, no one knows just what he will do next, but Moscow’s comments seem to point toward a looming return to the Cold War. China is trying to look economically friendly for the United States while at the same time pursuing a policy of naval expansion that alarms its neighbors and Washington. In Japan, there has been a change in Prime Ministers, the LDP is unstable, and there is open talk of changing Japan’s longstanding defense policies (predicated on the pacifist post-World War II constitution). The United States, meanwhile, is still dealing with the political aftermath of its latest overseas war, where violence continues, and is looking to build up Australia and Japan as close strategic partners in Asia.

The year is 2000. The summit is between Kim Jong Il and Kim Dae Jung.

How little has changed, how much has changed.

In 2000, the summit was all the news all the time.
In 2007, it is barely noticed.

In 2000, there was a groundbreaking coming out party for the mysterious Kim Jong Il.
In 2007, Kim is a known entity.

In 2000, there was real hope and concern for some fundamental shift in inter-Korean relations.
In 2007, reality prevails, and the geopolitical constraints on the two Koreas are more than obvious to all.

Inter-Korean cooperation is a positive thing, much preferable to constant hostilities. Inter-Korean trade has more than tripled since 2000. North Korea has expanded its international diplomatic ties. There are still concerns about North Korean political behavior at home, human rights and of course nukes. But the two Koreas are operating within a closed system. Their options are shaped by their neighbors. The thought of a 70-million strong nuclear and missile armed technologically proficient and resource rich unified Korea is still there, but the timing is much further in the future.

North Korea Exposed: "Money, Women, Threat and Blackmail"

2007-09-06T14:08:00.000+09:00

There is something odd about the latest North Korea accusations of foreign spying. (Chosun Sinbo article) I do not recall any recent cases so public, large and involving DPRK citizenry so prominently. North Korea regularly complains about attempts by foreigners to spy or subvert culture. Rails against radio broadcasts, hidden agendas in humanitarian aid, corrupting music and excessively shaggy hair are not an unusual feature of North Korean media. Neither are the monthly reports of U.S. aerial espionage, identifying the types and flight plans of elint and sigint capturing aircraft.

But this is a claim that North Koreans have become witting pawns in the foreign espionage game. Not only North Koreans, but “functionaries who frequently visit third countries” who were recruited by a “foreign espionage organ” that used “money, women, threat and blackmail” to build a cadre of spies. These comments come from Ri Su Kil, a functionary at the State Security Department.

Now, the only North Koreans who frequent third countries are a small cadre of traders, and a much larger cadre of... cadre – government officials. These “functionaries” that the State Security Department is referring to, may well be government officials, corrupted, bribed and blackmailed into becoming agents of espionage for an unnamed foreign power.

Now that is a potentially significant development, far removed from the typical propaganda and warnings of foreign espionage and instability campaigns. If North Korean officials, who we already know go abroad to make cash and sell state historical treasures, are now coming back to record state secrets and sell them to the highest bidder (or the holder of a set of 8X10 glossies of said official in bed with an underage male prostitute), then the DPRK regime may be in worse internal shape that it previously appeared.

Now, as to the identity of the mysterious recruiting nation, well, the State Security Department says they won’t tell right now, it is too sensitive. But they WILL repeat several times that some of the spy equipment seized has a SONY label. When fed a question about this tidbit of information at the press conference, Ri coyly replies that whether or not the piece of equipment in question was manufactured by SONY or not, it is an “objective fact” that it was used for “a political and intelligence plotting maneuver.” Of course, repeating SONY is a less than subtle way to say “Japan.” And this gets even more interesting, considering the DPRK and Japan resumed normalization talks in Mongolia just as the spy scandal was being made public.

So, we have North Korea admitting its own citizens were bought off by a foreign spy agency, suggests these citizens are government officials or at least state functionaries, and drops hints that the foreign intelligence agency may well be based in Tokyo. All this in the middle of negotiations with Japan in Mongolia, and ahead of the planned inter-Korean summit. Either this is a very elaborate stage show, and may be used as a negotiating ploy in Mongolia to counter Japanese complaints of North Korean kidnappings and North Korean espionage in Japan, or it may be used to back out of the inter-Korean summit... or it could actually represent a breach of the North Korean bureaucracy by foreign intelligence agencies – and the North Koreans may be facing an internal security crisis that for some reason they decided to broadcast.

Odd.

Random Images of Tokyo

2007-07-10T22:11:00.000+09:00

Transforming Kia

2007-06-29T17:36:00.000+09:00

OK, there wasn't a transforming Kia in the movie, but bing in Korea has its perks, such as seeing Transformers before any folks back in America. And for those of us who still have boxes of the transforming robots in the garage, it was a treat.

Sushi, the Breakfast of Champions

2007-06-29T09:24:00.000+09:00

There is nothing quite like getting up at the crack of dawn and heading down to the massive warehouse-like structure that is the Tsukiji Fish Market. Creatures from the sea (live, dead and somewhere in between) are piled, stacked and laid out in foam boxes, some iced, others packed in sand, still others floating in buckets, the water turning rust with the slowly leaking blood.

Walking between stall after stall, through narrow alleys and lanes, dodging the rubber-booted men trudging cartloads of boxed and not-so-boxed fish, the stall owners tossing buckets of bloodied seawater on the floor, the occasional eel slithering along the ground, searching out a sewer drain or some exit to the sea, only to feel the wheels of the cart or the heel of the boot end its journey abruptly.

In the slightly wider lanes, the gas-powered carts shoot past, a never-ending stream of rhythmic engines, the metal bumpers rounded and worn from frequent use, the boxes of fish, creatures, and other assorted gifts from the sea bouncing around on the back. The occasional hand cart, bicycle or pedestrian weaves between the fast moving carts, risking wheel or leg to cross the raging stream of steel and find another relatively quiet row of fishmongers.

Lined along the floor are the massive frozen carcasses of Tuna, their heads thawing in nearby buckets, their fins and tails stripped away. A few are fresh, and these are being turned into the finest of sushi by men with knives and swords, lining up just the right cut and then carrying it out with a smooth motion and a flourish of steel for effect. The red flesh glistens in the dim glow of naked electric lights swinging above.

And then it is off to stand in line, waiting outside one of the more famous sushi restaurants, waiting to sit at the counter and spend some exorbitant sum for the freshest sushi of the morning. Once seated at the counter, the sushi pieces are handed over as they are made, placed on the lacquered shelf as much art as edible. Fatty tuna, snapper, sea urchin, squid, eel... The sushi chef laughs and smiles as he serves his creations, taking pleasure in our pleasure, adding a little extra here and there, keeping the wasabi off the kids’ portions.

And it is finally back out, into the dreary morning sky, a light mist and drizzle, walking off from the remnant of an older Tokyo to the bustling high-end fashion streets of Ginza.

Tokyo: First Inpressions

2007-06-26T22:31:00.000+09:00

There is a certain sense of order to Japan, particularly after traveling to other Northeast Asian nations. In China, despite the best efforts ahead of the Olympics, there is no such thing as a line. It is just first come first serve, and survival of the fittest when it comes to buying tickets, getting on the bus or subway, or boarding an airplane. In Japan, there is an overactive sense of order. Long, single file lines waiting for the bus to arrive, stretching neatly along the sidewalk. Polite lines waiting for shops to open. Three police assisting bus rider to form straight lines. The sense of service is also exaggerated. Deep waist bows from fast food and chain restaurant staff. People operating the self service ticket kiosks for you. Happy cheerful recorded voices on the subway and buses announcing the upcoming stops, pleasant music chiming through the station. The food, served in small, attractive portions, several tiny dishes all placed orderly on the wooden tray. Yet Tokyo is no less crowded than Beijing or Seoul, and much more so than a frontier town like Ulaan Baator. The Chinese excuse that, with so many people, lines mean you never get anything goes out the window in Japan. But one wonders if this is a real, deep seated element of the soul, or just a hard constraint of social norms. After all, why the police to help form lines? Are workers at chain restaurants and department stores really that grateful that you bothered to stop by and browse, or have a quick bite? I guess the question of those international anthropo-sociologists is: is the order put in place to contain some underlying chaos, or is there an underlying chaos due to the imposed order?

5.18

2007-05-18T04:59:00.000+09:00

Kim Jong Il Chosen as Most Famous Leader by American Magazine

2007-05-15T04:18:00.000+09:00

In what has got to be one of the oddest bits of propaganda out of North Korea in a while, the KCNA May 12 ran a two-line story under the headline “Kim Jong Il Chosen as Most Famous Leader by American Magazine.”

Pyongyang, May 12 (KCNA) – The American magazine Time chose Kim Jong Il as the most famous leader in the world. Publishing a list of men of the present times, the magazine selected Kim Jong Il as a renowned leader exercising the biggest influence in changing the world, according to an Ukrainian Internet News on May 7.

Now, unless I am missing the Pyongyang issue of TIME, this is silly on several levels, not the least of which is that someone reading it might actually see a TIME magazine and discover that TIME did not decide that Kim Jong Il was the most famous leader in the world. What the Ukrainian Internet News article of May 7 appears to be referring to is the April 12 Time Magazine list of the most influential people in the world, as voted by their readers. (Kim didn’t even place on the Magazine’s final top 100).

On the reader-generated list, Kim Jong Il comes in at number 118, with 2,771 votes and an average rating of 45 out of 100. In regards to total votes, Kim had one tenth the number of votes for 97th place finisher George W. Bush, just 19 more votes than 53rd place finisher Bob Dylan, a third the votes of 83rd place finisher Rosie O’Donnell, one-twenty-fifth the votes of seventh place finisher J. K. Rowling.

Perhaps most symbolic of the different fortunes of North and South Korean Kim ended up 467,448 votes behind first-place finisher Rain (who had 170 times as many votes as Kim Jong Il.) Now, the order obviously didn’t match the total number of votes, as they were weighted, but for Kim to end 117 spots behind South Korean pop star Rain (who was helped no doubt by the web-savvy South Korean housewives) is far from being picked the most famous leader in the world.

But the North Koreans will grasp for any straw they can get. Unfortunately, in this case they drew the short straw, and some propagandist reporter for KCNA is soon going to find himself and his entire family moved to much less comfortable accommodations in the northern provinces of North Korea.

To be fair, Kim did make the list in 2004 and 2005. Perhaps if he changed his wardrobe, he might regain a space in the top 100 next year...

Krazy Kim's Missile Menagerie

2007-04-26T14:03:00.000+09:00

North Korea’s 75^th anniversary of the KPA parade rolled, marched and pranced through the streets Pyongyang April 25, with Kim Jong Il looking on approvingly. This was the first time in more than a decade that the parade included North Korean missiles, and counts of the video footage show four dozen missiles of four different types. In the footage I have seen, which isn’t the whole parade, I have only counted three types, so if you have the fourth, let me know.

The three I saw were the Hwasong (a SCUD variant), the AG-1 (A Seersucker anti-ship variant) and the KN-02 (A short range ballistic missile based on the old Soviet SS-21 Scarab). These are shown below, in that order.

The lack of NoDongs and TaepoDongs was intentional; no need to give the foreigners too much to be concerned about. But each KCNA press release on the parade made sure to include a line about the missiles: “Columns of rocket units also went past the tribune of honor, demonstrating the invincible might of the KPA equipped with modern offensive and defensive means.”

What is interesting is that these were battlefield missiles, not the strategic ones used to shape foreign perceptions, but actual, useable weapons. And they are also for sale. North Korea sells each of these missiles abroad, and their size, versatility and lower price point give them a much larger market that for the longer range missiles. These are also easier to move, and less likely to be intercepted by the United States under the proliferation Security Initiative. So Pyongyang can talk big, carry a medium-size stick, and get some free advertising. Come on down to the bargain basement ballistic blowout sale!!!

On a side note, for some reason this picture of the reviewing stand reminds me of the intro to the Muppet Show...

Ageing Vanguard

2007-04-25T23:55:00.000+09:00

The North Korean leadership is ageing and dieing. The remnants of the first generation leaders, the compatriots of Kim Il Sun, the anti-Japanese guerrilla commanders, are passing on. They were instrumental in maintaining the stability of the regime during the transition from Kim Il Sung to Kim Jong Il, and have remained important voices in the ear of Kim Jong Il. But they are, to put it bluntly, old. And they are dieing off.

The second generation leadership, the children of the revolutionaries, the Kim Jong Il generation, are in power. There are some hangers on from the first generation, in the military and elsewhere, but even Jo Myong Rok, a key first generation confidant of Kim Jong Il, is reportedly near death. Whereas the first generation leadership claim to power was based on their guerilla credentials (they actually fought for Korean independence), their Children’s claim is based on family lineage. Many of the second generation leaders were trained abroad, but primarily in Soviet, Chinese and Eastern European institutions. They have grown up as the children of the elite, and saw North Korea grow in prosperity, and then sink back into the doldrums. They are in government for the power. They believe they have a right to lead, based on their lineage, and are motivated by a burning desire to retain power – for without it they are nothing. This is the current leadership. Their number one driver is the perpetuation of the elite, of their status and power. It shapes all their actions.

But there is a rising generation, the third generation of leadership, that is now emerging. These are the children of the children of the revolution. They have grown up in a completely different environment than their predecessors. They have always been the elite, the privileged, separated from the common folk. They are the new aristocracy. Many have been to western nations, schooled in Europe, Australia and even the United States. They have seen the riches of the West, and even of the East (China, Japan and the like). They like power, but they crave money, wealth, material goods. These are the spoiled third generation, the next generation of leaders. Kim Jong Il’s son, Kim Jong Nam, reflects this generation’s desires and drivers. His detention in Japan a few years back was a clear indication of the motivations of this generation. They are not concerned with power so much as spending. This generation is soon going to move into the halls of power as the first generation dies off. And it is this generation, not the current second generation leaders, who will eventually sell out North Korea. Reunification hopes under the current leadership are delusional. But when the next generation takes charge, there will be a rapid dissolution of the North Korean state.

Below are pictures of Kim Jong Il and some of his top military officers at various parades in Pyongyang. Watch as they magically grow older, right before your eyes...

North Korea, Myanmar: Tyrannical Ties...

2007-04-23T12:41:00.000+09:00

North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il (not to be confused with newly-named Premier Kim Yong Il) is expected to arrive in Naypyidaw (the new capital of Myanmar) April 25, and the following day sign the agreement to re-establish normal diplomatic relations between the two “outposts of tyranny.” Should these events actually take place as the rumors suggest, North Korea and Myanmar would finally put behind them the 1983 North Korean assassination attempt on then-South Korean President Chun Doo Hwan, which took place October 9 at the Aung San Martyr’s Mausoleum. In the botched assassination attempt (the explosion occurred before Chun arrived), 17 South Koreans, including four cabinet ministers, were killed and four Burmese were also killed. At least 14 others were injured in the attack, carried out by three North Korean agents, allegedly on the orders of Kim Jong Il himself. (This was, interestingly, one of the last acts recognized by the U.S. State Department of state sponsored terrorism carried out by North Korea.) Since the early 1990s, North Korea and Myanmar have begun a series of informal exchanges, including talks on releasing the final North Korean held for the 1983 bombing, alleged military cooperation (Pyongyang reportedly sold a dozen or so 130mm M-46 field artillery pieces and some 20 million rounds of 7.62mm ammunition to Myanmar in exchange for rice in the late 1990s or early 2000s), and North Korean assistance in preparing the Naypyidaw (then known as Pyinmana) site for the new capital (Pyongyang’s expertise in tunneling has been rather useful for the SPDC, allegedly). In 2000, prior to the inter-Korean summit, North Korea approached ASEAN to request membership in the ASEAN Regional Forum, and not long thereafter, in July, Pyongyang normalized diplomatic relations with Manila, leaving Myanmar the only ASEAN state without formal diplomatic ties with North Korea. Myanmar assented to Pyongyang’s involvement in the ARF, however, and in 200 and 2001 hinted that it was considering re-establishing diplomatic relations. In November, 2000, a Myanmar government delegation paid a secret visit to Pyongyang, and in June 2001, a North Korean delegation, led by a vice foreign minister, visited Myanmar. In 2002, Myanmar was still only “considering” the normalization of relations. In 2003, North Korean technicians reportedly helped build a bunker complex in Taungdwingyi (to the Northwest of Naypyidaw) to house Myanmar’s MiG-29s bought from Russia. (It is quite possible that in return for the construction work, North Korean pilots trained on the MiGs.) In 2003, other North Korean technicians were spotted near the Monkey Point naval base, south of Yangon, raising speculation Pyongyang was selling ship to ship missiles to the SPDC. And there are other reports that Pyongyang (and perhaps China) aided Myanmar in upgrading radar stations near Victoria point to monitor Thai-U.S. naval exercises. There are wilder claims – of North Korea assisting Myanmar in a nuclear program, or even selling it nuclear missiles, but these fall far outside the realm of North Korean activity, and come from dissident sources out to shape international viewpoints. What is clear, however, is that North Korea and Myanmar have been at least mulling diplomatic ties for a while, and have been engaged in various forms of cooperation for even longer. And if the reports of North Korean assistance in building the underground bunker and tunnel system around Naypyidaw are accurate, the SPDC certainly trusts North Korea enough to share its most sensitive security secrets. In 2006, the two countries agreed in principle to normalize relations, and in early April 2007, there were numerous leaks of the imminent visit of a North Korean delegation to Naypyidaw to finally normalize relations, nearly two and a half decades after the October 9 incident. On April 19, North Korean Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il left Pyongyang for a multi-nation Asian visit, with no destination named (but hints as he was seen off at the airport by envoys from Indonesia, India, Pakistan and Iran.) His visit to Myanmar fits right into the flight path. Much of the talk of the normalization between the two centers on the potential dangers of two pariahs, two outposts of tyranny, getting together. This is rather silly. They already cooperate. For North Korea, the resumption of diplomatic ties has much more to do with ASEAN than with some nefarious plotting among the Axis of Evil and the Axis of nearly Evil. Pyongyang, since 2000, has been seeking diplomatic ties all over the place, trying to break free from the economic and political constraints of its acrimonious relationship with the United States. While it joined ARF, it never finalized cooperation with ASEAN, due to the lack of formal ties with Myanmar. But with the success (or at least hints of success) with South Korea getting Washington to at least consider counting Kaesong-made goods as fitting within the FTA, and with the South Korea-ASEAN FTA coming onto effect June 1, Pyongyang sees a way to increase its economic contacts throughout Southeast Asia, riding on the coattails of South Korea. Add in the recent ten point economic agreement between Seoul and Pyongyang, which calls for joint development of mineral resources in third countries, and you have a North Korea looking perhaps at joining in the South Korean natural gas exploration in Myanmar. And if folks get all worked up about two “evil” nations having diplomatic ties, well, North Korea wont lose any sleep over that.

China Shifts Tack On North Korea Management

2007-04-21T13:29:00.000+09:00

China has formally appointed Chen Naiqing as special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs. Chen, China’s Ambassador to Norway, was born in Shandong, China in December 1953, graduated from the Dalian Foreign Language Institute in 1974, and joined the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) the same year in the Department of Translation and Interpretation. Chen studied at the London School of Economics in 1975 and 1976, and remained in London as a staff member and attaché of the Embassy until 1982. Chen then moved back to the MFA in 1982, serving in the Department of translation and interpretation (1982-1986) and the Department of West European Affairs (1986-1988). Chen then moved to New York as Second Secretary and then First Secretary of China’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations (1988-1992) before returning to China to take up various positions in the Department of Policy Planning. In February, 2003, she took up her post as Ambassador to Norway.

Chen replaces Li Bin, former Ambassador to South Korea (2001-2005) who took on the role as special envoy on Korean Peninsula affairs in September 2005. Li was raised in Beijing, studied at Kim Il Sung university in Pyongyang, and lived in Pyongyang for nearly two decades, serving in the embassy and serving as a guide for Kim Il Sung and Kim Jong Il during visits to China in the 1980s and 1990s. Li was awarded the DPRK Friendship Order First Class in August 2001 for his "positive activities" to boost China-DPRK relations and work toward Korean unification. In May 2006, after returning to China from South Korea, Li took up the post of Deputy Mayor of Weihai City, in Shandong province, but in December 2006, Li was called to Beijing for questioning, accused of leaking state secrets, stripped of his position in Weihei and in early 2007 was arrested. (The arrest prompted Yonhap reporter Park Ki Sung to deny that Li had given him information on one of Kim Jong Il’s secret trips to China, insisting he and his fellow reporters had figured it out themselves. See the Asia Times article by Sunny Lee for more on this) Li’s detention was far more likely linked to China’s ongoing spat with North Korea than with anything li may have leaked to a South Korean reporter about Kim Jong Il’s itinerary.

The appointment of Chen fills the gap left by Li. It also changes the dynamic of the position. Rather than having someone who is closely tied to North Korea as the key envoy, Beijing is instead placing someone intimately familiar with the main policy planning and broader foreign policy goals of China. North Korean relations, or Korean peninsular relations, are being shaped more in line with China’s broader foreign policy than with China’s specific relation with North Korea. It is somewhat interesting that both Li Bin and North Korean Premier Pak Pong Ju were both unceremoniously dumped about the same time. Pak’s removal was linked both to failed policies and his close ties to Beijing. Li appears to have been dumped in part for his close ties to Pyongyang. What the two were scheming together without the sanction of their respective governments is anyone’s guess.

But Beijing is now moving on, and Chen may bring a new vision into the Korean Peninsular issue – one that looks at it as a small piece of a larger puzzle, rather than as a puzzle in itself. This may not be good news for Pyongyang, and North Korea may soon turn its affection to Russia to regain some leverage.

North Korea: New PM, New Direction?

2007-04-12T13:51:00.000+09:00

North Korea’s Supreme People’s Assembly met April 11 for a one-day session, attended by Kim Jong Il. During the meeting, the SPA appointed Minister of Land and Marine Transport Kim Yong Il (sometimes Kim Young Il) the new Premier of the Cabinet, replacing Pak Pong Ju, who served as Premier since 2003. (Just for clarification, this is a different Kim Yong Il from the Vice Foreign Minister who is rather vocal on the nuclear issue) Kim Yong Il was born in 1944, served nine years in the military beginning in 1961, and later attended the Rajin University of Marine Transport (which was founded in 1968, so Kim Yong Il was in one of the earlier classes to graduate from the university).

Kim apparently served as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Marine and Land Transport for several years, before being promoted to Minister in 1994 or 1995 (either way, apparently after the death of Kim Il Sung). Kim Yong Il was reaffirmed Minister of maritime and Land Transport at the 10th SPA in 1998 and the 11th SPA in 2003. In December, 2005, he accompanied Kim Jong Il on an inspection of a new (or revitalized) dock at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Facility. Kim Yong Il attended the commissioning ceremony for the dock in March, 2006. (Yonhap reports that he accompanied Kim Jong Il on another inspection sometime in 2005, but I have yet to find verification).

In March 2005, Kim Yong Il flew to Damascus to sign an agreement on Maritime transport. He oversaw maritime transport deals with Pakistan in 1998 and China in 2002 – both of which were signed in Pyongyang. Yonhap reports that Kim Yong Il also delegations to Cuba and China within the last seven years. In general, though, Kim Yong Il has kept a low profile. There is little information in South Korea on his family background, place of birth, or his involvement in North Korean policymaking to this point. Kim Yong Il is a 2002 recipient of the Kim Il Sung order.

Kim Yong Il’s appointment means that he is now responsible for North Korea’s economic direction. His predecessor, Pak Pong Ju, is rumored to have failed in his task when he promulgated ineffective agricultural policies. Interestingly, Pak was Minister of Chemical Industry before being appointed premier, suggesting he was much more adept at focusing on heavy industry than on agriculture. Pak had been close to Kim Jong il, nearly the same age as the dear leader, and was also sent abroad several times as part of economic delegations, studying reforms and market systems. His appointment in 2003 was part of an infusion of second generation technocrats into the top tiers of the North Korean leadership. His last public appearance with Kim Jong Il was in May, 2006. His fall was made abundantly clear when he was not even present at the latest SPA session to read the government work report.

Kim Yong Il’s appointment (one of only two apparent changes in the North Korean leadership this time around), may indicate the direction of North Korea’s economic policies in the coming years. His lengthy stay in the Ministry of Maritime and Land Transportation, and his focus on maritime issues, may hint at a more active focus on trade for North Korea. In addition, Kim Yong Il’s oversight of the construction of the computerized Dock No. 2 of the Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory may hint at North Korea’s entrance into ship building or repair, and Kim Jong Il even reportedly said, during his visit, that the new facility should ultimately have facilities to serve foreign ships’ crews, and take in ship repair of foreign vessels.

As with all such appointments, there is usually much more behind the scenes, and the individual placed in charge may prove unable or unwilling to bring about a new direction for the North Korean economy. But if Kim Yong il’s background is any indicator, North Korea will look to increase foreign trade in the coming years – something that is likely to encourage South Korean and Chinese officials eager for some change in the North Korean economic situation.

Kim Yong Il visiting the Dock No. 2 at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory with Kim Jong Il in December, 2005. Kim Yong Il is pointing, Pak Pong Ju is standing behind the two Kims.

Where was Kim Yong Il (Minister of Maritime and Land Transport) Information from KCNA unless otherwise noted

1961: Joins the Military. (Yonhap)

1970s(?): Begins study at the Rajin University of Marine Transport. (Yonhap)

1994(95?): Appointed Minister of Maritime and Land Transport. (Yonhap)

September 1997: Part of the committee that nominated Kim Jong Il as

July 20, 1998: Signed an agreement in Pyongyang on maritime transport between North Korea and Pakistan. Signing for Pakistan was Ambassador Rehmdil Bhatti.

September 5, 1998: Re-appointed Minister of Marine and Land Transport at the 10th SPA session.

March 27, 2002: Awarded the Kim Il Sung Order on the 90th anniversary of the great leader's birthday (one of numerous recipients, but the third mentioned in the list as released by the SPA Presidium). (Central Broadcasting Station, via BBC)

June 15, 2002: Present at a signing ceremony in Pyongyang on maritime transport. Singing the agreement were Chinese Vice Minister of Communications Hu Xijie and Chief of Staff of the North Korean Ministry of Maritime and Land transport, Ra Dong Hui. Also present was Chinese Ambassador Wu Donghe.

September 3, 2003: Re-appointed Minister of Marine and Land Transport at the 11th SPA session.

April 19, 2005: Attended a reception at the Syrian Embassy in Pyongyang, hosted by Syrian Charge d' Affaires a.i. Muhammad Adib Alhani. Also in attendance were Secretary of the CC of the WPK Choe Thae Bok, Minister of Foreign Trade Rim Kyong Man, and Mun Jae Chol, acting chairman of the Korean Committee for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.

May 7, 2005: Left Pyongyang for a visit to Syria. He was seen off at the airport by Ra Tong Hui, chief of Staff of the Ministry, and Syrian Charge d' Affaires a.i. Muhammad Adib Alhani.

May 11, 2005: Signed an agreement in Damascus on maritime transport.

December 13, 2005: Accompanied Kim Jong Il on a field guidance visit to Dock No. 2 at the Ryongnam Ship Repair Factory. Also joining them was then premier Pak Pong Ju.

March 24, 2006: Attended a commissioning ceremony for Dock No. 2 of the Ryongnam Ship Repairing Factory. Also in attendance was Vice-Premier Ro Tu Chol.

April 11, 2007: Appointed Premier of the cabinet of DPRK.

Dear Leader Travel Diary

2007-03-30T22:07:00.000+09:00

On the side, I maintain the "Where is Kim Jong Il?" Kim Jong Il tracker. Why? Who knows. But anyway, here is a review of first quarter visits. The 2007 tracker page has details.

The first quarter is almost up, and Kim Jong Il’s inspection tours this quarter have been a typical mix of economic, social and military locations, though military inspections were a bit low this quarter compared to previous first quarters. Kim made four inspections of military sites in the first three months of 2007, including one connected to a tank division.

Number of military sites inspected by Kim Jong Il in the first quarter of previous years:

4 times in the first quarter of 2007

12 times in the first quarter of 2006

3 times in the first quarter of 2005

14 times in the first quarter of 2004

6 times in the first quarter of 2003

6 times in the first quarter of 2002

2 times in the first quarter of 2001

4 times in the first quarter of 2000

7 times in the first quarter of 1999

10 times in the first quarter of 1998

Kim’s main focus this quarter was in the energy and economic realms. Even as the six party talks started and stalled and started and stalled, and as U.S. and South Korean military exercises ramped up, Kim stuck to the economic activities (something he does quite a bit these last few years). There is a major push on internal economic issues, and the six party talks coupled with the Kaesong development are ultimately designed to help spur the DPRK domestic economy. During the quarter, he visited:

the Huichon Machine-Tool Factory

the Youth Electrical Complex in Huichon

the Huichon Ceramic Factory

the newly built Thaechon Youth Power Station No. 4

the Chongjin University of Mining and Metallurgy

the newly built Orangchon Power Station No. 1

the construction site of the Orangchon Dam

the Jangyonho Fish Farm

the Chongjin Primary Seasoning Factory

the newly built Army-People Power Station in Chongjin

the Pakchon Silk Mill in North Phyongan Province

And, as usual, Kim spared time for cultural activities, including:

an art performance given by the Merited State Chorus of the KPA

a visit to the statue of President Kim Il Sung in Ranam District, Chongjin

a visit to the Malum Revolutionary Site in Chongjin

a visit to a room for the preservation and education in slogan-bearing trees in Chongjin

field guidance to Chongjin University of Mining and Metallurgy

the art performance "The Blue Sky over My Country" (Part Dawn.)

a concert given on works created by People's Artiste Jang Ryong Sik

Finally, Kim paid a visit to the Chinese Embassy to mark the Lunar New Year. Much was made of this visit in the press, but in fact it is not all that unusual for Kim to visit the embassy or meet with the Chinese in the first quarter. While in other countries a head of state visit to an embassy is a major deal, in North Korea, so long as it is the Chinese embassy, it is not entirely out of the ordinary. Despite the mixed feelings between DPRK and PRC, North Korea remains heavily reliant upon Chinese goods, services and good will. And the visit to the embassy was a way for North Korea to symbolically show it understood that dependency.

Other key first quarter meetings between Kim and China included:

On March 6, 2000, Kim visited the Chinese embassy.

On January 15-20, 2001, Kim visited China.

On February 10, 2002, Kim met with the incoming Chinese Ambassador (Wu Donghe).

On April 19-21, 2004, Kim visited China (technically in the second quarter)

On January 10-18, 2006, Kim visited China.

And on March 4, 2007, Kim visited the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang.

In addition to these, Kim had several meetings with various Chinese officials visiting North Korea.

So what does all this tell us? Not much. But sometimes watching Kim’s travels can reveal national economic or strategic priorities, and the focus on economic and cultural issues over military ones suggests that DPRK is not feeling any particular pressure after the nuclear test or amid the six party talks. Pyongyang is feeling confident.

What's In A Word? Part II

2007-03-29T04:44:00.000+09:00

In regards to yesterday’s post, Hayden appears not only to be talking to the Americans, but also to the North Koreans. If the rumors are accurate that DPRK’s Kim Kye Gwan asked USA’s Christopher Hill in New York in March to treat North Korea the way the United States treats India (recognize its nuclear weapons and still cooperate with it), then Hayden may have been offering an answer. By saying North Korea’s nuclear test was not successful and North Korea is not a nuclear power, Hayden has effectively told Pyongyang that the United States has no intention to treat the DPRK like India, reinforcing what Hill told Kim at their New York meeting. Washington does not consider North Korea a nuclear power yet. It will not accept North Korea as a formal nuclear power. This means that, for North Korea, destruction of the existing nuclear devices is a must for diplomatic relations with the United States. And this may be an untenable position for Pyongyang. Meaning that, no matter what progress in thee current round of six party talks, there is little agreement on the ultimate outcome, and trouble is coming – though that trouble may not manifest until the next U.S. president takes office.

What’s In A Word?

2007-03-28T12:10:00.001+09:00

U.S. CIA Chief Michael Hayden, on an “unannounced” visit to Seoul, said Washington does not consider North Korea a nuclear power because North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test was a failure. This is a silly bit of semantics, something the CIA is famous for. Every word counts, as a way to justify sometime in the future some action in the past. In this case, by saying the test was a failure (likely), and saying that the failure means North Korea is not a nuclear power (despite the fact that the CIA has been saying for years that North Korea “likely” possesses two or three nuclear devices), Hayden can justify to the hawks at home the decision to negotiate with North Korea was not capitulation to a nuclear North Korea, but the continued attempts at prevention of north Korea’s nuclear capabilities. Silly words that distract from the core responsibility of the intelligence agencies – finding the information rather than creating ream after ream of CYA documents.

Washington Takes a Page from North Korean Playbook

2007-03-19T23:50:00.000+09:00

The release of North Korea’s funds from Banco Delta Asia (Macao) by the U.S. Treasury Department has smoothed the continuation of the six party talks process. Responses internationally to the decision to let North Korea reclaim the $24 million have been mixed, with plenty of complaints that the United States gave in and had to “pay” North Korea for the continued talks.

But instead, the United States paid North Korea nothing. In fact, it turned North Korea’s tactics around and applied them TO Pyongyang. Washington froze North Korea’s access to its money. It then withheld that money, until North Korea finally agreed to talk and take other steps (like agreeing to IAEA visits and planning to shut Yongbyon). Then Washington gave back to North Korea what was already North Korea’s.

Pyongyang has used a similar tactic over and over again. It creates a new crisis, and demands concessions to return to the status quo. Pyongyang has now been paid back in kind, with Washington creating a “crisis” for North Korea, and demanding compensation to return to the status quo.

Just desserts all around.

ROK @ SXSW

2007-03-09T23:20:00.000+09:00

There are three Korean features at SXSW this year.

On Thursday, March 15, the Seoul Electric Band performs at the Plaza of City Hall from 5:30-6:30 PM as part of the “Live from the Plaza” series.

On Saturday, March 17, the Park Chan Wook movie, “I'm a Cyborg, but That's OK” will makes its North America premier at the Paramount at 7:30 PM as part of the SXSW film festival.

In a bit of unfortunate timing, the highlight of the Korean presence at SXSW begins just one hour after “Cyborg” starts. YB (Yoon Band) will be playing at Maggie Mae’s beginning at 8:30 PM March 17.

Juche Girl, Sarangheyo <3<3<3

2007-03-09T08:46:00.000+09:00

Juche Girl, Juche Girl

Juche Girl, my heart melts for you.

Who has such brilliant insights as you, daughter of the fatherly leader?!

Who else could come up with the solution to our oil problems: clone dinosaurs so we can melt them into oil.

And who else has such a wise and caring brother who points out how Bush tips over wheelchairs for the laughing pleasure of vampire Cheney? Or has a brother who points out that Kiwis have no wings

because Bush steal their wings and take them to his white house to eat them. Proof of that is that white house has "west wing".

And really, who else could see such ideological struggles in the flight of birds as this October 2005 observation?

I was watching a troop of good little comradely sparrows flying and swirling in formation like invincible state-of-the-art Mig-21 of the KPA Air Force who protect the children from US imperialist air pirates when capitalist puppet seagull flew over me and pooped on me >_<
The poop of the air pirate seagull hit me on the head and stuck in my hair. This made me very sad and angry and I ran home crying. This make me hate Bush more than ever.

Ah Juche Girl, I could read you all day every day. Please, write more!

And the best thing is that, somehow, Juche Girl gets a nod from the Songun Blog, listed among such sources of information as Naenara, Uriminzokkiri and KCNA. If Songun Blog only knew...

And as you read this, watch out for your kittens and your kids' ears, because, as Juche Girl tells us...

Bush is criminal ugly monster who eat little cats and world children eardrums

KPA Airforce

2007-03-07T14:24:00.000+09:00

No reason for this post, but as I was wandering around looking at videos of the SU-45, I jumped to some of the J-10, which eventually got me to an obviously dated video of the KPA Air Force posted on the Songun Blog. There is some dated information on the size and shape of the KPA Air Force over at GlobalSecurity.org, and to top off the dated look at the KPA Air Force, attached are a few pics from the DPRK military museum of a Yak-18 and a MiG-15 stuck down in the basement.

Crossing the Yalu

2007-03-06T13:37:00.000+09:00

Human Rights Watch has released its latest report on North Korean border crossers, titled Harsher Policies against Border-Crossers. The report cites interviews with 16 border crossers, as well as information from aid groups and the anti-regime South Korean paper, Daily NK. I will not attempt to address the accuracy of the report, nor the motivation of the interviewers or interviewees. The issue of North Korean human rights is one that is both troubling and difficult to gauge given the emotions and agendas of all players.

During my time in Dandong in January, I saw little sign of any North Korean border patrol presence along the river for several miles, but that was a survey of less than a week. There are places just east of Dandong city where the river is no more than a few feet (and in one spot, just 18 inches), with no fences on the North Korean side and a single barbed wire fence on the Chinese side. Crossing is likely limited more by fear of retribution than of difficulty (unlike the more heavily fortified DMZ or the old Berlin Wall).

Stories, oft repeated but never directly sourced, floated around Dandon of the treatment of North Korean border crossers who were caught and turned over to North Korean security. Typical of these stories is that those caught are pierced beneath the collar bone and strung together on a wire to be walked back across the bridge, or pinned through the flesh between te thumb and index finger and strung together on wire that way, though no one who told these stories had actually seen the actions take place.

North Korea and China use such stories to discourage the movement of individuals across the border – Pyongyang for political and security reasons, Beijing for security and economic reasons. There is likely a certain level of truth in the allegations, but a certain amount of exaggeration as well. Historically, there has been a fair amount of human activity across the border, mostly illegal, but frequently facilitated by border security on both sides that are willing to turn the other way for a fee, like a television set or some other useful commodity.

That still seems to be occurring, but the increase in Christian aid groups on the Chinese side of the border is encouraging more North Koreans to cross, offering promises of assistance and a better life (but in some cases manipulating the flow of border crossers for broader political goals). Barely across the border, where the river is just a few feet wide, the bright neon protestant church crosses light the night sky to guide the North Korean pilgrims on their way. Then comes the longer trek to Mongolia or Vietnam or Thailand, before a very small fraction can ever make it to South Korea (where many soon find that, despite the better economy, they are unable to adjust and make their new country their home).

Below are a few pictures of the Dandong area, across from Sinuiju in North Korea, one of the more heavily crossed areas of the North Korean border, due to the easy access to the Chinese city. These are from January 2007, and show in some places the minimal physical barriers to crossing (though there are many ways to discourage such activity).

One of the church complexes along the Chinese side of the Yalu river, opposite North Korea. In Northeast China, three are many more visible protestant churches than in some other areas. Near the Yalu, many of these are ethnic Korean.

DPRK/China Yalu River border. Around the bend, the river narrows to a width of just 18 inches, considered (by my guides) the narrowest spot in the Dandon area.

The barbed wire fence on the Chinese side of the Yalu. This fence is only in place where the river is rather narrow. On the North Korean side, the land is flat, and cultivated right up to the river's edge. On the Chinese side there is an embankment above the wire fence, leading to rural housing and farms.

A North Korean border guard resting by his post along the Yalu river, east of Dandong.

Happy New Year

2007-02-20T02:48:00.000+09:00

Guess Who's Having a Birthday

2007-02-16T03:38:00.000+09:00

February 16, 2007 is Kim Jong Il's 65th Birthday. Happy Birthday Mr. Kim. I would shake your hand, but you have said that is not sanitary or fitting of Korean sensibilities, so I give you a slight bow of my head. In honor of Kim's Birthday, here is a little set of pictures to see as Kim grows up.

1948

Late 1940s, maybe early 1950s

As a student

1975

1982

1983

1988

1989

1991

1992

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

Reshaping North Korean Nuclear Management

2007-02-14T14:38:00.000+09:00

The February 13 agreement at the six-party nuclear talks is receiving quite a bit of criticism from various quarters in the United States and abroad. Certainly, like any agreement, this one is full of unanswered questions, incomplete timelines and verification procedures, and a general lack of any enforcement measures. That said, there are some notable aspects of this agreement that far outshine the September 19, 2005 Joint Statement – not the least of which is the establishment of working groups to both separate the various individual issues from the broader talks, and allow for more focused discussions and arrangements before tactical and contentious issues are ever brought before the larger forum. If the process proceeds under the new, more routinized and institutionalized format, rather than the ad hoc crisis management format of the past talks, will allow for more progress on various elements of the overall process, while avoiding allowing individual hang-ups to stop the whole process. Thus, the Japanese issue with North Korean abductions, or the North Korean issue with U.S. banking sanctions, would be moved to the smaller working group discussions – similar to the way the U.S. and DPRK held a series of bilaterals prior to the latest round of six-party talks. The working group model also removes the sense of all-or-none from the talks, making breakdowns seen in the 2004 Agreed Framework less likely as there are multiple tracks ongoing simultaneously. Perhaps this is where much of the criticism comes from. The United States is now dealing with North Korea as an equal partner at talks, not as a crisis that needs immediate management or as an “Evil Axis” member that needs punished and constrained. This really leaves a sour taste in the mouths of the “hawks” and “conservatives” who didn’t want to see the United States “give in” to North Korean “nuclear blackmail.” At the same time, the “doves” and “liberals” who called on Washington to hold bilateral talks with North Korea are seeing progress on the multilateral front instead, but aren’t seeing any concrete outcomes or requirements. In the end, at first glance, it appears that North Korea is the big winner. Pyongyang instigated the crisis – just to force negotiations. It now has those negotiations. Effectively, North Korea trashed its room, and then demanded an allowance from the United States before cleaning up. And the United States gave in. Now, this giving in is interesting. Under Bush, the United States has pursued a policy toward North Korea that consisted of criticizing, vilifying, and basically ignoring North Korea and its actions. This strategic neglect was intentional. If one wasn’t going to engage North Korea in state-to-state discussions, and wasn’t going to attack, then ignoring North Korea was the only way to deal with them. Basically, North Korea was the kid holding his breath at the toy store demanding a toy, and the United States was the parent ignoring the kid, knowing that, when the kid passed out, it would begin breathing again. But, like at the toy store, The U.S. wasn’t alone, and lots of other countries were watching and criticizing. So long as it was a top-tier issue, Washington could deal with the angry looks and keep ignoring Pyongyang. But Iraq and Iran have taken up all the bandwidth, and Washington has devolved North Korean policy back down to State Department. And State, with some opportunity to again shape policy, has jumped on the opportunity. So now, they have moved beyond ignoring, and beyond dealing with the issue as a crisis, and instead set a framework for future talks on a more mutual basis. So back to the current accord. This time, they have moved past the game of chicken to setting a series of actions in motion that happen relatively simultaneously, rather than one after another. Again, this is designed to reduce the problems seen in the 1994 agreement. North Korea will shut down Yongbyon (something it has done in the past), seal it (something it has un-done in the past) and invite back the IAEA inspectors. Washington, in association with the other parties (aside from Japan), will supply “emergency” fuel and aid. Both these steps happen within 60 days. Half way through that period, the six parties get together again to see where they are at. Washington gets its concession for moving forward with talks (North Korea has to identify and list all its nuclear facilities and materials) and North Korea gets what it wants for moving forward (Washington talks about normalizing relations, removing sanctions and taking North Korea off the State Sponsor of Terrorism list). South Korea gets what it wants - the ability to build up North Korean infrastructure, as head of the economic and energy air working group, thus smoothing the way for future reunification. Russia, as head of the Northeast Asia Peace working group gets a role in the Asia-Pacific region, something it hasn’t had for quite a while. China retains overall control over the denuclearization process, keeping the tools of leverage for dealing with the United States. And Japan gets to keep hounding North Korea over abductions, something good for domestic consumption and for justifying Tokyo’s defense development and constitutional changes. Of course, the problem of North Korea’s nukes isn’t solved, but then dialogue with the USSR didn’t eliminate their nukes either, and the general reaction from all the parties suggested that the Oct. 2006 DPRK nuke tests, while unfortunate, didn’t really change anyone’s views on the real situation in Northeast Asia. So if you wanted a real agreement that is designed to remove North Korea’s nuclear capability quickly, not there. If you wanted an agreement that takes a crisis and turns it into a managed relationship, this is it. Everyone can cheat, and it can all break down, but given the more than a decade North Korea has used the nuclear issue as a bargaining chip, at least here is a new way to try to address the issue and take some control out of Pyongyang’s hands.

Nuke Redux: North Korea Regains the Initiative

2007-02-09T08:14:00.000+09:00

The resumption of the six party nuclear talks in Beijing has picked up where they left off back in 2005, with the Sept. 19 Joint Statement. While there have been two other meetings (in November 2005 and December 2006), neither moved beyond North Korean demands that the September 2005 USA PATRIOT Act action against Banco Delta Asia in Macao, which froze $24 million in various North Korean funds, but more importantly triggered a chain reaction in which numerous financial institutions stopped doing business with any North Korean-related account. But on Feb. 8, the parties picked up where they left off 17 months earlier, and began laying out steps for the dismantlement of North Korea’s nuclear program.

Now, without addressing the issue of whether this round will really end North Korea’s nuclear capabilities (it won’t) or whether North Korea really even intends to get rid of their nuclear program (they don’t), lets look at what significance there has been in the nearly two year delay in the nuclear negotiations.

Since the Sept. 19 Joint Statement, North Korea has seen some of its financial interactions impacted. There are anecdotal stories from China that North Korean mid-level officials, when they visit China, bring paintings and antiquities to sell for hard currency. But, countering these minor impositions, there has been little fundamental economic impact on North Korea.

China hasn’t invested too much additional into North Korea, but neither has Beijing cut off trade and economic assistance. South Korea hasn’t shut down the Kumkang tourist project or the Kaesong industrial zone (and in fact, Seoul can’t strike a FTA agreement with Washington because Washington won’t include Kaesong-made goods in the agreement, meaning the South Koreans have little intent of shutting down the operations). Japan has cut trade with North Korea to near zero (at least officially), but Pyongyang has other ways to get Japanese goods (primarily via China or Mongolia).

In general, then, North Korean economics have really not suffered all that much from the banking sanctions. There have been inconveniences and embarrassments, but in the end, it was only $24 million frozen, not a really large sum. And it looks like Washington is preparing to release about half of that back to the North Koreans (a $12 or $13 million repayment to restart nuke talks).

Perhaps more importantly, since the last substantial talks broke down, North Korea has tested its Taepodong-2 (with questionable success) and tested a nuclear device (also with questionable success). In both cases, Pyongyang has done was Washington demanded it not do – and gotten away with it. All the previous assumptions of U.S. action if North Korea acted up were thrown out the window. North Korea returns to the talks feeling more confident and capable.

What is perhaps most important to remember is that North Korea was not pressured or backed into the negotiations. It is Pyongyang that creates the periodic nuclear crises to force Washington, Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo and Moscow into talks. North Korea has chosen to restart the talks – and has demonstrated once again that it can shape the actions of major countries. Washington conceded and began to talk about lifting the banking sanctions. Washington offered earlier fuel shipments and other rewarding moves to North Korea. Washington has apparently decided to soften its demands and start making a phased deal with North Korea.

So overall, North Korea has delayed talks for nearly a year, got away with a missile and nuclear test, drawn everyone back to the table with sweeter offers, and simply picked up where it left off. Isolated crazy and falling apart, North Korea seems to have its act together when it comes to manipulating the world for its own end. And all just a little over a week before Kim Jong Il’s birthday...

Hu Shan Great Wall

2007-02-02T12:55:00.000+09:00

Off to the Hu Shan section of the Great Wall of China, "It is the starting of eastern the great wall." you know, "you will feel regret if you don't come to Hu Shan great wall." I definately didn't want to feel regret, so it was up and down the Hu Shan wall. This is one of the rebuilt great walls, and sits in Liaoning province almost along the North Korean border (there are great views of North Korean farmland leading to Uiju from the wall). Some parts are rather steep, but it is a relatively short section, so not too bad. Upon reaching the far end of the wall, however, we were surprised to find the museum (you end up on the roof of the museum from the wall) was locked. We could hear people downstairs, anda generator running, but it took 20 minutes of shouting and banging to get them to hear us and come up and let us in (we had bought tickets at the other end of the wall, so it had better have been open...). The museum is just two floors, and only a few artifacts, but they powered up the generator to provide power so they could turn on the lights for our visit.